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ABSTRACT 
Until the introduction of administration boards in 1972-1973, the 
responsibility for administeri ng the urban black townsh i ps in "white" 
South Africa was vested with the municipalities as agents of the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development. 
The establishment of administration boards to replace the 
municipalities' Non-European Affairs Departments reflected the 
determination of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development 
to secure tighter direct control over the implementation of policy, 
particularly that affecting influx control and labour regulation. 
The decision to end municipal control was made after the report of 
the Van Rensburg Inter-Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Control 
Measures, which reported in 1967. The report's concern that influx 
control was not working as intended, coupled with doubts about the 
political autonomy of Opposition controlled municipalities, which dated 
back to the 1950s, were the major reasons for the introduction of 
administration boards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to explain the introduction of 
Administration Boards in the early 1970s, after Parliament had passed the 
Bantu Affairs Administration Board Act in 1971. In terms of thi s Act, 
responsibility for administering the urban black townships outside the 
homelands passed from the white municipalities to the newly created 
administration boards. The ending of municipal responsibility for the 
implementation of legislation affecting the urban black communi ty was of 
fundamental importance, particularly to the implementation of influx 
control. 
As this study will show, the deci sion by the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development to' establish new statutory structures as 
agents for the Department in the implementation of. pol icy was almost 
entirely due to a commitment by the Department to tighten influx control, 
restrict the capacity of blacks to achieve residence rights in the 
townships outside the homelands and to increase the extent of migrant 
labour in urban industries. 
The Department strove to achieve these goals with increased vigour 
and emphasis during the 1960s. New legislation, amendments to 
legislation and regulations governing housing and labour during this 
period testify to this. These actions took place against the homelands 
policy and accordingly premised with the assumption that urban blacks 
were only temporary residents in the urban areas of "white" South Africa 
to sell their labour. 
Against this ideological backdrop, the role of the 'municipalities as 
agents of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the 
implementation of policy became crucial. Although the Department had 
considerable powers to check on how efficiently the local authorities 
were administering legislation, by implication these powers were not 
deemed sufficient by the Department to ensure the application of policy 
as strictly as it wished it, especially by those municipalities which 
were seen as controlled by the United Party. 
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Conflict between these Opposition controlled municipalities and the 
Department was a major feature of the 1950s and 1960s and was perhaps the 
most important factor in the decision to end municipal r esponsibility for 
the administration of legislation . 
Particular attention is paid throughout the thesis to an examination 
of the attitudes of municipal administrators to the vital issues of 
influx control, and the housing and financial policies towards urban 
blacks. Very little, if any, attention is devoted to the views of other 
important actors in the development of pol i cy; namely, urban 
industrialists, mining interests, white farmers and of the persons most 
intimately affected by the policy decisions - the black community 
themselves. This lack of attention to their views is not because their 
views are considered irrelevant to the development of policy but, rather, 
because it would have considerably expanded the scope of the study. 
Accordingly, I have not strayed far from the attitudes, perceptions and 
ideological assumptions of the municipal and head office administrators . 
Chapter One, detailing the development of policy before 1948, serves 
as an introduction to the major focus of this study. The importance of 
the attitudes of municipal administrators to the evol ution of pol icy is 
established during this period with their uniform commitment to tougher 
i nfl ux control pol i ci es. 
In Chapter Two, the consequences during the 1950s of the election 
vi ctory of the National Party in 1948 are examined. The justificati ons 
for much stronger policies towards influx control are examined and the 
most important aspects of the new legislation - Section 10 of the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 and the introduction of labour 
bureaux - are discussed. It is in response to aspects of these policy 
measures that the conflict and opposition between United Party controlled 
municipa l ities and the Department of Native Affairs has its roots. 
Chapter Three deal s wi th the hardening of pol icy between 1960 and 
1967 which took place against a more explicit ideological and planning 
formulation of the homelands policy. Important amendments during 1964 
affecting Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) qualifiers are a result of this 
policy emphasis . It is during this period that the ending of municipal 
xi 
control is seriously consi dered and the report of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee of Inquiry into Control Measures is examined to show the 
concern within the Department that influx control was not working as well 
as intended. 
Chapter Four, covers the period between 1968 and 1971 when the Bantu 
Affairs Administration Board Act was passed. The first attempt by the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development to end municipal 
control over labour regulation - which failed - and the arguments 
presented by municipal administrators for opposing the introduction of 
new statutory authorities are discussed. The provisions of the Bantu 
Affairs Administration Board Act are then noted. 
Chapter Five discusses the developments to influx control during the 
1970s leading up to the report of the Riekert Commission and the 
subsequent White Paper in 1980. The various factors explaining the 
origins of aspects of the Commission's recommendations towards influx 
control are illustrated. 
Chapter Six concludes the study. A conceptual framework explaining 
the political importance of bureaucracies in political systems is 
consi dered with reference to the statements of the municipal and head 
office administrators considered in this study. Finally, the major 
themes of the study are restated. 
A note on terminology: The changing official terminology referring 
to legislation and government departments directly concerning black 
persons poses considerable problems when a consistent usage of 
terminology is desired. The term "black" is used throughout this study 
to refer to those formerly called "Bantu" and "Native". What is now the 
Department of Co-operation and Development is referred to by its earlier 
titles in discussion of the periods during which they were so named. Thus 
it is referred to as the Department of Native Affa irs until 1958, when it 
became the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. In 1978 it 
became the Department of Plural Relations and Development and in 1979 it 
changed its name for the fourth time, to become the Department of Co-
operation and Development. The same style is adopted in references to 
legislation. 
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I. SELECTED ISSUES AND THEMES OF URBAN BLACK ADMINISTRATION 1923-1948 
As later chapters will illustrate, the introduction of 
administration boards in the early 1970s was a response by the Department 
of Bantu Administration and Development to the political opposition and 
administrative discretion which certain United Party controlled 
municipalities adopted to legislation introduced by the National Party 
after their election victory in the 1948 general election. This 
opposition to aspects of the unfolding legislative programme was 
particularly acute during the 1950s. This chapter briefly outlines the 
development of urban areas pol icy before the election victory of the 
National Party in order that developments after 1948 can be placed in 
context. 
A. Urban African Administration Before the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 
1923 
Wi th the di scovery, and subsequent development, of the di amo nd and 
gol d reefs on the Witwatersrand and Kimberley in the last quarter of the 
19th Century, the foundation of South Africa I scapi tal i st economy was 
laid. It was with the exploitation of these minerals that the 
urbanisation process amongst blacks received its first major impetus "as 
they either vol untarily left their rural reserves or were induced by a 
variety of taxes to become migratory labourers in these industrial and 
mining centres. 
This drift to the towns soon saw the development of a core of blacks 
living and working in these areas which, in turn, led to attempts by 
administrators in the Boer Republics and the Natal and .Cape colonies to 
regulate and control the accommodation and employment of persons in the 
urban areas and entrants to the towns. Davenport has pointed out that 
this response saw the evolution of basically similar policies in all the 
pre-Union colonies with segregated residential areas and controls on the 
mobility of blacks. (Davenport, 1971: 6) 
Powers were devolved to the local authorities to administer and 
control these segregated residential areas - the location. These powers 
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included health, the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of 
overcrowding in the locations. 
Munici palities generally did very little to meet the needs of their 
black location residents as a series of Government commissions during the 
first two decades of this century reported. The South African Native 
Commission of 1903-1905 was the first to report on the unsatisfactory 
condi tio ns in the 1 oca tio ns. 
"The Commission has visited and inspected several municipal 
locations, and records its opinion that in some respects their 
condition leaves much to be desired. The Natives who reside in 
or frequent these locations are in the main working people . As 
such there is every reason why they shoul d be encouraged to 
stay as useful members of the community. The tendency of 
inadequate accommodation is to make them dissatisfied and 
restless; the standard of comfort is low, and they are liable 
to be overcrowded and overcharged." (South African Native 
Affa i rs Commission, 1903-1905: para . 248) 
This was echoed by the commission appointed to inquire into assaults 
on women and by the report of the Tuberculosis Commission which reported 
in the following terms. 
" . .. the majority of such locations are a menace to the health 
of their inhabitants, and indirectly to the health of those in 
the town. We have, indeed, no hesitation in saying that we 
know of no municipal location which is entirely satisfactory. 
We do not go so far as to say that there is none which is 
entirely satisfactory, but if there be we are unaware of its 
existence . Some, of course, are much less objectionable than 
others, but all those which we have seen are bad in some 
feature or other." (Gregory, 1914: para. 235) 
These unsatisfactory conditions, caused in the first instance by 
municipal neglect, were aggravated by the drift to the towns wh i ch was 
gaining momentum. By 1911, almost 500 000 blacks were living in urban 
areas - a 40 per cent increase over the figure recorded in the 1904 
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census. The following table charts the progress of this urbanisation 
process for the census years of 1904, 1911 and 1921. 
Table 1 
Urban Black Population in South Africa 1904 - 1921 
Census year 
Urban black population 
Total urbanised (all races) 
Urban blacks as % of 
total urban population 
% increase of blacks urbanised 
(over census period) 
Urban blacks as % of S.A. 
black population 
1904 
352 275 
1 210 487 
229.1 
10 
1911 
494 275 
1 489 881 
33 
40 
12,2 
1921 
649 314 
1 931 863 
33,6 
32 
13,8 
Source: Derived from: Republic of South . Africa, Urban and Rural 
Population 1904-1960 
In the Transvaal, the emerging core of the South African economy, 
the urbanisation process amon9st blacks was even more marked during the 
same period. 
Table 2 
Urban Black Population in Transvaal 1904 - 1921 
Census year 
Urban blacks 
Total urbanised (all races) 
Urban blacks as % of 
total urban population 
% increase of blacks 
urbani sed in Trans vaal 
Urban blacks as % of 
Transvaal black population 
1904 
152 760 
345 033 
44,3 
16,2 
1911 
311 449 
595 500 
52 
103,9 
25,5 
1921 
364 092 
747 304 
48,7 
16,7 
24,3 
Source: Derived from: Republic of South Africa, Urban and Rural 
Population 1904-1960 
The Tuberculosis Commission of 1914, besides drawing attention to 
the poor health conditions of urban blacks, drew attention to the 
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profiteering, through overcharging for services, which certain 
municipalities made out of their adjacent locations. The Commission 
advocated a separate revenue account for location administration "and 
that any surplus of revenue over expenditure should be strictly devoted 
to the betterment of the location and the improvement of the conditions 
of its native and coloured inhabitants". (Gregory, 1914: para. 252) 
Meanwhile, the Natives Land Act of 1913 had been passed, setting the 
basic segregationist pattern and division of land between blacks and 
whites in the rural areas. Complementary legislation for the urban areas 
was first considered by the Department of Native Affairs in 1912 but 
shelved while the issue of rural segregation enjoyed priority. Six years 
later, in 1918, the Department of Native Affairs again put forward 
proposal sin a draft bill. 
These proposals formed the basis of a revised Bill announced by the 
Department of Native Affairs in 1922 which had "a pronounced welfare 
focus". (Davenport, 1971: 13) It also allowed for blacks to have "fixity 
of tenure" in the locations. In the same year, however", the Transvaal 
Local Government Commission, chaired by Colonel Stallard, declared its 
opposition to any form of permanent tenure for blacks in urban areas who 
were only to enter such areas to sell their labour. 
This statement of principle - although questioned at various times -
was to form the basis of urban areas legislation and policy for the next 
half century and influence related issues of the provision of housing, 
facilities, financial arrangements towards the urban black community and 
conditions of tenure in the locations. 
The Native Affairs Commission, which examined these differing views 
on the presence of blacks in urban areas between 1921 and 1923, advocated 
the granting of property rights to blacks in urban locations but still 
gave some support to Stallard's doctrine. (Davenport, 1971: 13-14) On 
this basis, the debate on the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill opened in 
Parliament in February 1923. 
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B. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 
The aims of the Act were twofol d. Firstly, it aimed at improving 
conditions of residence in the municipal locations, particularly of 
housing. Secondly, it aimed at providing a means of control over blacks 
already resident in urban areas and over those who wished to leave the 
reserves and find work in urban areas. These two aims must be examined 
in greater detail . 
The Act aimed at improving living conditions in the locations in 
various ways. It became the responsibility of the municipalities to 
administer the locations, which were to be segregated from the white 
residential areas. The local authorities were to provide housing and 
general amenities and the Minister could compel municipalities to provide 
these services if the Department of Native Affairs felt local authorities 
were not meeting their responsiblities. The ability of municipalities to 
provide housing without having to shoulder large deficits through the 
inability of location residents to pay economic rents, as a result of low 
wage levels, was to become a major source of discontent for 
municipalities in the 1920s and beyond. 
Municipalities were required to create Native Revenue Accounts which 
were to be credited with all the revenue derived from location 
administration. No surplus on this account could be transferred to the 
general rates - so meeting the recommendation of the Tuberculosis 
Commission which had pointed to instances of municipal profiteering of 
location residents. However, defici ts on the Native Revenue Accounts 
coul d be met from the general rates. The sources of finances accruable 
to the revenue account included fines, rents, beer profits (where a 
municipal monopoly had been adopted) and registration fees (except in the 
Transvaal where these were a source of provincial finances) . 
While the evidence supports the view that the creation of the Native 
Revenue Accounts was intended to prevent municipal profiteering, their 
creation did not end it. Many municipalities refused to bear the losses 
involved in location administration and improvements, caused in large 
part by the inelastic sources of revenue, and instead accumulated 
deficits against the account. Subtler means of exploiting and 
overcharging location residents for municipal services were available -
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such as including a profit margin in the costing of essential services. 
Nevertheless it does seem that the Native Revenue Accounts were intended 
by the Department of Native Affairs to prevent such profiteering, 
although this did not happen in all cases. 
While the Act did not legislate for the financial self-sufficiency 
of the locations, as happened to urban blacks with the introduction of 
administration boards fifty years later, it indirectly did so. This was 
done firstly, by restricting the sources of revenue to those which the 
municipalities could generate from the urban blacks themselves (rents, 
beer profi ts and fi nes) and through registration fees paid by employers 
of black labour and secondly by the reluctance of many municipalities to 
s ubsi di se the ir I oca tio ns from the general rate fund. 
The Act also created advisory boards which were to be consulted "on 
all matters relating to the management of the location". (Cape Times, 8 
February 1923: 54) Smuts rejected the argument that the boards should be 
given administrative powers, in addition to their consultative rights, 
because "it was much too early to make the natives views compulsory (and) 
it would be going too far to vest them with actual administrative 
functions." (Cape Times, 8 May 1923: 285) No regulations could however 
be made, or withdrawn, without prior municipal consultation with the 
advi sory boards. 
The second aim of the Act - to provide a means of control over 
blacks living in urban areas or those from rural areas wishing to enter 
urban areas to seek work - was provided for in various ways. 
Firstly, the development of segregated residential areas: Section 5 
allowed the Governor General to declare that, from a specified date, all 
blacks within the urban area, or a portion of it, would have to live in 
the location, hostels or native villages. Certain limited categories, 
including domestic servants, were exempted from this provision. 
Secondly, a range of influx control provisions were contained in 
Section 12 (1) which municipalities could invoke if they so wished. Thus 
adoption of these influx control provisions was permissive and not 
mandatory. Section 12 (1) (b) made it possible for municipalities to 
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insist that every black male entering a proclaimed area had to register 
on arrival in the urban area and proof of registration could be demanded. 
Section 12 (1) (h) gave municipalities powers to expel blacks from 
proclaimed areas if they were unable to find employment within a 
specified period after entry or if they were unable to find employment 
after di scharge from a previous employment. The registration of service 
contracts provided municipalities, except in the Transvaal where this was 
a central government responsibility, with a further means of control as 
both employer and employee coul d be asked for proof of registration. 
Finally, blacks under 18 could be refused permission to enter proclaimed 
urban areas unless accompanied by an adult. 
Fewer blacks were exempted from the provisions of Section 12 (1) 
than were exempted by Section 5 (1) from having to live in segregated 
locations. The rationale for this is obvious: Section 12 aimed at 
controlling entry to urban areas, which was of more immedi ate concern 
than enforci ng stri ctly segregated townships, gi ven the costs attached to 
providing housing to ensure this. It was of more importance first to 
stop the influx, or stabilise it, and then to tackle the enforcement of 
segregated locations. 
The Department of Native Affairs had intended that the provisions of 
wha t eventually became Sections 12, 13, 14, 15 and 28 of the Act, to be 
the core of a separate bill, the Pass Laws Amendment Bill. These plans 
were however dropped duri ng the parl i amentary ses si on and the provi si ons 
were incorporated in the Urban Areas Act. 
In view of the subsequent difficulties municipal administrators were 
to face in preventing influx into the larger towns after the Act came 
into operation, this raises the question of whether the Act was intended 
to provide an efficient influx control machinery which municipalities 
could use to reserve housing solely to those blacks employed within 
municipal boundaries. 
Judging from Smuts' statements during debates on the Bill, he was 
committed to a milder form of Stallardism in that he wished to prevent 
blacks from living in locations unless they were employed in the adjacent 
white area. (Cape Times, 8 February 1923: 54) Furthermore, he appeared 
confident that the provision that blacks should return to their places of 
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origin if unable to find work would be sufficient to stem any influx. 
"The native who comes to a proclaimed area has to possess a 
pass or a certificate which gives him a certain time within 
which to look for work, and if within that period conceded to 
him he does not find work, he goes. I think that the point 
that natives should not come simply to swell the numbers at the 
location has been completely met." (Cape Times, 8 February 
1923: 54) 
Smuts' rejection of a plea to exempt wider categories of blacks from 
the labour and influx control provisions of Section 12 (1) does, taken 
with the above, indicate a commitment to a reasonably efficient system of 
influx control. 
"You don't want thousands of people walking about without 
identification documents, and you want practically every man to 
be i dentifi able so that you may know where you are •.. You woul d 
be making a leap in the dark and exempting tens of thousands of 
people who would make the administration in regard to the rest 
of the native population impossible." ( Cape Times, 8 May 1923: 
286 ) 
Furthermore, these influx control provisions were included in the 
Act after pressure from municipalities who feared that their 
responsibilities to provide housing would have been too great without 
ways of controlling any influx of workseekers from rural areas; this was 
to indicate the close connection between housing finances and municipal 
interests in pressing for influx control amendments during later years. 
Smuts told Parliament: 
"Allover South Africa they (the municipalities) find it an 
enormous burden (the provision of housing) ••• This drastic 
provision, entirely novel in the legislation of South Africa, 
is now throwing on the municipalities of South Africa the 
burden of seeing that there is proper accommodation for the 
reception and housing of their natives. The municipalities say 
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that unless there is a certain amount of control it is 
impossible for them to discharge the obli gation. We can only 
get the municipalities to accept the burden of this Bill if we 
provide a certain measure of control, and Section 12 and the 
following few Sections give that control, and provide that 
where natives flock to urban centres who are not requi red by 
the economic requirements of those centres, it will not be 
neces sary to provi de hous i ng for them but they can be sent back 
to the location from which they had came." (Cape Times, 8 May 
1923: 286) 
These three indicators - Smuts' attitude to wider exemptions from 
the provi sions of Section 12 (1); his apparent bel i ef that these 
provisions would be sufficient to stop "redundants" from living in the 
locations; and a deal between the municipalities and the Department of 
Native Affairs on the issue of influx control and its consequences for 
municipal housing responsibilities - would seem to indicate that the 
Government saw the Act as providing reasonably efficient procedures which 
municipalities could use to regulate the drift to the towns. 
Why then was Section 12 (1) made permissive and not mandatory? A 
tentative answer could be that the Department of Native Affairs did not 
wish to saddle the smaller municipalities, who would not suffer from an 
influx of workseekers to the same extent as the large municipalities, 
with a relatively expensive influx control machinery. Presumably the 
Department expected the larger municipalities to invoke these provisions, 
as they subsequently did, with the notable exception of Port Elizabeth. 
i) Municipal Response to the 1923 Act and the 1930 Amendment 
Municipal reaction to the Act revolved largely around the issue of 
finances for the provision of housing. This issue was to become a major 
source of grievance to the municipalities and was particularly important 
because the extent to which blacks could be housed in segregated 
locations depended on the provision of housing in areas proclaimed for 
thi s purpose. But it went further to include the question of rents in 
the segregated locations, and also affected the ability of municipalities 
which had adopted the influx control provisions of Section 12 of the Act 
to enforce them. 
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The first annual report of the Department of Native Affairs 
presented to Parl i ament after the introduction of the Act reveal ed both 
the difficulties and the progress of municipalities in enforcing the Act. 
By 1927, locations had been established in 64 urban areas in terms of 
Section 1 (1), but the complementary clause allowing municipalities to 
force blacks into segregated locations had only been applied in 26 areas. 
The relatively few urban areas which had invoked the compulsory 
segregationist clause (Section 5) was the direct result of the inabi 1 i ty 
of municipali ties to almost single-handedly shoulder the responsibility 
of providing housing for urban blacks. Although municipalities could 
obtain authority to require employers of more than 25 blacks to provide 
or hire accommodation for their employees - by 1927 this had only been 
enforced in Johannesburg and Pretoria - municipalities were obliged to 
meet the rest of the demand for housing on terms which were decidedly 
di sadvantageous to them. Municipalities could not obtain housing loans 
at sub-economic rates of interest from the State until 1932 which meant, 
given low wages, that the municipalities we"re unable to recoup their 
financial commitments for housing by charging economic rentals. The 
unwillingness on the part of municipalities to secure loans to improve 
and provide housing in the locations under these conditions appears to be 
shown in figures provided by Rogers. Between 1924 and 1932, 
municipalities borrgwed approximately £500 000 at economic rates of 
interest. (Rogers, 1933: 194) In 1932 when sub-economic loans became 
available to municipalities, they took the opportunit,y to borrow £1,6 
million during the next seven years. (Rogers, 1949: 179) 
The inability of municipalities to raise SUb-economic loans until 
1932 was not the only factor serving to push up the cost of providing 
housing with consequent higher rentals. The widespread use of white 
labour, at union rates, helped to increase the cost of building a house 
to more than double that of the variation on a si te and service scheme 
which the Bloemfontein municipality employed. 
The result was that in Johannesburg, rentals, including service 
charges accounted for between 23 per cent and 32 per cent of a black's 
income. In Natal, where municipalities were allowed to adopt a beer 
monopoly, rents were lower. ( Randall, 1939) This, in Johannesburg at 
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least, was accompanied by widespread defaulting in the payment of 
rentals. Ray Phillips quotes figures showing that in December 1934, 
while the collection of rentals amounted to £- 5776, total arrears 
amounted to £14 535. (Phillips, n.d., 81) 
The first amendments to the principal Act, passed by Parliament in 
1930 , reflected these issues, being designed to increase the ability of 
municipali ties to enforce stricter control over location residents . 
The amendments did this, firstly, in response to a deci sion by the 
courts in 1927 which prevented the Johannesburg municipality - and thus 
others - from enforcing the segregation of blacks in proclaimed locations 
until the council could provide alternative accommodation in the 
proclaimed location. A further amendment allowed municipalities to 
license landlords outside the locat i ons and to restrict the number of 
blacks living on their premises - a move aimed at controlling the numbers 
of blacks living outside the segregated locations . These two new clauses, 
when added to Section 5's provisions, gave added powers to municipalities 
to enforce the goal of segregated residential areas. 
But more importantly, the amendment was a response to the 
difficulties experienced by the larger municipalities in controlling the 
continued influx of blacks into the towns . As already shown, the 
financial implications involved in the provision of housing were 
decidedly disadvantageous to municipalities. A continuing stream of 
blacks into the towns served to increase these disadvantages and, as far 
as the municipal administrators were concerned, had to be stopped. 
Thus municipal representatives from Johannesburg, Cape Town and 
Bloemfontein complained bitterly to the Select Committee on Native 
Affairs in 1929 about the conti nuing influx and what housing costs were 
involved . They suggested various measures to halt the influx - that 
wives and children should not be allowed to enter urban areas, that 
municipalities be given powers to fix population quotas for the locations 
and to refuse si te permi ts . 
The Bloemfontein representatives stressed that the influx - which 
they estimated at 1 000 a year - was adversely affecting labour supplies 
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for farmers who "complain bitterly" about the "distinct tendency on the 
part of the rural native to leave the farms and to dri ft to the towns". 
(Select Committee on Native Affairs, 1929: 14) The municipal 
administrators were suggesting that tighter influx control provisions 
would serve both municipal interests, by preventing an increase in the 
demand for housing, and farming interests, by ensuring an adequate labour 
supply for the farmers, through restrictions on the freedom of movement 
of rural blacks. 
The influx control provisions in the 1923 Act had not been 
s uffi ci ent to stem urbani sation. The Johannesburg representatives tol d 
the Select Committee that "there is no law at the present time to control 
the influx ..• " (Select Committee on Native Affairs, 1929: 1), while the 
Bloemfontein witnesses said it was "almost impossible in the absence of 
any further machinery to cope with this particular difficulty •.. ". 
(Select Committee on Native Affairs, 1929: 14) The Cape Town municipality 
declared that "the natives seem to be on the march to Cape Town" and even 
doubted whether the process could be stopped with additional powers of 
control over entry to urban areas. (Select Committee on Native Affairs, 
1929: 41) 
Two related issues were involved in this controversy - who was to 
finance housing and was a migrant labour system, with its cheaper housing 
costs and greater opportunities for control, not preferable to the 
provision of family housing. On this latter issue, the Johannesburg 
municipality grasped the advantages of a migrant labour system and the 
difficulties of providing family housing. 
"There is too heavy a burden on the local authority and it can 
be obviated by certain amendments to the Act. The first thing 
that is necessary to do is to control or restrict the influx 
of families to the towns. The kraal native who comes to the 
town to work and is required there is no diffi culty to us at 
all, but when the native brings his family, as he is doing 
today, you have got an entirely different state of affairs." 
(Select Committee on Native Affairs, 1929: 2-3) 
This "entirely different state of affairs" was soon explained to the 
Select Committee. 
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"We have a very great difficulty in regard to the payment of 
rents. In one location there are usually 3 000 to 3 200 per 
month behind in revenue. That means that these natives either 
cannot payor neglect to pay their rent. We have no trouble 
at all in regard to the single men with their rent, the 
defaulters are the married men." (Select Committee on Native 
A ffa irs, 1929: 5) 
The inability of urban blacks to pay the rentals set by the 
municipali ties was not only a consequence of the unfavourable financing 
conditions and the use of white artisan labour but also involved the wage 
levels of urban blacks. Municipal administrators, and others, argued 
that they were being unfairly asked to subsidise what was an employer's 
responsibility to pay a living wage. This perception was expressed by a 
member of the Select Committee, L. Moffat, who said: 
"The rental we charge is not an economic rental. The rental 
is less than the actual return necessary on the bui 1 di ng, but 
very heavy for the native to pay on his average wage. It is 
practically as you say that the municipality has to stand the 
cost of the housing and that helps the employer to have the 
native labour at a cheaper rate." (Select Committee on Native 
Affairs, 1929: 5) 
The 1930 amendments sought to achieve this tighter control requested 
by the municipalities in various ways. As already noted, Section 5 was 
amended to nullify the effects of the 1927 judgement which prevented the 
Johannesburg municipality from pressing ahead with enforcing the 
residence of blacks in proclaimed segregated locations. A new sub-
section was added to Section 5 which empowered the Governor-General, 
after a request from a municipality, to prevent any black from entering 
an urban area "for the purpose of seeking or undertaking employment or of 
residing therein" unless the conditions prescribed in the proclamation 
were met. By 1933 only three local authorities - Kroonstad, Steynsrust 
and Bloemfontein - had been proclaimed under this sub-section. This 
provision gave muniCipalities, who wished to do so, powers to shut off 
all further infl ux in addi tion to the provisions which they might have 
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invoked in terms of Section 12. 
An amendment to Section 1 allowed muncipalities to require 
unemployed blacks to leave the urban area, unless they were exempted 
through owning rateable property, were registered black voters in the 
Cape or were the dependants of these exempted categories . This 
provision, with its potentially far-reaching consequences, was never 
enforced during the 1930s because no regulations \~ere ever promulgated 
which would have allowed municipalities to enforce it. (Allison , 1940: 
58) 
From the evidence it is clear that , to the municipalities at least , 
the problems arising from the continuing urbanisation and drift to the 
towns was a source of major concern. 
deal wi th new entrants to the towns 
Their clamour for extra powers to 
must be measured aga i nst the Hertzog 
government's response. During debate on the Bill, Hertzog appeared to 
accept the inevitability of black urbanisation but others, especially 
Stallard and Nicholls, warned of the heavy financial burden being carried 
by the municipalities. Stallard accordingly proposed an amendment 
increasing the qualifying period of residence and employment of black 
males from two to five years as a means of alleviating the consequent 
family housing responsibilities but the amendment was rejected by E.G. 
Jansen, the Minister of Native Affairs. 
"I think that two years would be quite sufficient to meet the 
posi tion here . After all there are few natives who remain 
continuously resident in any urban area for any length of 
time. After they have lived there for two years continuously, 
i t means that they have established themselves, and they 
should be given the opportunity to bring their wives in. " 
(Hansard, 1930: 3845) 
But later in the debate Jansen did accept a proposal making the 
right of entry of black women subject to the ava i 1 abi 1 i ty of 
accommodation in the segregated locations. 
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C. Municipal Reaction During the 1930s and the 1937 Amendment 
i . The Problem of Finance 
The 1930 amendments did not resolve the issues described above. 
Indeed these issues grew more acute duri ng the 1930s as the 
muni\=ipalities struggled to cope with the consequences of an ever 
increasing influx of blacks, particularly women. 
As already stressed, these conflicts must be understood against the 
background of the financial policies of municipalities towards their 
location residents. These issues - housing, rents and continued inflow 
of blacks to urban areas - were mirrored in the treatment by 
municipalities of their Native Revenue Accounts. By the end of the 1930s 
towns outside Natal were able to adopt a municipal monopoly and did so, 
often it seems, because of the financial relief such a system brought to 
them. Simultaneously, other amendments to the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 
introduced in 1937 brought tougher influx control powers, designed to 
allow municipalities to cope with these inter-related problems . 
Before examining the financial issues involved it is useful to quote 
F. Walton Jameson, a member of the Central Housing Board, to illustrate 
the relationship between the provision of housing and the financial 
involvement of municipalities. 
"Let us examine an actual case of a Native location about to be 
developed by a public authority. Some 5 000 Natives require 
rehousing at least two and a half miles out of town. In order 
to come within reach of the wage earner at £2.10.0 per month, 
600 dwell i ngs of the one 1 i ving room, one bedroom type are to 
be buil t, and on1 y a dozen or so dwell i ngs of the two bedrooms, 
one 1 i ving room type are to be provi ded. Th is means tha t the 
public authority, quite rightly, prefers to provide two well-
built rooms for Natives at present living in slum shacks and to 
provide them at a rental within the economic reach of the 
Native. Sociologically, however, the two bedroomed dwelling 
fails. At best it means all the males over 12 must sleep in 
one bedr oom. There is no door between the 1 i vi ng room and the 
bedroom. To build a door adds to the cost, and the important 
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consideration is to keep the rent down. Most of the families 
require two bedrooms and a li ving room , but they cannot have 
them. Who is goi ng to pay for the extra accommodation? The 
public authority cannot do so without considerable costs to the 
general rate. It is useless to charge a higher rent. Is the 
housing problem solved under these conditions? It must be 
admitted it is not. 
"Under the Union Government's sub-economic housing schemes, the 
public authorities are required to lose 2,5 per cent rental and 
the Government loses a similar amount, while the loans carry 
0,75 per cent interest. A number of public authorities feel 
that even a loss of 2,5 per cent is too heavy, and -few will 
face heavier losses." (Jameson, 1937: 29-30) 
Jameson's statement was made in 1937 - the year in which 
municipalities could no longer attempt to enforce prohibition of beer 
consumption and when tighter influx control regulations came into force. 
It is hoped to show the links between these developments through 
examining the financial policies towards selected Native Revenue 
Accounts. Information on the standing of these accounts i.s not easily 
accessible but a series of articles by R.J. Randall contain valuable 
information. (Randall, 1939; Randall, 1940) 
Randall's articles in the South African Journal of Economics are 
important because he contrasts the financial standing of the Native 
Revenue Accounts of Johannesburg - which had not yet then invoked a 
muniCipal beer monopoly despite urging by its Native Affairs Department 
manager - with those of Durban and Pietermaritzburg, which had a monopoly 
on beer sales. Two different methods of financing location expenditure 
were at issue. In Johannesburg, income from rents accounted almost 
exclusively for income flowing to the revenue account and was 
insufficient to cover expenditure, while in Durban and Pietermaritzburg 
beer profits balanced the accounts and even generated a surplus. 
Without being able to fall back on beer profi ts, the Johannesburg 
municipality SUbsidised the Native Revenue Account to the extent of 
£ 11 645 in 1925, increasing to £23 158 in 1938, the last year for which 
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it subsidised the account before introducing a beer monopoly. During 
these 14 years the total subsi dy amounted to 5:240 948. Duri ng the same 
period the income from rents never constituted less than 80 per cent of 
total income. By 193B rent income had risen to £147 234 out of a total 
income of £172 225 . 
Thus, in the absence of beer profits, the account was dependent 
almost exclusively on income from rents which, in turn, meant that any 
current account expenditure which the Johannesburg municipality wished to 
incur on local administration was, except for the deficit met each year 
from general rates, derived mostly from rent income. But this example of 
subsidisation, limited when compared to the total expenditure of the 
municipa1i ty, was contrary to the general pattern where municipalities, 
unable to fall back on beer profits because they had either tried to 
enforce prohibition or allowed domestic brewing, aimed at balancing their 
Native Revenue Accounts by restricting expenditure to income. 
The annual report of the Department of Native Affairs for the year 
1935-36 confirms this. It reported that "the majority of local 
authorities have shown a liberal attitude ... meeting the deficits by 
advances from their general funds free of interest and sometimes even by 
means of out and out grants." (Department of Native Affairs, 1937: ~4) 
Yet, it must be pointed out that advances from the general rates still 
had to be paid back by the Native Revenue Account, and hence location 
residents. In these circumstances, the waiving of interest was not a 
particularly generous act. 
On the other hand, the advantages of a beer monopoly are well 
illustrated by Randall's statistics on Durban's treatment of the Native 
Revenue Account. Extremely profitable beer sales, with profits of 
between 300 and 400 per cent in most years, allowed the Durban 
munici pa1ity to restrict subsidisation to only £272 over 13 years. 
(Randall, 1939: 164) In addition, a large capital reserve fund was built 
up out of the almost annual surpluses. In Pietermaritzburg, a similar 
situation was to be found. The contrasts between Johannesburg and Durban 
are stark indeed. 
Municipal administrators in Durban admitted that the provision and 
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financing of further facilities in Durban's locations depended on the 
continued patronage of municipal beer halls. D.G. Shepstone, then a city 
councillor and later an Administrator of Natal, argued in response to 
Randall's charges that "beer profit is, in effect an investment made by 
the beer drinkers in the provision of amenities for the urban native 
population. It yields dividends by way of medical attention, grants-in-
aid, and other social services." (Shepstone, 1940: 268) 
Beer sales were just a very lucrative way of getting location 
residents, out of whom the Durban municipality was unable to extract a 
profit on family housing schemes (Shepstone, 1940: 270), to themselves 
provide the funds for further facilities in the location. It served then 
to absolve white ratepayers from having to subsidise the location. 
The turning point for municipalities outside Natal who wished to try 
to balance their Native Revenue Accounts came with the 1937 Native Laws 
Amendment Act. The Act amended the principal Act which had previously 
laid down a general principle of prohibition where either a muntcipal 
monopoly or domestic brewing had been introduced with Ministerial 
consent; the amendment no longer allowed municipalities the option of 
prohibition, so forcing municipalities to consider afresh the means of 
supplying beer to the location residents. While the scrapping of the 
attempt at total prohibition ~Ias primarily prompted by its failure, it 
certainly presented to many municipalities the obvious means of reducing 
their subsidy to location residents and of balancing their Native Revenue 
Accounts by implementing a municipal beer monopoly. This monopoly was 
often to be invoked in opposition to Advisory Board feelings. (Saffery, 
1940: 92) 
For example, the Johannesburg City Council used the introduction of 
a municipal beer monopoly in 1938 to end its long period of subsidisation 
- a policy change caused directly by the establishment of profitable beer 
halls. (Lewis, 1941: 48) Beer profits rose rapidly from slightly more 
than £7 000 in 1938 to £063 752 in 1940. (Hawarden, 1941: 48) 
The policy change led Eleanor Hawarden to comment that "the European 
citizens of Johannesburg have used the profits on kaffir beer to relieve 
them of a responsibility which they would otherwise have had to shoulder, 
and they are building the beer profits into the financial structure of 
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the City". (Hawarden, 1941: 49) The decision to end the subsidisation 
was however to be reversed and once again resumed in 1942. 
There seems to be no reason why the same shoul d not have 
other towns which adopted a municipal monopoly after 1937. 
joined their Natal compatriots in appropriating to themselves 
happened in 
They, too, 
the profi ts 
on beer sales, which before 1937 had gove to the illicit brewers in 
prohibitionist municipalities. Location residents were accordingly being 
asked to almost exclusivley fi nance improvements and services to their 
locations, except for funding from the Central Housing Board for housing 
purposes. 
Further evidence of the financial stringencies and reluctance of 
municipalities to bear the deficits of the Native Revenue Accounts was 
shown at a conference held in September 1937 to explain the provisions of 
the Native Laws Amendment Act to the municipalities. The Transvaal 
Provincial Auditor echoed the annual report of the Department of Native 
Affairs, quoted earlier, when he said that "there are many cases in which 
there are no losses to be borne by the General Account and there is very 
substantial profit". (Department of Native Affairs, 1937 : 17) But to 
those municipalities who were carrying deficits on their Native Revenue 
Accounts, this was a burden they wished to be without. The Simonstown 
delegate to the conference moved a motion, later adopted, requesting the 
Department of Native Affairs to help meet the deficits incurred "in 
carrying out obli gations forced upon them by the Government." (Department 
of Native Affairs, 1937: 18) Cape Town's delegate reported an accumulated 
deficit of £106000 with annual deficits of about .:'£7 000. The Kimberley 
City Council, in turn, supported the motion. "Moreover, it feel s that 
the Government, while making the fullest use of its powers over the 
service, is shirking its financial responsibility and throwing the whole 
burden of this on the Municipalities." (Department of Native Affairs, 
1937: 18) 
The Government declined to meet this request - a factor which no 
doubt prompted more municipali ties to adopt a beer monopoly in preference 
to domestic brewing. The later decisions to opt for municipal monopolies 
instead of allowing domestic brewing appears to have been contrary to the 
expectation of the Department of Native Affairs. In its annual report 
for 1937 it reported that domestic brewing had been adopted in 111 towns, 
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while in "recent years the popularity of the monopoly system has 
diminished, especially in the smaller centres, where, in several 
instances, the venture has not proved to be a profitable one". 
(Department of Native Affairs, 1937: 35) 
Clearly the financial advantages of a municipal monopoly in the 
larger towns were overwhelming, especially in the face of low wages and 
unprofitable tenants; a seemingly inexhaustable demand for housing, and 
particularly re-housing in segregated locations and a continued inflow of 
blacks from already impoverished rural reserves. 
ii. The Problem of Influx and Housing 
The 1936 census results illustrated the extent of the increase of 
the urban black population which had taken place since the previous 
census in 1921. The results for the country as a whole were as follows. 
Table 3 
Urban Black Population: 1936 
Urban blacks 1 219 892 
Total urbanised (all races): 3 155 896 
Urban blacks as a % of 
total urbani sed: 
% increase of urban blacks 
since 1921: 
Urban blacks as a % of S.A. 
black population: 
38,6 
92 
18,4 
Source: Derived from: Republic of South Africa; Urban and 
Rural Population 1904-1960 
This influx had not occurred evemy throughout the urban areas but 
was most pronounced in the major industrial centres, particularly the 
Witwatersrand. Two issues, in particular, were of major concern to 
municipal administrators during this period. The accelerating influx of 
black women and families was of concern to municipalities throughout the 
country while municipalities in the Transvaal were pressing the 
Department of Native Affairs to transfer responsibility for the 
registration of service contracts to them, as was the case in the other 
provinces, so they could gain greater control over the entry, employment 
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and residence of urban blacks and particularly new entrants. The influx 
of women and families to join their husbands in the urban areas was 
important because, if not stopped, would increase demands for the 
provision of family housing. The 1930 amendments had restricted the 
right of women to enter urban areas unless their husbands had lived in 
the area for two years and providing accommodation was available. 
However, a major problem in enforcing this provision centred around the 
problems of an acceptable marriage document testifying to proof of 
marriage, whether by Native law or civil law, to a male living in an 
u r ban are a . T h"u s, i n 193 5 the R e e f Con fer e nee 0 fLo cat ion 
Superintendents adopted a resolution urging a system of registration of 
marriages in the Transvaal similar to that in Natal. It also resolved 
"that no Natives be issued with stand permits or granted married quarters 
in a location unless they can satisfy the superintendent that they are 
married to each other." (Phillips, n.d.: 97) Then, with an eye on the 
housing implications, the conference urged that "when the Native families 
resident in urban areas are provided for, sufficient provision will have 
been made for Natives living under conditions of married life, and 
therefore further Native families should be prohibited from coming to the 
Reef and Pretoria" (Phillips, n.d.: xxviiil 
This was an attempt by Transvaal municipalities to persuade the 
Department of Native Affairs to allow them to extend the migrant labour 
system used in the mining industry to the commerci al and industrial 
sectors. The financial advantages such a housing system would bring to 
the municipalities, who were largely responsible for the provision of 
housing for blacks employed outside the mining sector, would seem to have 
been the major component in the justifications for these resolutions. 
In the Cape, municipalities were urging the introduction of a pass 
system to the province to restrict movement to the urban areas. At the 
conference held in 1937, the Cape Town municipal delegate said even the 
stricter influx control provisions which the Act introduced were not 
sufficient to be of assistance to the municipality. 
"You cannot have an area ring-fenced with Police, and all 
manner of Natives will come in in some way. I hope you will 
give this matter consideration and arrive at a decision whereby 
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the trouble will be stopped at its source and the Natives told 
by law that if they move without permission they will be 
charged with contravening the Act." (Department of Native 
Affairs, 1937: 12) 
As already mentioned, Transvaal municipalities were urging the 
transfer of responsibili1;y for the registration of service contracts from 
the Department of Native Affairs to them because, they argued, the 
division of responsibilities between the two authorities was hindering 
the efficient implementation of influx control to the detriment of the 
municipali ties . 
These powers were claimed by the municipalities because they would 
then be placed in "possession of machinery for tracing the history of 
individual natives and for controlling the movements of natives generally 
within their areas." (Young, 1935: para. 34)* But, more importantly, 
if this were done, control over housing and labour would then reside 
under one authority - the municipality. This argument was however 
rejected by the Young/Barrett Committee, appointed in 1935 to examine 
urban areas pol i cy rejected thi s argument and it was only in the 1 ate 
1940s that Transvaal municipalities began to be given responsibility for 
the registration of service contracts, with immediate consequences for 
influx control. 
In conclusion, the central issues confronting municipalities during 
this period were the interwoven issues of finance, housing and influx 
control. The key component was influx control. For without first 
restricting movement to urban areas, municipalities were unable to 
control the demand for housing with their unprofitable tenants. The 
provision of housing was costly and stricter influx control, particularly 
over the entry of women and children, would have financial benefits for 
the municipalities. 
* The Young/Barrett Report quoted the resolution requesting the transfer 
of these powers: "This conference ..• is of the opinion that the 
existing system of Government control of labour requirements in the 
local authorities concerned is inadequate and ineffective, and that 
legislation providing for municipal registration and control appears 
to be the only sol ution ... " (Young, 1935: para. 33) 
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D. The 1937 Native Laws Amendment 
This 1egis1atio-n was the product of almost seven years of debate, in 
and out of Parliament, over policy towards urban blacks. It is not 
intended to discuss this debate as preference has been given instead to 
examining the views of municipal administrators involved in urban black 
administration. The legislation amended the Natives (Urban Areas) Act by 
considerably strengthening the influx control machinery available to 
local authori ties and was also aimed at allowing municipalities to cope 
with aspects of their housing dilemmas. 
The tightening of influx control was not only a response to the 
financial and housing difficulties experienced by the muncipa1ities but 
also served to protect supplies of black labour for white farmers from 
competition for urban employers. This aim was acknowledged by General 
Smuts, Acting Minister of Native Affairs, at the 1937 conference referred 
to earl i er. 
"Owing to this migration, we find that the farming industry of 
this country is suffering correspondingly, and to-day one of 
the greatest difficulties with which we have to deal in this 
country is this scarcity of farm labour at the same time that 
there is a surplus of Native population, many of them probably 
unemployed in the towns. That is the situation with which the 
Act tries to deal." (Department of Native Affairs, 1937: 2) 
Smuts urged municipalities to implement influx control more 
efficiently and blamed them for not having enforced it during the 1930s. 
"There is power at your disposal to do so. You will remember 
that an amendment of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, an 
amendment which was passed in 1930, gave power to the 
Municipalities to restrict this increase of unwanted Natives 
into their towns . This provision, however, has not been made 
use of generally. I am told that there are only 11 towns in 
South Africa who have so far availed themselves of the power to 
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limit and control the entry of Natives into their locations. In 
these 11 towns where the system works I am told it works very 
satisfactorily. But then the majority of our urban communities 
have so far not availed themselves of these powers. I do not 
k now why - they may have diffi cu1 ties of the ir own - but there 
is no doubt, the proper way to deal with this influx is to cut 
it off at its sources and to say that our towns are full, the 
requirements met, we cannot accommodate more Natives and we are 
not going to accept more except in limited numbers." 
(Department of Native Affairs, 1937: 3) 
Smuts' references to the 11 towns which had adopted the provisions 
of Section 5 (6) as the only towns to have invoked influx control is 
misleading. For a plethora of influx control measures were to be found 
in Sections 1 and 12 and in other sub-sections of Section 5. The annual 
report of the Department of Native Affairs for 1936 provides evidence of 
this. Seventy six urban and industrial areas had been proclaimed under 
Section 12; segregated locations had been introduced in 30 areas while 
234 locations had been established in terms of Section 1. Besides, as 
shown above, the municipalities, in spite of having adopted these 
provisions, still complained of an inabi1i~ to implement influx control, 
for differing reasons. 
The provlsl0ns of the 1937 amendment were squarely within the 
confines of Sta11ardist doctrine, as acknowledged by the Minister of 
Native Affa irs. 
"One of the main objects of this Bill is to remedy thi s state 
of affairs and to establish once and for all the policy that 
natives should only be permitted in the towns in so far and for 
so long as their presence is demanded by the white population." 
(Hansard, 1937: 4220) 
The Act did this by introducing new restrictions and tightening 
existing restrictions affecting the rights of residence of blacks to 
enter urban areas and on their conditions of residence in such areas. It 
was however primarily achieved through the new requirement that 
municipalities determine their "reasonable labour requirements" through 
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biennial censuses. Any blacks deemed "surplus" after such a census could 
be removed from urban areas. 
The provisions of Section 12 - which governed entry to urban areas -
were appreci ably strengthened. Permission to enter coul d now be refused 
by the municipal i ties if a surplus of labour was deemed to exist; 
permission for women to enter remained dependent on the ava il abil ity of 
accommodation and subject to the two year qualifying period but 
municipalities could now rescind this permission at any time or grant it 
for a limited period only. Workseekers were allowed no longer than 14 
days in which to find work before being required to leave the urban 
areas. 
The amendment is also important because it attempted to link a 
system of urban influx control with control s of movement out of rural 
areas. Permission to enter urban areas was made dependent on the 
carrying of any required passes while more importantly, blacks in the 
Transvaal and Natal who fell under the Native Service Contract Act of 
1932 could only enter urban areas if they could show that they had been 
released from legislative obligations to white farmers. Women also came 
under this dual control mechanism as they coul d only leave rural areas 
with the permission of the magistrate or Native Commissioner. 
Urban influx control and general municipal control over blacks 
living in municipal areas was also strengthened in other ways by the 
amendment. New categories of blacks who could be removed from urban 
areas in terms of Section 17 were added - namely illici t beer brewers and 
black women who had entered urban areas without the approval of either 
the municipality or had left a rural area without permission from the 
magistrate or commisioner. The amendment furthermore allowed 
municipalities to presume that blacks were in urban areas illegally 
unless persons who were challenged could prove otherwise by producing 
proof of permission to remain in urban areas. This presumption of 
illegality clearly shifted the onus of proving a right of urban residence 
to urban blacks themselves where previously no such presumption had 
existed. Exemptions from the provisions of Section 12 were reduced - the 
amendment no longer exempted blacks who qualified for the parliamentary 
vote in the Cape through occupying premises owned by local authorities. 
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The ability of blacks to purchase property in urban areas was, in turn, 
severel y ci rcumscribed. Bl acks coul d onl y buy property already ow ned by 
blacks unless the local authority approved otherwise. 
But while the net effect of the 1937 amendment was to tighten influx 
control, as detailed above, it was also the first time that influx 
control legislation granted exemptions from such control to blacks who 
were born or 1 i ved permanently in urban areas. Such persons were 
exempted by Section 12 (1) (e) from the requirement to leave urban areas 
if they could not find employment within 14 days of either entering an 
urban area or at the end of a contract. Previous legislation had not 
recognised or attributed such exemptions to any category of residents. 
The amendment recognised the difficulties faced by municipalities in 
the provision of housing and, besides the tougher influx control 
machinery already mentioned, attempted to deal with these problems in two 
other ways. Municipalities could now force all employers to provide 
accommodation for their black employees, where previously this was only 
applicable to employers employing more than 25 blacks. Secondly, the 
amendment introduced powers allowing municipalities to collect any rents 
or service charges payable by blacks directly from their employers, 
provi ded this did not exceed 25 per cent of their wages . Municipalities 
could also obtain a warrant of execution against movable property owned 
by rent defaulters. 
These two provisions offered to municipalities a partial alleviation 
of crucial issues involved in the provision and financing of housing; 
who, besides the municipalities, was to be responsible for providing 
housing and of providing a secure mechanism whereby m~nicipalities could 
obtain payment of rentals. Both were however only partial answers to the 
problems. Municipal beer monopolies and various developments during the 
1950s, provided other partial answers. 
In conclusion, the period between 1923 and 1937, by when a 
formidable set of influx control procedures had been enacted, illustrates 
the pressures on municipalities to favour the adoption of tougher curbs 
on movement to the cities. The close links between influx control, 
housing and finances in this process was firmly established, and 
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anticipates developments during the following decade. So too, were the 
close links between employment and housing controls in the implementation 
of influx control established during this period. The urgings by 
Transvaal municipalities for the delegation of responsibility for the 
registration of service contracts to them as a necessary and vital 
complement to their existing responsibilities over housing was to 
continue during the 1940s with greater vigour, and ultimately success . 
E. Tentative Steps Towards a Centralised System of Influx Control in 
Urban Areas 1938-1948 
The period between 1938 and 1948 are important years in urban black 
administration because it was during these years that municipal 
administrators and government officials firmly recognised that effici ent 
implementation of influx control and labour allocation by the 
. municipa1ities was vitally dependent on establishing more co-ordinated 
and centralised structures of labour control. Arguments in favour of the 
establishment of labour bureaux has been presented durning the 1930s - by 
the Young-Barrett Committee for example - but it was the tremendous 
increase in the urban black population during this period which led 
municipal administrators to cogently argue for the country-wide 
establishment of labour bureaux or labour exchanges. These pleas were 
accepted by the Native Laws Commission of 1946-48 (the Fagan Report) 
whose report is notable for its arguments in favour of centralising 
labour control procedures. It is these developments which wi 11 be 
examined in this section. 
The results of the first, and only census, held in 1938 in terms of 
Section 16 of the amended Natives (Urban Areas) Act, only reflected a 
total of 33 645 persons whom the municipalities regarded as "surplus" -
none of whom were from the six largest municipalities. The accuracy of 
these figures has been doubted (Hellmann, 1949: 241) but whether accurate 
or not, the outbreak of the War in 1939 foreshadowed a further ·wave of 
influx into the urban areas, as wartime industrial expansion created more 
work opportunities. Between 1936 and 1946 the black population of 
Durban, Pretoria and Cape Town more than doubled while in Johannesburg it 
increased from 220 000 to 387 000. 
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These developments once again highlighted the difficulties 
municipa1i ties faced in providing housing and in general labour control 
under such condi tions. The new influx control machinery introduced by 
the 1937 amendment had allowed municipalities to enforce influx control 
with a degree of strictness not possible before. But this clampdown did 
not last for long as the United Party government attempted to ame1 iorate 
the pas slaws. 
In August 1941 an Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health 
and Economic Condi tions of Urban Natives was appointed under the 
chairmanship of D.L. Smit, secretary for Native Affa irs. The commi ttee 
was instructed to make suggestions for the improvement of the general 
conditions of urban blacks, other than through increasing wage levels. 
The report, and the response by municipalities to its suggestions 
that the pass laws be modified, provides another illustration of the 
central concerns of urban black administration - influx control, housing 
and finances. 
On the issue of housing, the report noted the difficulties faced by 
municipalities in providing housing in segregated locations. It 
estimated that approximately 33 per cent of the adult urban population 
still had to be housed "if the policy of segregation is to be carried out 
strictly". (Smit, 1942: para. 155) But this estimate excluded the need 
to rehouse existing residents of locations who lived in unsatisfactory 
housing. The crux of the housing problem was one of cost and ability to 
pay, or as the report put it: 
"The real problem of rehousing of Natives is fundamentally an 
economic one, and as long as an economic wage is not being paid 
to them, it is necessary for the housing of this class to be 
subsidised." (Smit, 1942: para. 167) 
While the question of what constituted an "economic wage" or indeed 
what was uneconomic about black wages is open to dispute, it nevertheless 
remained true that the losses on SUb-economic housing were being carried 
by the State and the municipalities and not by industry. The report 
argued that municipalities ought to "contribute towards the expenditure 
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involved", on the basis that local authorities were an integral part of 
the State, but recognised that greater financial assistance from the 
Treasury would have to be provided to fund housing programmes, because of 
the magnitude of the housing required. 
Like the Tuberculosis Commission of almost 30 years earlier, the 
Smit report illustrated the widespread reluctance of municipalities to 
incur and undertake fi nanci al expenditure funded by the general rates. 
The near uniformity of financial policies followed by the municipalities 
was shown on issues such as housing and the levying of charges against 
the Native Revenue Account. 
To take housing first. Only 41 local authorities - 16 of them 
larger ones - had undertaken sub-economic housing schemes while the 
Report noted that there were 267 proclaimed locations. Although the 
Report noted that almost all of the fi nance which the Central Housing 
Board had available for sub-economic housing had been taken up, the 
rel uctance of municipali ties, particularly the smaller ones, to undertake 
sUb-economic housing was fully realised by the committee. 
"Thus it wi.ll be seen that only comparatively few have 
undertaken sUb-economic housing schemes. As a resul t of 
questioning in some of the smaller places visited, it seemed 
clear that the general poverty existing in the urban areas not 
only of the Native section, but of the whole community, caused 
the local authorities to fear that if they errbarked on housing 
schemes, even at sub-economic rates of interest, they would be 
called upon to contribute towards the running costs of the 
scheme and they felt unable to make this contribution. 
Witnesses indicated that if such housing schemes were 
undertaken, Natives would not be able to pay even sub-economic 
rents." (Smit, 1942: para. 173-74) 
A variety of recommendations were made, including compelling local 
authorities to undertake housing schemes, but the report stressed that 
local authorities would have to continue to shoulder some of the losses 
involved in sUb-economic housing schemes. 
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The refusal on the part of many municipalities to incur losses on 
the general rates for housing schemes was however only one aspect of 
financial policies towards location residents. The handling of the 
Native Revenue Account provides a better example of these financial 
pol icies. The Smit report, while providing some evidence of liberal 
attitudes towards the subsidisation of location residents, also found, it 
seems, more evi dence to the contrary 
"Frequently witnesses asserted that the principle of self-
balancing Revenue Accounts was being followed by many 
municipalities. The Committee found that there was some basis 
for this, but in view of the general poverty discovered and the 
necessity in almost every case for improved services, such as 
health, sanitation and water, it urges local authorities in 
their own interests, to avoid the adoption of this principle." 
(emphasis in original) (Smit, 1942: para. 202) 
"The Committee was struck by the fact that in almost every 
instance, the charge for control was being debited as a whole 
against the Native Revenue Account. In some cases high 
salaries are paid to managers of the Native Administration 
Department and location superintendents and the Native Revenue 
Account is called upon to bear the whole brunt of the services 
in so far as the Natives are concerned. It is felt that it 
would be more equitable if a fair proportion of such salaries 
were borne by the General Account of the local authority. These 
officers are usually required to deal with Native affairs in 
the whole urban area and it can safely be said that a 
consi derable portion of their effort is on behal f of the 
communi ty generally in the carrying out of pol icy and control." 
(emphasis in original) (Smit, 1942: para. 203) 
The Smit report noted the pressures of urbanisation - the "growing 
tendency for Natives to bring their families to town with them" - thus 
accepting the inevitability of further inflows of blacks from the rural 
areas "The belief that the situation can be met by developing the 
Natives Reserves is illusory. There will always be the urge to obtain 
some cash to satisfy new needs and tastes .• and for this reason, if for 
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no other, labourers will continue to come in from the country." 
1942: para. 48) 
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Why then did the Report, having catalogued al the. enormous backlog 
in housing and the poor quality of much of the existing housing stock; b) 
the fi nanci a1 di sabil i ties attached to providing sub-economic housing; 
and c) accepted the inevitability of further urbanisation, not recommend 
a tightening of influx control to overcome such difficulties? Instead it 
ignored the attitudes of municipal administrators and recommended the 
abo1 i tion of the pass laws and a moderation of the curfew. Against this 
however it proposed the retention of the registration of service 
contracts and advocated a renewed attempt at establishing labour 
excha nges because of the ir "pa 1 pab 1e advantages". 
The recommendation to "face the abolition of the pass laws" was 
justified in conventional liberal arguments - that the pass laws were 
expensive to maintain, led to a loss of manpower, provided fuel for black 
grievances and created technical offences which involved little or no 
moral opprobrium. Possibly, the committee felt that the measures 
suggested to overcome the housing shortage would allow for an energetic 
solution to the housing problem even if the lifting of the pass laws made 
migration from rural areas easier. 
Bell has suggested, however, that even with the scrapping of the 
pass laws, the element of control remained. "While the Report has been 
consistently interpreted to have recommended the abolition of these laws, 
it did not discard the principle of control in which these regulations 
were rooted. It was the existing state of affairs to which the abolition 
of the Pass Laws was to be preferred." (emphasis in original) (Bell, 
1978: 33-34) 
Accordingly in May 1942 instructions were issued to the South 
African police that the pass laws were only to be enforced on suspicion 
of some other crime having occurred. 
Not unexpectedly, municipal administrators on the Witwatersrand had 
- through the Association of Reef Managers and Superintendents -
unequi vocally rejected the prospects of a relaxation of the pass laws. 
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Their objections were threefold, but most importantly they feared an 
increase in housing commitments if the pass laws were relaxed. Their 
grounds for opposing any relaxation, spelt out in a letter to the 
Department of Native Affairs duriQg 1941 in response to the Department 
inviting their views on the proposal, re-affirmed the importance of the 
financing of housing as a justification for influx control during this 
period. 
"1) That the Pass Law as it at present exists provides some 
measure of assistance to local authorities in controlling the 
native population in relation to housing obligations. 
"2) That it felt there should not at the present time be any 
relaxation of Pass Law restrictions, and that some form of 
identification is essential. 
"3) That the resentment felt by the Natives in relation to the 
administration of the Pass Law is occasioned principally by the 
methods employed by the Police in demanding documents, and that 
it is suggested as a remedy that the Police be requested to 
exercise more diplomacy and tact in demanding the pass 
documents." (Associ ation of Reef Managers and Superintendents, 
15 May 1945: A15)* 
Before returning to a di scussion of the views of Transvaal 
municipalities, especially their pleas for the introduction of a national 
* The Association of Reef Managers and Superintendents represented 
administrators on the Witwatersrand between 1934 and 1943 when it 
changed its name to the Associ ation of Administrators of Non-European 
Affairs. In 1953 it became the Institute of Administrators of Non-
European Affairs of Southern Africa. I am grateful to Professor 
Rodney Davenport for kindly lending me his notes of the minutes of the 
Association's monthly meetings. All page references refer to the 
referencing system used by Professor Davenport in his notes. The 
minutes were housed in the Johannesburg Municipalities' Non-European 
Affairs Department, file 18/6. 
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system of labour exchanges, it is important to look at some of the 
findings of the Elliot commission appointed to examine the incidence of 
crime on the Witwatersrand soon after the relaxation of the pass laws. 
The commission, appointed in July 1942, while discounting any suggestion 
of a serious increase in crime in the preceeding years, commented 
critically on the rela xation of the pass laws announced earlier in the 
same year . Thi s adverse cri tici sm was not made on the grounds of any 
connection between the relaxation of the pass laws and the inci dence of 
crime, but on two other factors - namely the close links between 
observing the pass laws and observing the need to register service 
contracts which the Smit report had not recommended be abolished and 
secondly, that unregulated migration to the towns would hinder efforts at 
amel i orating urban condi tions. 
The Commission quoted figures from which it argued that, in 
Johannesburg at least, the relaxation of the pass laws had led to a drop 
in the observance of the legal requirement to register service contracts 
and to obtain workseekers permits. The table i s reproduced below: 
Table 4 
Pass Law Prosecutions, Work seekers Permits and Service Contracts 
February - August 1942 
A. Prosecutions 
B. Daily Average+ 
Recept ion Depot 
C. Permits granted 
February March 
4 437 4 653 
BB1 B01 
April 
4 569 
605 
June July 
4B2 56B 
36B 331 
August 
319 
290 
to work seekers , 
including renewals++ 
12 970 11 992 10 145 6 76B 9 444 8 707 
D. Registrations 
other than mines 10 143 10 455 9 B55 B 21B 8 050 9 319 
+ For previous two years the average was 612 persons . 
++ For previous two years the average was 12 3B2 persons . 
Source: Elliott, 1942 : para . 26 
The Commission argued: 
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"It will be observed that there has been a considerable drop in 
respect of (b) and (c) subsequent to the date of relaxation, 
and a fair inference is that, as time goes on, natives will 
more and more tend to disregard the various provisions of the 
regulations in question." (Elliott, 1942 : para.26) 
The committee had thus pinpointed the enormous difficulties in any 
attempts at relaxing influx control while insisting on the continued 
registration of service contracts and the issuing of workseekers permits . 
Although the registration of service contracts was not necessarily a form 
of influx control, its continued observation depended very closely on 
influx controls which provided a means of ensuring compliance with the 
requirement to register service contracts. 
Furthermore, the committee, which had three senior municipal 
administrators as merrbers (G. Ballenden, J.R. Brent and J. Baker), agreed 
with the long-standing argument put forward by the Transvaal 
municipalities that the registration of service contracts ought to be a 
municipal responsibility. This was the "vital control" needed by 
municipalities if they were to effectively control blacks within 
municipal boundaries, by ending divided responsibility over aspects of 
influx control. 
The Elliot Commission thus underlined the administrative 
difficulties attached to any attempt at relaxing the pass laws if a 
commitment to "effective control" over blacks in urban areas was to be 
retained . The suspension of the pass laws continued until 1946 when they 
were ordered back into operation. 
Meanwhile, faced with an unprecedented influx of blacks to urban 
areas, the clamour by Transvaal municipalities for a more co-ordinated 
and centralised system of influx control continued . These officials had 
already argued that a "co-ordinating body should be in existence to 
administer a uniform policy for the whole Reef" which woul d entail the 
introduction of labour exchanges . (Association of Reef Managers and 
Superintendents, 19 June 1941: B7) 
In 1946 - as some Transvaal municipali ties were preparing to take 
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over the registration of service contracts - two senior municipal 
officials once again proposed the establishment of labour exchanges as 
essential to efficient influx control. Earlier attempts at establishing 
labour exchanges had been both sporadic and unsuccessful particularly 
when it came to distributing labour between urban centres . Their 
arguments are worth examining in detail in view of later developments. 
J.R. Brent, from Pretori a, who had advocated a system of labour 
exchanges for both blacks and whites in evidence before the Native 
Economic Commission of 1930-1932 and to the Smit Committee, again argued 
for such a system in his address to the Institute of Race Relations. 
Brent proposed that labour exchanges should also be concerned with 
training, but it was the advantages to influx control administration and 
the distribution of labour that weighed uppermost in his mind. He 
proposed a network of exchanges in both urban and rural areas which 
"would act in close collaboration with the urban training depots and 
1 abour exchanges by the constant exchange of information relating to the 
state of the labour market and conditions in towns." (Brent, 1946: 34) 
These exhanges would be complemented by a central exchange in each 
province which wou 1 d be sol ely concerned wi th i nfl ux control. These 
central exchanges "would be a clearing house and distributor of surplus 
Native labour throughout its province and inter-provincially." (Brent, 
1946: 36) 
Brent proposed that the labour bureaux be given exclusive rights 
over the allocation and supply of labour through forbidding employers to 
employ any black not supplied by the bureau. This monopoly was proposed 
by Brent for two reasons - firstly because it would be possible to place 
blacks in employment for which they had had previous training or work 
experience and secondly "because they (blacks) would not be allowed 
haphazardly to flock in uncontrolled numbers into the nearest town to 
seek work". (Brent, 1946: 35) 
These municipal labour exhanges, Brent continued, should have five 
sections - "in order of sequence" - a) an influx control office, b) a 
registration office, c) a reception depot, d) a training depot, and e) an 
employment office. 
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"These are all complementary to each other, and constitute the 
only efficient and comprehensive way to tackle the problem of 
Na ti ve 1 abou r in urban areas to the maximum benefit of employer 
and employee." (Brent, 1946: 35) 
Brent's suggestions were echoed by those put forward by L.r. 
Venables, from Johannesburg. Venables urged the Minister of Native 
Affairs to promulgate regulations under Section 38 (2)(j) of the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 ensuring: 
a) the establishment of labour exchanges in every town with a 
population greater than 5 000, whether or not the local authority 
administered the pass laws; 
b) machinery to co-ordinate labour exchanges and distribution of 
Native labour throughout the Union; 
c) compulsory registration by every employer of any contract, 
including women, with a charge for a certificate of registration; and 
that 
d) the labour exchanges make weekly returns to the national labour 
office of the labour posi tion in their areas. 
Venables furthermore urged the Department of Native Affairs to 
provide accommodation under Section 38 of the Natives Trust and Land Act 
of 1936 for blacks who were surplus to the labour requirements of 
specified urban areas. He also urged the re-introduction of the labour 
census on a four yearly basis which had not been held since the first 
census in 1938. (Association of Reef Managers and Superintendents, 8-9 
January 1946: C37) 
These suggestions by Venables were the basis of the official 
response by the Associ ation of Administrators of Non-European A ffa i rs to 
the Department of Native Affairs over the proposed delegation of the 
registration of contracts to municipalities. The Association pledged 
itsel f to do "everything in our power to assist in establishing a 
rational system of administration, embracing rural as well as urban 
areas." (Associ ation of Administrators of Non-European Affairs, January 
1946: C39) There was also strong' support within the Associ ation for the 
Government to investigate the posibility and desirability of laying down 
minimum wage rates for rural labour to prevent rural blacks moving to the 
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towns in search of higher paid employment opportunities. 
The Department of Native Affairs had already accepted many of these 
recommendations and was prepared to delegate the registration of service 
contracts to Transvaal municipalities, subject to three conditions. 
Firstly, each local authority had to accept a proclamation under Section 
10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act to restrict the entry 
of blacks into municipal areas; secondly, each local authority had to 
provide adequate reception depot accommodation and to ensure that all 
blacks passed through these depots before being allotted to employers and 
that thirdly, each local authority had to establi sh a labour exchange. 
(Associ ation of Administrators of Non-European Affairs, 18 July 1946: D9) 
By 1947 virtually the entire Witwatersrand was technically closed to 
further influx as the municipalities had either been proclaimed in terms 
of Section 10 or they had accepted responsibility for the registration of 
service contracts. Pretoria was the first major city to be proclaimed 
under Section 10 through Proclamation 138 of 1944 (Government Gazette, 14 
July 1944: 54) and in April 1946 it took over the registration of service 
contracts. In March 1947, Johannesburg, Brakpan, Springs, Nigel, 
Roodepoort-Maraisburg, Randfontein and Germiston were similarly 
proclaimed. (Government Gazette, .14 March 1947: 807) 
Proclamation in terms of Section 10 meant that no blacks could enter 
municipal areas unless they met the following conditions: 
a) that they had been engaged in employment and were proceeding to 
take up such employment; 
b) that municipal officials were satisfied that a bona-fide 
temporary visit was being undertaken; or 
c) that the local authority was prepared, after considering labour 
conditions in its area, to allow entry. 
Exclusive municipal control over the two most important components 
of influx control now meant that the Transvaal municipalities could 
refuse entry and workseekers permits on the grounds of an over-supply of 
labour. An example of how important this undivided control was in the 
pursuit of tightening influx control is shown by the actions of Pretoria 
- the first major Transvaal municipality to exercise such exclusive 
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control - on gaining this power. 
Prior to October 1945 - when the 1944 proclamation came into 
operation - the Native Commissioner had issued an average of 10 800 
workseeker permits per month even though the monthly labour turnover of 
Pretoria's 38 000 workforce was only about 1 700. Thus nearly 9 000 
pe rs 0 ns ha d be e n a 11 owed entry into Pretori a each month over and above 
the labour turnover. On gaining exclusive control of these important 
influx control components, the municipality reduced the number of 
workseekers permits by about 9 000 to a maximum of 2 000 per month which 
it regarded as being sufficient to meet the labour requirements of 
Pretoria. It furthermore became municipal pol icy to protect the 
interests of blacks already resident in Pretoria's townships from an 
uncontr~led influx from outside workseekers by giving preference to 
local residents in the allocation of employment opportunities. 
Workseekers permits were only issued to outsiders if local residents 
could not satisfy the demand for employment openings. 
As S.F. Kingsley, an official in Pretoria's Non-European Affairs 
Department, argued a further crucial benefit which municipal control of 
the registration of service contracts brought was more efficient 
implementation of the other influx control provisions in the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Consol i da tion Act : 
"Alleenlik wanneer die munisipaliteite self Artikel 23 
administreer, is dit moontlik om Art. 11 (Invoering van 
naturelle in stadse gebiede waarin die registrasiestelsel 
toegepas word), Art. 12 (Beheer oor die bi nnekoms van vreemde 
naturelle) en Art. 14 (Verwydering van naturelle wat 'n 
stadsgebied onwettig binnegekom het) met enige mate van sukses 
toe te pas." (Kingsley, 1950: 7l 
Reef municipalities welcomed these new powers to control influx but 
urged that the Department of Native Affairs allow their efficiency to be 
tested before introduci ng a regional system of influx control. A sub-
committee of the Assocation of Administrators of Non-European Affairs, 
appointed in June 1947 to consider the establishment of a regional influx 
control authority, produced a report which was nothing short of an 
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indictment of previous attempts by the State and municipalities to 
implement influx control. 
The sub-committee found that the Union Government, the Pol ice and 
local authorities had failed to implement influx control effectively and 
that an adequate force of inspectors was needed to trace illegal 
residents . Besides recommending that all local authorities on the 
Witwatersrand take over the registration of service contracts and that 
labour exchanges be established, it recommended that it be "accepted as a 
cardinal principle of policy" that the interests of urban blacks be 
protected by refusing entry to blacks from rural areas into towns where 
unemployment existed, which Pretoria had already adopted. It urged the 
immediate establishment by the Union Government of a national labour 
information office in Johannesburg to co-ordinate and publish information 
about labour requirements and surpluses throughout the country , and that 
minimum wage rates be laid down for blacks working in urban and rural 
areas in an attempt to stop influx to the towns because of the 
attractions of higher wages. (Association of Administrators of Non-
European Affairs, 14 August 1947: E5) 
These recommenda tions came on the eve of the report of the Native 
Laws Commission which the United Party government had appoi nted in 1946 
in an attempt to chart future urban pol icy. The appoi ntment of the 
commission followed the unprecedented influx of blacks into the towns as 
a result of the war - time industrial conditions and possibly also as a 
result of the easing of influx contr ol during this period. The demands 
of the war effort severely affected the provision of housing to such an 
extent that "building activity was practically frozen". (Fagan, 1948: 
para. 3) The result was over-crowdi ng in municipal locations with the 
consequent development of squatting and shanty towns in peri -urba n areas 
over which municipali ties had no control , which only 'served to increase 
the attractiveness of these areas to black residents . 
It is against this background of uncontrolled influx that the Fagan 
Commission was appointed. Its report, while in many respects a liberal 
and e~ightened one, also however, in its recommendations regarding 
labour exchanges and centrally controlled labour regulations, adopted 
many of the viewpoints of municipal administrators, sketched earl ier in 
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this chapter. Indeed these recommendations on labour bureaux anticipated 
the changes which the National Party government was to introduce in 1952 . 
The Fagan Report certainly provided a ringing denunciation of the 
Stallardist doctrine of temporary black sojourners which it labelled an 
"untenable proposition" and accurately observed that it " •.• lies near the 
root of many provisions of the legislation relating to natives in urban 
areas ..• " (Fagan, 1948: para. 28) Instead, the commissioners argued for 
a policy which would encourage and facilitate the stabilisation of an 
urban black labour force without finding it necessary to recommend the 
abol i tion of migratory labour. The evidence presented to the Commission 
on the harmful effects of migratory labour on agricultural production in 
the reserves, on productivity of. migrant labourers in urban based 
industries and to migrant labourers and their families left in the 
reserves, was quoted with obvious approval yet the Commission could not 
recommend the compulsory ending of migratory labour. Instead the 
stabili sation of urban black labour could only be achieved by an 
energetic housing programme in urban areas which would allow families to 
settle permanently without fear of future removal or expulsion. 
These recommendations followed from the Commission's premise that 
influx into urban areas was an economic phenomenon which could not be 
stopped, or reversed, but merely guided. To some extent this argument 
was contradicted by the statement that the post-war conditions were the 
result of a "disturbed equilibrium" in the process of urban migration 
(Fagan, 1948: para. 67), which suggests that a set of peculiar 
circumstances were the cause of the influx rather than it being a natural 
occurence. 
As mentioned earlier, the main importance of the Fagan Commission is 
to be found in its recommendations that the responsibility for regulating 
urban migration be removed from the municipalities and vested instead 
with the central government. It recommended that a country-wi de gri d of 
1 ab ou r bu reaux be es tab 1 i shed under ei ther the control of the Department 
of Native Affairs or the Department of Labour as an urgent necessity to 
control migration to the ci ties. The cruci al issue of whether use of the 
labour bureaux ought to be made compulsory for both black workers and 
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white employers - as urged by municipal administrators - drew an 
anbivalent response "from the Commission. On the one hand they wished to 
avoid the impression that the bureaux would be an intensified form of 
pass law machinery and hence preferred to see voluntary use of the 
bureaux, but also recognised that compulsion for employers and black 
employees would be "useful" in ensuring that other compulsory pass law 
provisions and the payment of taxes were obeyed. (Fagan, 1948: para.44) 
It was however in the final recommendation on the issue of labour 
bureaux that the Fagan Commission, despite its earlier liberal 
recommendations, anticipated the legislation introduced a few years later 
by the National i st government. In essence the report was prepared to 
recommend that entry into urban areas be restricted solely to those who 
had been recrui ted and channelled via the labour bureaux. 
"While we suggest that the use of labour bureaux should not be 
compulsory and that they should as far as possible be 
unconnected with matters to wh i ch compulsion is attached, such 
as passes and taxes, the existence of the organisation may, 
where compulsion is found to be necessary, be useful as a means 
of helping to ensure that such compulsion will be exercised in 
the best, the least onerous and the most purposeful manner. 
Where, for instance, a proclamation issued by virtue of Section 
10 of Act No . 25 of 1945 closes an urban area against the entry 
of Natives except in accordance with conditions prescribed in 
the proclamation, a further condition may be added exemption to 
Natives recommended for admission by the labour bureau." 
(emphasis added) (Fagan, 1946: para. 44) 
If this recommendation is read against the measures introduced by 
the procl amations of 1944 and 1947, quoted earl i er, then entry into urban 
areas would have been effectively closed to workseekers, unless recruited 
by the bureaux. The Fagan Report had thus accepted the 1 ong-hel d 
criticisms of municipal administrators that an essential pre-condition 
for a more efficient system of influx control was the introduction of a 
centralised and national system of labour bureaux . It must however be 
noted that while the 1950s legislation on labour bureaux was not very 
different to these recommendations, the underlying assumption of the 
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Fagan proposal s and the Nationalist legislation was markedly different . 
The Fagan report accepted the permanance of urban black residents and 
continued urbanisation (what was at issue was the regulation of it) while 
the National Pa r ty legislation was premised on the Stallardist doctrine 
of temporary sojourners. 
F. Conclusion 
This discussion has chiefly concerned municipal attitudes and 
pressures for a persi stent tightening of influx control . By 1948 many 
municipalities in the Transvaal - where influx was the greatest and most 
politically sensit i ve - had only recently gained control over the 
registration of service contracts which they had been agitating for since 
the mid-1930s . As has been pointed out, the two mos·t important factors 
allowing them to implement influx control more effectively were the 
delegation of service contract registration and the series of 
proclamations under Section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation 
Act of 1945. The benefits this brought to Pretoria have been 
illustrated, as one example of what was occurring across the Reef from 
1947, as administrators from as far apart as Erme10, Pretoria and 
Vereeniging reported in June 1947. It should be pointed out however that 
Johannesburg only took over the registration of service contracts in 1953 
- why it should have taken them over at a much later stage than other 
Transvaal municipalities is not clear. Thus it i s important to recognise 
the importance of these developments duri ng the mid to late 1940s as 
marking the beginning of a concerted programme of influx control 
implementation. The tightening of influx control in 1937, while marking 
an earlier phase, did not continue for long and is overshadowed by these 
later developments. 
Furthermore, the realisation that a more co-ordinated system of 
labour control was needed had been legitimised by the report of the 
Native Laws Commission. It accepted the fairly long-held views of 
prominent municipal administrators, such as Brent and Venables, that this 
was the next step in the development of influx control . To this extent 
the grid of labour bureaux set up in the early 1950s was not a radically 
new departure from what had been proposed as future pol icy before the 
National Party victory in 1948. 
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To conclude, it is necessary to look at the role of the 
municipalities in the development of influx control during this period. 
It is clear that the municipalities were not simply structures 
implementing state policy in a passive and unconcerned manner while 
agricultural, mining and industri al interests fought out a battle to 
ensure sufficient labour supplies for themselves. 
On the contrary, the municipalities were vitally concerned with any 
future course State policy over influx control might take, primarily 
because of the housing commitments it could involve. The influence and 
interest of municipalities in influx policies derived from the financial 
disadvantages municipalities were expected to shoulder in the provision 
of sUb-economic housing for blacks. Yet it is during this period that 
the roots of the conflict between many United Party municipalities and 
the Department of Native Affairs during the 1950s, wh.ich is the major 
focus of the next chapter, begin to emerge despi te the uni form response 
by Reef municipalities to the necessity of labour bureaux. The 
Witwatersrand-based Association of Administrators of Non-European Affairs 
nearly split in late 1946 when the East Rand municipalities wanted to 
establish their own organisation. The precise reasons for wanting to 
break away are not clear, but appear to have been linked to a 
determination to press more conservative demands upon the Department of 
Native Affairs. The municipalities concerned - Heidelberg, Alberton, 
Brakpan, Boksburg, Nigel, Vereeniging and Springs - eventually formed an 
East Rand branch of the association. 
That the reasons for wishing to establish a separate body were 
politically motivated was shown by the determination of A.S . Marais of 
Boksburg to press for the establi shment of labour bureaux before the 
Fagan Commission had reported. He was over-ruled by W.J .P. Carr from 
Johannesburg on this issue; it is possible that Carr and other more 
liberal administrators saw the Fagan Commission as about to produce a 
liberal . report for future policy which should be awaited, whereas Marais 
- an outspoken conservative supporter of the National Party in the 
following two decades - did not wish to await its findings for that very 
reason . Both men continued to differ on racial policy during the next 20 
years, reflecting the different wings of the Institute of Administrators 
of Non-European Affairs. 
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II THE CONSOLIDATION OF INFLUX CONTROL : STATE POLICIES BETWEEN 1948 AND 
1960 
The first decade after the election victory of the National Party in 
1948 are possibly the most important years in the post-war period of 
urban ·black administration. The decade saw a consistent progression of 
state policies designed to arrest the influx into urban areas and to 
stabi li se these areas - the provision of housing on an extensive basis 
and the spreading of the costs of housing between state, municipality, 
industry and the urban black resident more evenly than before . These 
developments will be explored in three sections; firstly the legislation 
passed during this period to arrest the inflow of blacks and 
justifications for such legislation; . secondly the changes to housing and 
financial policies which complemented the influx control legislation and, 
thirdly, the conflict between the state and the Department of Native 
Affairs, on the one hand, and the larger (United Party controlled) 
municipalities, on the other hand, over the aspects of the new policy 
directions. 
A. Labour Allocation and Influx Control 
.I n di rect contrast to the rec omme nda t ion of the Fagan C ommi s s i.o n 
that urban blacks be accepted as permanent urban residents, on which the 
United Party had fought the 1948 election, the racial policies of the 
National Party were formulated by the Sauer Report, with its hard-line 
Stallardist attitude towards blacks in urban (white) areas. The National 
Party committed itself to entrenching the migrant labour system, which 
the Fagan Conmission had so strongly condemned without being able to urge 
its ending. The extensive legislative progranme of the 1950s and 1960s 
were foreshadowed in a statement of party policy from an election 
pamphlet during the 1948 campaign. 
"The party real i ses the danger of the drift of the Natives to 
the urban areas and undertakes to maintain the European 
character of the urban areas ... All Natives must be placed in 
separate residential areas. Concentration in the urban areas 
must be curbed, and the Natives in the urban areas must be 
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regarded as visi tors who can never be entitled to any political 
or equal social rights with Europeans in European areas. The 
number of detribalised natives must be frozen. Thereafter the 
influx of the Natives in the urban areas and their regular 
departure will be taken under control by the State on a 
cou ntry-wi de basi sand co-operatio n wi th the 1 oca 1 authori ti es. 
The Native reserves must be placed under effective efflux 
control and the urban areas under influx control. All 
superfluous Natives in the urban areas must be sent back to the 
rural areas or the Native reserves from which they 
migrated .•. In future Natives from rural areas and reserves 
woul d be allowed to enter European areas as temporary workers 
and to return to their homes regularly on the expiration oJ 
their service contracts." (Hansard, 1950: 4797-98) 
The primary mechanism for ensuring a more even distribution of black 
labour was the labour bureaux system, which will be examined shortly. 
However, two important elements in this policy programme were the need to 
stabilise both the urban areas, after the influx during and after the 
Second Worl d War, and the reserves, as Verwoerd recognised in his first 
policy speech to the Senate after his appointment in 1951 as Minister of 
Native Affa irs. 
"It is quite clear that the situation now to be handled is that 
of stabilising the present population and providing for their 
needs, before attacking further problems of population 
di stribution." (Senate Hansard, 1951: 2231) 
"The principle object that we are trying to aim at is to settle 
down the present reserve population and its offspring there and 
to gradually move any surplus Native population from European 
areas to their own regions by providing a livelihood for them 
there." (Senate Hansard, 1951: 2890) 
This stabilising of the population in the reserves was to be 
achieved by encouraging the establishment of labour intensive industries 
. near the reserves and the development of agriculture in the reserves. The 
appoi ntment of the Toml i nson Commission was intended to gi ve effect to 
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the latter aim, which was however never achieved to any meaningful extent 
as offici al planners were to admit more than twenty years later. (See: 
Development Studies Southern Africa, 1980) 
The National Party government soon began to take active steps to 
slow down the inflow of blacks to the Witwatersrand, the major 
metropolitan area drawing in labour. The 1947 proclamation, mentioned 
earlier, was repealed in late 1949 and replaced by more restrictive 
clauses governing entry to the entire Witwatersrand region. (Government 
Gazette, 1949) 
The fi rst major comprehensi ve restrictions, though, were introduced 
by the Natives Laws Amendment Act of 1952. Firstly, the Act introduced 
labour bureaux throughout the country; the proclamation issued on 31 
October 1952 in terms of the Act created a grid of district, local and 
regional labour bureaux under the control of a central bureau in the 
Department of Native Affairs. While earlier proponents of labour bureaux 
had tended to equi vocate over whether their use shoul d be compul sory or 
voluntary for employers of black labour, the new legislation opted for 
the latter. Blacks were to register as workseekers at the bureaux and 
could not be employed in proclaimed (urban) areas unless they had been 
registered as a workseeker. Employers, in turn, had to report all 
vacancies to the bureaux. So, in theory, labour bureau officials in 
proclaimed areas would be able to correlate demand for labour with the 
supply, if all workseekers registered and if employers reported all 
vacancies. Permission to enter urban areas could then be refused to 
workseekers if an over-supply of urban labour existed. If the supply of 
labour in an urban area exceeded the demand and if the regi stered 
workseeker was not qualified under Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) of the 
Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, he could be refused permission 
to stay in the proclaimed area and endorsed out . (Institute of 
Administrators of Non-European Affairs (lANA), 1953: 22) 
If the legislation was implemented as intended, as Dr Eiselen, 
secretary for Native Affa irs, explained to municipal administrators in 
1953, it woul d mean tha t: 
a} persons who arrived in urban areas to seek work without having 
had recourse to the district labour bureau would be refused entry and 
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shortages of labour would be filled from the district labour bureau; 
b) the i ssui ng of workseekers permi ts to outsi ders woul d become 
redundant as bureau offici al s ought to know of every vacancy; and 
c) all redundant persons and persons found illegally in prescribed 
areas would be sent to the district labour bureau for placing in 
employment in non-proclaimed areas. (lANA, 1953: 24) 
The second major component of the Act was to repeal the original 
version of Section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 
with its optional invoking of influx restrictions: it was replaced by 
new clauses which prevented residence of longer than 72 hours in 
proclaimed areas unless the person qualified in terms of the newly 
amended Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications. These 
qualifications could only be gained on the basis of birth in urban areas, 
length of employment or residence in such areas or on the basis of a 
family relationship to such persons - see Appendix A for details. 
Justifications for these far reaching new measures covered a variety 
of themes. It is however clear that the major rationale was to restrict 
the townward drift of blacks as strictly as possible to ensure the 
farming sector - the backbone of the National Party support - with 
sufficient labour. Concern by farming unions over the draining of rural 
labour supplies was forcefully expressed by the South African 
Agricultural Union in 1944 to the previous government, but rejected. This 
theme was now taken up with more vigour by the new government . E.G. 
Jansen, the Minister of Native Affairs, in a speech to Parliament in 
1950, linked the introduction of labour bureaux to the need to prevent 
the drain of labour from rural white areas. But he warned that farmers, 
for their part, would have to improve conditions of service to retain 
1 abour. 
"We expect that when the bureaux are in full operation, the 
distribution of available Native labour will be much better 
arranged than in the past. From all parts of the country I 
receive letters from people who complain about the lack of 
Native farm labour ... they (the farmers) cannot, however, afford 
to pay the high wages which are paid in the cities . • . The high 
wage determinations in, and the attractions of the city, have 
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caused the di sruption of farm labour throughout the 
country . . . So far, however, no effective solution of that 
problem has been found. The creation of labojJr bureaux will 
undoubtedly help, but it should be realised that there cannot 
be any compulsion . " (Hansard, 1950: 4708) 
Jansen's reference to compulsion in the use of labour bureaux 
probably refers to the backdown tile previous year by the government over 
plans to make use of labour bureaux compulsory. (South African Institute 
of Race Relations, 1948-49: 32) Their use was however made compulsory 
for black workseekers through the 1952 amendment. 
Nationalist parliamentarians representing farming constituencies 
were outspoken on the need to keep blacks out of the cities and on the 
farms. One parliamentarian argued that even the first few years of 
National Party rule had seen a significant difference i n the availability 
of labour for farmers. 
"The hon. member is the last man and his party (United Party) 
are the last people to talk of a shortage of farm labour. They 
are the cause of labourers leaving the farms and going to the 
urban areas. It is as a result of this pol icy of theirs that 
the farms will eventually be entirely without labour •.. The 
Minister and his party are carrying out a pol icy which will 
supply the farmer with sufficient labour for purposes of 
production. But we must first remedy the harm which resulted 
from their pol icy, under their government. This is not 
something which can happen in a month or in a year . These 
things happen gradually. I am also a farmer and I employ a 
great deal of labour. Today I have more labourers than I had 
two or three years ago. Labour i s flowing to my farm, and I 
have no trouble to get it. I have all the labour I require." 
(Hansard, 1951: 7868-69) 
Even allowing for a degree of hyperbole, Klopper's statement would 
seem to reflect the greater success municipalities were having in 
controlling influx . The example of Pretoria, after the 1944 
proclamation, has already been mentioned and thi s coul d only have been 
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improved with the amendments in 1947 and 1949. Municipal officials were, 
however, later to argue that the proclamations were defective because 
black miners were exempted from the provisions of Section 10, providing a 
loophole which was not plugged until the amended Section 10 in 1952 was 
made applicable to all blacks in urban areas, including mineliorkers . 
(lANA, 1954: 181) 
However, the most explicit example of the power of agricultural 
interests in formulating National Party policies towards labour 
distribution was provided by another National Party parliamentarian in 
the debate on the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952. These were the 
representations, mentioned above, by the South African Agricultural Union 
in 1944 which, to succeed, had to be complemented by a firm distinction 
between blacks living in urban and rural areas which the Section 10 
qualifications' did. As explained by the MP, who represented Fauresmith, 
the SA AU plan involved: 
"There the head-committee of the South African Agricultural 
Union proposed that measures be taken to make it possible to 
cope with this position. They very clearly suggested that the 
division of labour as Natives were concerned should take place 
on the following basis: A permanent section of urban Native 
labour was to be brought into being and al so a permanent 
section of Native farm labour for the p1atte1and. That was the 
basi s of the pol icy ... On the one hand there had to be the ci ty 
Natives who could be employed in the cit;y, in the industries 
and in other employment in the ci ties, but on the other hand 
there had to be a permanent labour corps of Natives available 
for the work in thep1atte1and. The Natives on the p1atte1and 
were then also to be divided into two sections, namely those 
who were themselves engaged in farming as in the reserves, and 
the others who were in the service of the farming community on 
the p1atte1and. That was recommended to him (P. van der Bij1, 
the former minister of Native Affairs) by the Agricultural 
Union in 1944 as a long term policy." (Hansard, 1952: 632) 
The Section 10 qualifications created by the amendment were to 
divide blacks into "cit;y Natives" and "p1atte1and Natives", and to trap 
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blacks on the farms, which became non-proclaimed areas. The attainment 
of urban residential rights was to be restricted to as few persons as 
poss i ble and migratory labour would be used to supply any labour needed 
in proclaimed areas where a shortage existed. H.F. Verwoerd, appointed 
Minister of Native Affairs in 1951, stressed this point when piloting the 
amendment through Parliament: 
"It is self-evident that the man who was in the city for the 
shortest period, the man who has the least experience, the man 
who is the least useful as a worker - that is to say, the 
newest recruit in the field of labour - must be the first to be 
put out if there is unemployment ... The first person to whom 
permission will be refused to look for work again after he has 
become unemployed and if there is a surplus of labour in the 
vicinity will be the person ... who has just arrived there or who 
has perhaps been in the city only a year or two ... But if 
unemployment in the ci ty assumes such enormous proportions 
that, even when the groups mentioned are no longer there, there 
is still unemployment, then to protect the more permanent 
residents, those who have been there three or four years will 
be the next to be refused permission to seek work. The extent 
of the supply of labour will be the limiting factor, and the 
guillotine will fall at different stages, beginning with those 
who have been in the city for the shortest period." (Hansard, 
1952: 1310-11) 
The Section 10 qualifications involved, in Verwoerd's words, "giving 
certain definite classes guarantees, security and stability" (Hansard, 
1952: 1311) in the urban areas but these persons were to be restricted to 
an absol ute minimum. This was the reason why the length of residence and 
employment needed to qualify for Section 10 (1) (b) was set at 10 and 15 
years. However, because it was an open ended qualification, it did not 
do thi s and subsequent amendments were designed to further restrict the 
attainment of such qualifications. 
Section 10 qualifications were thus designed to entrench and 
preserve the interests of blacks who were already resident in urban 
areas, as municipal administrators had long been urging should be done. 
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The relatively privileged position of blacks who now possess these 
qualifications, compared to those who do not, is not purely a consequence 
of the introduction of the qualifications; rather their introduction was 
desi gned to consol i da te the interests of urban blacks while at the same 
time providing a means of regulating further inflows to urban areas. 
The privileged position of urban black residents in the employment 
queue was facilitated by the declared policy of the Department of Native 
Affairs to only allow entry of blacks to the urban areas if the demand 
for employment exceeded the supply from the urban townships. (Van 
Heerden, 1954: 59) 
This packet of legislation represented the single most important 
development in the refinement of influx control since 1923 and heralded 
systematic application of it by the municipalities particularly against 
black males. We have seen how the labour bureaux system and the 
provisions of Section 10 were designed to achieve two goal s in 
particular: the canalising of labour from areas of labour supply to 
labour demand, especi ally the farming sector, and to prevent the movement 
of blacks to the urban areas on a scale similar to that which occurred 
duri ng the preceedi ng decade. 
Significant progress was reported by the Department of Native 
Affairs on the first goal within a short period of the introduction of 
the bureaux. In a review of legislation to the Senate in 1955, Verwoerd 
could boast of the success of the scheme. About 300 district bureaux and 
200 local labour bureaux had been established by then. 
"The gradual and systematic action of the labour bureaux system 
against the illegal entry of employment-seekers into prescribed 
areas, brings with it the fact that a considerable number of 
them are channelled into the non-prescribed areas, chiefly in 
agriculture. From the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging in 1953 
there were altogether 17 839 placings of Natives in 
agriculture, while in 1955 the figure came to rest at 25 331, 
an extremely important figure for agriculture to take 
cognizance of. .. For Pretoria the monthly figure was about 600; 
from Cape Town, about 100 monthly placings ... From Port 
Elizabeth about 270 per month." (Senate Hansard, 1956: 3874) 
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This suggests that the alleviation of the labour supply problems of 
agriculture was achieved in an important respect by the removal of 
unemployed persons from the urban areas as claimed by the Department of 
Native Affairs. (Department of Native Affairs, 1959 : 40) 
Two further important developments in the refinement of the influx 
control system duri ng the 1950s were the introduction of a consolidated 
reference book for blacks and its gradual extension to black women later 
in the decade, bringing them more tightly under the influx web . ./ 
The Natives (Abol i tion of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) 
Act, 67 of 1952, introduced a consolidated reference book in the place of 
the multitude of passes which blacks had to carry. The consolidated 
document was an important adjunct to both the labour bureaux system and 
the revised Section 10 qualifications introduced during the same year in 
facilitating the identification and control of blacks . Officials in both 
the Department of Native Affairs and in the municipalities recognised 
this and it was warmly welcomed by the latter. (lANA, 1954: 186) 
The migration of black women to the cities had long been a point of 
concern to municipal administrators, as shown i n the previous chapter . 
The greatest inflow of black women to urban areas took place duri ng the 
1930s and 1940s and while some municipalities, notably Bloemfontein, had 
insisted on the issuing of permits to women to enter the locations, most 
muncipal i ties had not done so. 
The election victory of the National Party lead to the clampdown 
foreshadowed in their election manifesto. In April 1950, the Department 
of Nat{ve Affa irs indicated their intention to extend the pass laws to 
black women . (Hansard, 1952; 737) The first step in this process was the 
revised provisions of Section 10 which were applicable to all blacks but 
practical difficulties - mainly identification problems it seems -
prevented this being of use to municipalities in controlling the entry of 
women. 
A departmental circular issued in October 1953 reiterated the 
determination of the Department to see Section 10 used to restrict the 
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entry of black women where the provisions of Section 29 (the powers of 
removal of idle persons etc.) were not suitable for this purpose. The 
circular pOinted out that the influx procedures were being applied with 
extreme strictness "because there is already a surplus of labour in the 
urban areas." (lANA, 1957: 161) 
Despi te the seriousness with which the Department of Native Affairs 
viewed the issue, municipalities, on the whole, took only tentative steps 
to bring black women under the ambi t of the influx measures. For 
example, some local authorities were, as late as 1957, arguing that no 
legislation or regulations made the registration of service contracts 
applicable to women which accordingly prevented efficient control over 
their entry and employment. A senior administrator went so far as to 
label the 1949 registration regulations a "dead letter" since it did not 
affect women. (lANA, 1957: 159) An early example of the difficulties and 
confusion over this issue is illustrated in an exchange between a 
municipal offici al - who was sympathetic to Government policy - and a 
head office representative at the 1954 lANA conference. 
Dr Jurgens (Springs): "1 asked just now about influx control on 
Native females. There is at present no control and we find on the 
Reef towns you get a terrific number of them coming into the urban 
area ... and then they bring in their children from the rural 
areas ... l raised a hornet's nest around my ears a couple of months 
ago when 1 asked my Council to ask the Minister to initiate the 
registration of Native females, to bring in identification cards for 
Native females into our municipal area. They nearly roasted me. But 
notice Mr President, 1 was told very baldheadedly by them that it is 
none of my concern, that it is a matter for the Government .•• We feel 
we cannot apply influx control if the Native females are allowed to 
come and go as they like into the urban areas. 
Mr Heald: The position is that insofar as Section 10 dealing with 
control is concerned, it is applicable to all Natives . • . As regards 
the application of Section 10 control to females, the question is 
whether the municipalities are prepared to accept it as a matter of 
policy and implement it by providing the necessary staff. 
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Dr Jurgens: I must disagree . It is not only in my town that there 
is this objection to the Native female being included in this 
registration. If it is going to be brought in, it has to be brought 
in throughout the Union ... Either you have to bring in the policy in 
toto, or leave it alone. 
Mr Heald: The provision is on the Statute Book and there is nothing 
more that can be done . Unless some speci al machinery is introduced 
the Section 10 machi nery is applicable throughout the whole Union. 
And, as I say, practically every local authority is using that 
machinery as far as the control of males is concerned, but in one or 
two places they are taking steps to deal with it as far as women are 
concerned. As far as reference books are concerned, the question 
whether we will carryon immediately the total registration has been 
effected, insofar as men are concerned, is a matter that will have 
to be decided in the near future ... " (lANA, 1954: 38) 
In 1956 the Department of Native Affairs announced that women were 
to carry the consolidated reference book - a decision which led to 
wi despread di scontent throughout the country - although this was phased 
in at different times in different municipalities. This deci sion meant 
that black women were now getting firmly locked into the system of influx 
control although it would take until the 1964 amendments to Section 10 to 
complete the process. Municipal administrators, in 1957, recognised that 
influx control procedures against women had been applied "very half-
heartedly and with great diversity" in most urban areas. The blame, 
though, was placed directly at the feet of the Department of Native 
Affairs: "The main reason for this is the lack of a formulated policy, 
identification documents, proof of marriage and indirect pressure by the 
European employer." (lANA, 1958: 115) They urged a series of measures to 
limit the entry of women to urban areas, but the most important single 
action curtailing entry was only to be placed on the Statute Book in 
1964, as described in the next chapter. 
To conclude this section on the development of influx control during 
the first decade of National Party rule, it is instructive to tie the 
various legislative threads together to show the all-encompassing nature 
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of influx control mechanisms which municipal officials could draw on. Two 
statements by Eiselen show this and also serve as an introduction to the 
policy developments affecting housing during this period. 
At the second annual conference of the Institute of Administrators 
of Non-European Affairs in 1953, Eiselen reviewed the actions taken since 
the gaining of power by the National Party and concluded with respect to 
i nfl ux control: 
"Instromingsbeheer kan bes bewerkstellig word deur kragtige 
optrede op behuisingsgebied ingevolge die beginsels aan u 
gestel, volgehoue ondersteuning van arbeidsbeheer deur die 
buros en die volledige deurvoering van die bewysboek. Benewens 
voorgaande kan u deur middel van u lokasiepermitte, 
dienskontrakte en behuisingslisensies die ophoping van 
oortollige bevolking met al sy nadelige gevolge in u gebied die 
hoof bied." (lANA, 1954: 23) 
The above quote vividly presents the formidable interlocking web of 
influx control measures - reference books, labour bureaux, service 
contracts and housing permits - which could be used at different points 
in the chain of controls to detect illegal residents in urban areas. A. 
s imil ar poi nt was made in the annual report of the Department of Native 
Affairs for the year 1952-53, this time with direct reference to the 
links between housing and labour controls. 
"Influx control, by itself, is useless because no control is 
possible in any urban area if the labour supply and demand in 
the area concerned are not known. Labour bureaux now meet the 
need since it is compulsory for every workseeker to register at 
the labour bureau for employment and· for every employer to 
not ify the 1 abour bureau of vacanci es .•. A further di rect result 
of the introduction of labour bureaux is that it is now 
possible to link up Native housing with Native labour. If 
housing is strictly limited to accommodation for employees and 
their dependents in urban areas, it will become possible to 
relieve the housing problem." (emphasis added) (Department of 
Na ti ve Affa irs, 1955: 25) 
56 
The link up between housing and labour controls had been, as we have 
seen, an issue of major importance to municipal officials in the 
Transvaal ever since the mid-1930s. The introduction of the bureau 
system, even more so than the delegation of the responsibility for the 
registration of service contracts to municipalities, was the most crucial 
event in facilitating the link i ng of housing and labour controls. It is 
now necessary to examine briefly the housing issues during the 1950s. 
B. Housing and Finance : Economic Rent and Self Sufficiency 
The National Party government inherited a housing crisis in black 
urban areas of enormous magnitude. The backlog was estimated at 154 185 
family housing units in March 1947 with a further shortage of 106 877 
single person units. By December 1951 it had risen to an estimated 
200 000 family units. (Language, 1952: 75) 
The backlog was caused by three factors - the movement to the cities 
duri ng the war years and immedi ately afterwards; the di stribution of the 
losses on sUb-economic housing between State and municipalities which 
discouraged municipalities from building such schemes and lastly the 
virtual halt in new housing programmes during the war. 
The means of overcoming the first two issues were relatively easy -
tighter influx control to reduce the demand for housing and secondly, at 
the urging of municipalities, to redistribute the costs of housing 
through making employers and urban black residents shoulder a greater 
share of the costs. The influx control mechanisms developed duri ng the 
1950s were dealt with in the previous section and do not need repeating 
here . Suffice to note that, as remarked in the discussion of 
developments during the 1940s, municipalities had interests of their own 
in favouring influx control. E.A. E. Haveman, manager of the Non-European 
Affairs division of the Durban City Council, made this point very 
forcefully in 1950. 
"We thus reach the stage where local authorities are concerned 
(in practice at any rate) not about the pros and cons of a 
black proletariat taking the place of the migrant peasant, but 
about the possibili1;y that the black proletariat will grow too 
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rapi dly - or, to put it more correctly, about the fact that it 
has grown so rapidly that the local authority cannot cope with 
its housing and other needs. Influx control, though ostensibly 
a mechanism for regulating labour supplies, is more usually 
resorted to as a means of reducing or slowing down the demand 
for housing." (emphasis added) (Haveman, 1951: 6-7) 
Municipal reluctance to continually provide new housing stock was the 
direct result of the financial disabilities municipalities incurred in 
providing housing even when financed by the State at sUb-economic rates of 
interest. Municipalities had to bear a 1,25 per cent loss on sUb-economic 
housing schemes, as did the State, but it was argued by a leading 
municipal official that this rose to between 2 and 4 per cent in practice . 
(Language, 1952: 82) 
The fundamental financial issue attached to housing was thus one of 
the redistribution of these losses and responsibility for funding. This 
question was resolved during the early 1950s in three ways: 
- the bui 1 di ng of cheaper houses by a comi natio n of the use of black 
artisans in black group areas; research into cheaper housing methods by 
the National Building Research Institute and the development of site and 
service schemes; 
- the gradual conversion of sUb-economic housing schemes into 
economic schemes which placed more responsibilit;y for meeting the cost of 
housing on the urban black' residents; and 
- the introduction of employer levies, through the Bantu Services 
Levy Act of 1952.* 
Within a year of their election victory, the National Party had 
announced the basis of its future housing policy, with the above three 
issues and the influx control option, figuring prominently. (Department of 
Native Affairs, 1951: iv) Late in 1949, the Department of Native Affairs 
* It shoul d be noted that municipalities had not used their powers under 
the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act to force employers to house 
workers employed by them. Language, of Brakpan, argued that these 
powers had not been invoked because "the enforcement of this 
legislation would directly conflict with the accepted principle of 
residential segregation between Europeans and Natives in urban areas." 
(Language, 1950: 32) 
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announced that employers woul d have to contribute levies towards the costs 
of housing and providing serv i ces but , after an outcry from employers, 
this idea was temporarily shelved. In 1952, however, the Bantu Services 
Levy Act was placed on the statute book with the capital derived from 
employer contributions being utilised to fund the costs of bringing 
services to black group areas . Employers remained opposed to the idea 
however. The advantages which the servi ces levy funds would mean in terms 
of administrative control over the urban black population were fully 
apreci ated by offici al planners and presented as a justification for the 
levy. As Eiselen explained: 
n ••• it was felt that after you have the land, you must have the 
services, so as to be able to bring to that area not only the 
10 per cent or 5 per cent of the people requiring houses but to 
bring there, i f possible, the whole 100 per cent, so as to 
obtain control over the floating Bantu population round our 
cities. You will agree that for the last ten years there has 
been no such control •. . The idea is that by bringing i nto 
serviced areas the entire Bantu population required by the 
towns, and legitimately employed in the towns, we will for the 
first time be able to excercise effective control over the 
Bantu population in the various urban areas. n (lANA, 1954: 29) 
The most i mportant development, though, was the decision to convert 
sUb- economic housing schemes to economic schemes . The Department of 
Native Affairs announced in July 1954 that a sUb-economic income limit of 
£15 per month joint family income applicable in all major urban areas 
would come into force. Municipal reaction to the announcement varied. 
That there were families who could afford economic housing was not 
queried by the municipalities but the poi nt at issue became one of how 
many coul d, and wha t woul d happen to tho'se who coul d not afford such 
housing . 
Municipal representatives from Johannesburg argued, for example, that 
the ' £15 limit was too arbitary and ought to be increased to £20 because 
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"the bulk of our urban toilers are in a sub-economic position, and the 
substantial portion of that bulk are not sUb-economic but are sub-sub-
economic. In other words, their income is so low that in some cases they 
are not in a position to pay any rent at all." (lANA, 1954: 60) 
In Pretoria's black township of Atteridgeville - "the Parktown of the 
Urban Bantu" - only 22 per cent of families were earning an income of over 
£15 per month. (lANA, 1957: 11) Johannesburg had a similar percentage 
earning above that limit, as did Durban. 
These criticisms did not succeed in deterring the Department of 
Native Affiirs from their goal of converting sUb-economic housing to 
economic on as extensive a scale as possible. The policy directive was 
backed up by the threat of not allowing municipalities to recover losses 
on sUb-economic housing occupied by tenants falling into the economic 
category from the Native Revenue Account or from beer profits if the 
policy was not complied with before 30 June 1954. (lANA, 1954: 66) 
A consistent justification presented by State officials for this 
change in housing poliCy was that the continuation of sUb-economic loans 
woul d have reached such proportions that the treasury woul d have hesitated 
to provide the necessary capital for sUb-economic housing. Thus in.July 
1957 it was calculated that the State's share of the losses on sub-
economic housing funds granted between 1948 and 1956 would amount to a 120 
mill ion los s over the 40 year repayment period. If the rates of Treasury 
funding in 1955-56 for economic housing had been provided at sub-economic 
levels, the ~20 million loss would have risen to about~ £40 million. 
(Buhrmann, 1957: 198) 
Judged against the background of the policy goals, by the end of the 
1950s the policy had been a great success. The importance of sUb-economic 
housing loans had declined to an almost negligible amount by the 1958-59 
financi al year, and many housing schemes originally constructed from sub-
economic funds had been converted to an economic basi s. 
The following table shows the extent to which economic funding had 
replaced sUb-economic funds in the construction of housing during the 
1950s. 
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Table 5 
Fundin~ of Urban Black Housing Schemes 1950-59 * 
Year Economic Funds Sub-Economic Funds No. of Houses 
1950-51 R1 484 434 R4 328 254 5 274 
1951-52 647 928 2 883 912 4 012 
1952-53 1 576 462 3 688 030 7 270 
1953-54 3 407 550 3 767 606 8 133 
1954-55 4 987 450 1 338 930 10 559 
1955-56 8 603 494 419 964 12 835 
1956-57 8 962 010 223 324 19 683 
1957-58 8 574 336 535 628 15 497 
1958-59 10 170 080 263 894 16 697 
R48 416 744 R17 369 542 99 860 
* Excludes: a) funds raised by local authorities outside central 
treasury sources . 
b) Native Services Levy Funds. 
Source: Nel, 1961: 125 
Built 
Complementary to the above fi gures, the State's share in carrying 
sUb-economic losses had also declined drastically by the end of the 
decade . 
Tabl e 6 
State Losses on Sub-Economic Loans for Black Housing 1954-1960 
Year Loss 
1954-55 R457 100 
1955-56 R501 528 
1956-57 R458 960 
1957-58 R379 694 
1958-59 R265 612 
1959-60 R260 898 
Source : Nel, 1961: 122 
Even though by the end of the decade the granting of housing loans 
was almost entirely at an economic rate, many mun i cipalities remained 
unconvinced of the general applicability of the policy . They did however 
accept the principle that families earning an "economic" income ought to 
pay an economic rent . The problems caused by the policy , were articulated 
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by the lANA president for 1958-59, S.A. Rogers from Cape Town, an 
Opposition controlled municipality. 
Rogers noted that the collection of rentals from those families 
earning less than the £180 economic level per year and occupying houses 
built from economic funds would cause difficulties to municipal i ties. He 
posed the question: who ought to be responsible for making up any 
shortfall? 
"If only dwellings out of loans at economic rates of interest 
are to be erected, how is the shortfall in the rental to be 
made up? Shoul d the ratepayers who do not employ any Bantu be 
called upon to subsi dise those employers whose wage rates are 
not high enough to enable their employees to meet the economic 
rent? I am not suggesting that the policy of granting loans 
for Bantu housing should revert to a sub-economic basis because 
this would only mean that the subsidisation would be 
transferred from the ratepayers of the local authority 
concerned to the taxpayers of the country as a whole. In my 
humble opinion it is the duty of the employer to make up the 
shortfall in the rental. If they do not do so the local 
authority will have to remit portion of the rent or else the 
Bantu family 'will be driven to augmenting its income by other 
me ans ." (lANA, 1959: 37) 
Similarly, Durban's S.B. Bourquin warned in a report to the city 
council in 1958 that insistence by the Department of Native Affairs on 
economic housing schemes could leave the municipali1;y carrying losses 
through the non-occupation of houses. 
"It is reasonable to expect that people will rather default 
wi th rent payments, than starve or go naked. The collection of 
arrear rents would become a futile, or at best, an invidious 
task, resulting in the forcible ejectment of working families 
and severely straining the harmonious relationship between the 
people and the authorities ..• Ability to pay will have to be an 
essential qualification for admission to the housing scheme, 
and in the absence of eligible applicants in sufficient 
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numbers, many houses might eventually stand empty. It would be 
i nevi table that losses incurred in this direction would sooner 
or la ter have to be borne by the ratepayers of the ci ty. 
(Bourquin, 1958: 3) 
Rogers' suggestion that employers should shoulder the housing costs 
came at a time when employers were agitating for the reduction or 
scrapping of their existing contributions to housing through the service 
levy on the basis that it had served its purpose. lIANA, 1959: 37) The 
Institute of Administrators had already considered asking the Department 
of Bantu Administration and Development to pass legislation making 
employers responsible for the payment of rent, as they were in Southern 
Rhodesia. But this was not pursued, for reasons not clear. (lANA, 1959: 
38) 
This issue is another indicator of the lengthy argument between the 
State, municipalities and employers over who was to bear the costs of 
housing in urban areas. It illustrates that even by the late 1950s when 
the costs had been almost completely redistributed, with the State 
probably having had the greatest reduction, at the expense of industry 
and the urban black resident, municipalities still found it a burden they 
wished to be without. This is an appropriate point to briefly discuss 
the financial policies towards the Native Revenue Account during the 
1950s as it complements the housing problems di scussed above. Data on 
thi s issue is not available in any great detail from the debates at lANA 
conferences but nevertheless general points can be made. 
In an important respect State policy towards the Native Revenue 
Account complemented that of the housing policy - namely a move towards 
placing the finances and costs of urban black administration on an 
economic or fi nanci ally sel f-suffici ent basis. In other words, 
restricting expenditure to that income the municipalit¥ could derive from 
the urban black communit¥. 
It is useful to begin this discussion by noting the sources of 
income accruing to the Native Revenue Account. The Native Revenue 
Account was broken down into fi ve separate sub-accounts: 
a) the General Native Revenue Account; 
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b) the Sorghum Beer Account which consisted of two sub-accounts; 
c) the Services Levy fund; 
d) the School levy fund; and 
e) the Trading Account (where municipalities traded in goods other than 
beer) . 
The sources of income were: registration fees, fines, service 
levies, beer profits, rents and other fees paid by residents for services 
provided by the municipalities. The most important of these, for 
different reasons, were the registration fees designed to cover the costs 
of influx control and the operations of the labour bureaux system 
(Mathewson, 1957: 110); the services levy which could be used for capital 
projects in establishing a township; and beer profits, two-thirds of 
which could be used to offset losses on housing and the remaining one-
third for the provision of social and welfare services. 
The crux of the financial question still remained one of 
subsidisation - whether the municipalit;y regarded the sources of income 
as sufficient or whether they were ~repared to meet the deficits so 
incurred from the general rates. State pol icy was strongly inclined 
towards a policy of ensuring the financial self-sufficiency of the Native 
Revenue Accounts or, in other words, trying to prevent the need for 
subsidisation by the municipalities. The Department of Native Affairs, 
in its report for the period 1954-57, argued that such a pol icy coul d be 
applied by all municipalities. 
"Some of the larger local authorities still subsidise their 
Native Revenue Accounts to a considerable extent, al though one 
of them has now reached the stage where revenue covers 
expenditure, without taking into account profits on kaffir 
beer. This proves that there is no reason why the other local 
authorities cannot do the same." (emphasis added) (Department 
of Native Affairs, 1959: 38) 
As indicated by the above statement, it was the larger 
municipali ties who, in general, were prepared to carry losses on the 
Native Revenue Account. Two possible reasons suggest themselves: that 
they had the resources to carry defici ts and secondly that, as they were 
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more likely to be controlled by the United Party, they were more prepared 
than their Nationalist counterparts to disagree with the premises of 
State policy and so subsidise the black residential areas. For example, 
the Johannesburg City Council's general rates annually met the 
"considerable deficits" of the Native Revenue Account while, on the other 
hand, Vereeniging's account had been self balancing since 1951. (lANA, 
1954: 121) On a country-wide basis, expenditure on the black group areas 
by the municipalities exceeded revenue as the following figures show: 
Income, Expenditure and 
Year Expenditure 
1950-51 £ 4 538 860 
1951-52 £ 5 025 000 
1952-53 £ 5 300 000 
1953-54 
1954-55 £ 7 682 391 
1955-56 £ 8 751 472 
1956-57 £10 227 914 
*: i ndi ca tes no da ta 
Native Affairs to 
Table 7 
Subs i dy of the 
Revenue 
* 
Native Revenue Accounts 1950-57 
Subsidy No. of Urban Areas 
£ 435 000 274 
£ 350 000 292 
£ 550 000 295 
£ 7 444 395 305 
£ 9 344 590 317 
£ 9 344 590 317 
given in annual reports of Department of 
update table. 
Source: Derived from: Annual Reports of Department of Native Affairs 
for period 1950-1957. 
What is noticeable from the above table is not that expenditure 
exceeded income, but rather that expenditure only exceeded income by a 
relatively small amount. This suggests that municipalities, in general, 
pursued financial policies designed to prevent the need for 
subsidisation. This point was made by E.M. Penrose, assistant treasurer 
of the Johannesburg City Council , in a paper on the financial 
implications of the Native Revenue Account which he presented to the 1956 
lANA conference. 
"The underlying motive of the statutory Account is to prevent 
the financial exploitation of the native sections of urban 
communities. In this it has been largely successful. It might 
be sa id, however, to have had a secondary effect, namely an 
understandable tendency to limit expenditure to the prescribed 
sources of revenue." (lANA, 1956: 51) 
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Penrose argued that the sources of income accruing to the Native 
Revenue Account were not sufficiently progressive and "seem likely to 
become increasingly inadequate" especially in the larger towns. His 
statement, supported by other municipal offici a1 s at the conference in 
di scussion on hi s paper, came at a time when the ethics of relying on 
beer profits as a major source of income were being reconsidered by the 
Department of Native Affairs. 
Though the municipal monopoly of beer brewing was extended outside 
Natal after 1937 it was only in 1952 that beer profi ts cou1 d be used to 
offset losses on housing for blacks. Previously the profits could only 
be used to provi de soci a1, welfare and recreational faci 1 i ti es wi th the 
result that beer profits were often not fully utilised. (lANA, 1953: 42) 
The amendment in 1952 increased the importance of beer profits to 
municipa1i ties which had adopted a monopoly - 19 by 1952 and mainly the 
larger ones. Profits on beer sales ranged from a "dead loss" to 135 per 
cent. (lANA, 1954: 122) In Johannesburg, annual profits by the mid-1950s 
were nearly £400 000 and total sales exceeded "by a considerable margin" 
the income from rents. (lANA, 1956: 55) Benoni, in turn, was making a 
profi t of £725 680 on beer sales by the 1959-60 fi nanci a1 year. 
But during the mid-1950s official policies towards beer profits were 
ina state of f1 ux and being reconsidered on ethical grounds - a rather 
surprising development given the tendencies in State policies towards the 
housing and financing of the urban townships during this period. A 
Departmental circular stressed these ethical problems: 
"It is the policy of the Department to restrict profits on 
kaffir beer to a minimum or to see that such profi ts vanish 
completely. The only reason for allowing local authorities to 
sell kaffir beer was to combat the evils incidental to 
uncontrolled brewing and not to make a profit. It is illogical 
and i mmo ra 1 to extract from a person who is supposed to be too 
poor to contribute a maximum amount of 2s. per month for the 
erection of schools, that amount - or more, from profits 
resulting from his consumption of kaffir beer." (lANA, 1956: 55) 
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The Department of Native Affairs obviously reconsidered the idea, 
presumably because of municipal criticism which the circular evoked -
ethical problems notwithstanding. (lANA, 1956: 57-84) 
To conclude this discussion of the financial policies pursued by 
municipalities during the 1950s it is important to note that it was 
during this period that the notion of a financially self-sufficient 
Native Revenue Account gained momentum. It became firmly entrenched in 
both policy emphasis and in municipal practise. This attitude towards 
the financing of urban black administration and the provision of 
faci 1i ties was to be entrenched even more firmly with the introduction of 
administration boards in the early 1970s. 
C. Municipal Officials Reaction to State Policies: Fagan versus Sauer 
It remains to conclude this chapter with a discussion of the 
reaction of municipalities to these policies, particularly to influx 
control. It has already been shown how, duri ng the 1940s, municipal 
officials were in broad agreement over the need to introduce labour 
bureaux. Yet an important hallmark of the 1950s was the conflict between 
the larger, United Party controlled, municipalities and the Department of 
Native Affairs over aspects of policy. This conflict will be explained 
in some depth. It will be argued that while there was a large degree of 
unanimity between all municipal officials and the Department of Native 
Affairs on the need for influx control measures, the explanation of the 
conflict is to be found in the differing attitudes towards policies which 
ought to be applicable to already urbanised blacks. To a large extent 
this reflected the differences between a Faganist and Sauerist 
(Sta11ardi st) approach as formulated by the two parties in the late 
1940s. This argument must be substantiated. 
An important starting point for this discussion is the attitude of 
municipal officials to what can be called the labour allocation component 
of influx control. As shown in earlier discussion, this formed a major 
justification for the tightening of influx control through the 1952 
amendments . These justifications were not lost on municipal officials 
serving ei ther National Party or Uni ted Party controlled munici pa 1 i ti es. 
For the purposes of this discussion it is more interesting to quote, as 
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an example, a prominent municipal official in the employ of a United 
Party controlled municipality than it is to quote a Nationalist example. 
At the lANA conference held in 1953 J.E. Mathewson, manager of Non-
European Affairs of the Benoni City Council, argued that it was of 
national importance to ensure an even distribution of labour between 
farming, mining and urban based industrial interests. 
"One of the most vital questions in urban areas is that of 
labour, and for that reason I would like to comment on it 
first. There are three main categories of employers of Native 
labour; agriculture and mining ... and secondary industry .•. It is 
important that in viewing the Native labour problem, 
particularly in the large urban areas, sight should not be lost 
of the requirements of the mining and agricultural competitors 
in the Native labour field ... farm labour from his point of view 
is heavy manual work, and as a result it does not appeal to him 
once he has tasted life and conditions in an urban area . . . 
Likewise, the mine labourer ... sees his urban colleague living 
under attractive family conditions, enjoying many privileges 
and amenities •. It is of national importance that the country ' s 
Native labour should be equitably distributed amongst all three 
of these industries ... I submit that if these three great 
employers of South Africa have to compete for their labour on 
an equal basi s, the result will seriously affect the economic 
structure of this country with disastrous consequences; and 
recovery from such a state of affa irs will be prolonged and 
difficult. I shall not attempt to suggest a solution to the 
problem in so far as it affects the farming and mining 
industry, but as it is the urban Administrator's concern to 
ensure adequate Native labour to urban secondary industry and 
commerce, ways and means must be found which would have the 
effect of leaving Native reserves clear for competition as 
between the other two industries." (emphasis added) (lANA, 
1953: 37 -38) 
The stress on restrictions of movement of rural and reserve 
residents to achieve an even distribution of labour is implicit in the 
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above statement. In Nationalist versions on the need to allocate labour, 
such a stress became expl ici t. (Pri nsloo, 1950: 56) More evidence to 
support the argument that officials in the employ of United Party 
municipalities welcomed the influx control measures of the 1950s will be 
offered shortly. However, while Mathewson's statement illustrates this 
support, his attitude to the assumptions of State policy towards the 
permanance of urban black residents differed markedly from the support he 
gave influx control measures. In the same address, Mathewson urged the 
Department of Native Affairs to abandon its temporary sojourner policy 
and to accept the permanence of urban black communities. 
"The time has come when every effort shoul d be made to 
stabilise the existing Native labour forces as permanently 
settled communities in the larger urban areas. This 
stabilising. process will require co-operative handling on the 
part of industriali sts, who should be persuaded of the 
advantage in employing Native labourers who are already 
permanently resident in an urban area, as against that of 
recrui ting and introduci ng labour from outside. Local 
authorities should recognise the benefits which would flow from 
a permanently established labour force within the compass of 
the available employment in their areas and provide for it the 
necessary accommodation, whil st the State shoul d accept 
responsibili ty for the provision in urban areas of such 
amenities as are outside the scope of local authorities . " 
(lANA, 1953: 38-39) 
This expression of Faganist ideology was supported by 
representatives from other Opposition controlled municipalities. W.J.P. 
Carr, Johannesburg's manager of Non-European Affairs, attacked the 
provisions of the revised Section la, passed the year before charging 
that they prevented the development of a stable and permanent community. 
"The implications under the new Section 10 of the Act are so 
far-reaching that I think it is impossible for this ever to be 
achieved: how it is possible to have a measure of stability and 
security in an urban area under these conditions is something 
which is difficult to realise." (lANA, 1953: 44) 
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And D.N. Bang, from Pietermaritzburg, linked stability i n urban 
black areas with the introduction of freehold rights. 
"I consider that the best way to enlist the co-operation of the 
responsible element of the Bantu, is that legislation should 
lean towards the fact that we have a permanently established 
Native population in urban areas, so permanent that there is no 
possibility of them being moved el sewhere, and work towards 
granting facilities for the ownership of fixed property." 
(I ANA, 1953: 50) 
Such statements were of course contrary to aspects and general 
tendencies of National Party policies towards urban black residents and 
serve as an illustration of what I would call the Faganist approach which 
the United Party and the municipalities controlled by it, were committed 
to. Even though State legislation was formulated on the lines of the 
Sauer commission recommendations, it was at the municipal level that 
Opposition controlled municipalities were able to contest aspects of 
State policy because of the delegated powers municipalities were given in 
the implementation of the policy. It was this discretion and what I have 
called the Faganist approach of the United Party controlled 
municipalities which led to the most important conflict of the 1950s 
between these municipalities and the Department of Native Affairs which 
came to a head in 1954. Early signals of this impending clash can be 
detected at resentment over Johannesburg's delay in taking over the 
registration of service contracts while, in contrast, Pretoria had 
eagerly accepted the powers. This resentment was articulated by Dr Albert 
Hertzog during debate on the Native Laws Amendment Bill of 1952 which 
introduced the amended Section 10 provisions. 
"Whe n the regi stratio n system was trans ferred to the ci ty 
cou ncil s, .. • we saw a tremendous difference between the ci ties. 
We saw that difference between Johannesburg • •. and Pretoria ..• In 
Johannesburg they obeyed their master's voice, the voice of the 
capitalist employer. Those employers wanted resevoirs of 
unemployed Natives there. " (Hansard, 1952: 1299) 
The charge that United Party controlled municipalities were more 
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interested in satisfying the labour needs of industrialists than in 
implementing State policy was to be a recurrent theme of criticism by 
National Party spokesman of the United Party controlled municipalities 
during the next two decades. It was, however, the site and service 
scheme plans which sparked the major conflict in 1954. At the centre of 
the conflict was the Johannesburg City Council who reacted negatively to 
aspects of the si te and service scheme which the Department of Native 
Affairs introduced in the early 1950s as a means of overcoming the 
housing shortage in urban areas. The Department wished to use the site 
and service scheme to remove 57 000 persons from the suburbs of 
Sophiatown, t~artindale, Newclare and Pageview to ne\~ residential areas at 
Meadowlands and Diepkloof - in the process alienating freehold rights 
which some families held in the four suburbs and which would not be 
granted to them in the areas they were to be moved to. Thi s al i enation 
of freehold rights coupled with doubts of the municipality about the 
practicality of the scheme (lANA, 1954: 43-44) were used by the 
municipality as reasons to refuse to accede to the scheme. 
Faced with this opposition, the Department of Native Affairs 
reacted by creating a new statutory authority, the Resettlement Board, to 
implement the scheme, so removing control of the 57 000 persons to be 
moved. The Board was to consist of nine or ten persons appointed by · the 
Minister of Native Affairs and was given extensive powers over the 
Johannesburg City Council to ensure the implementation of the removals. 
The appoi ntment of the Resettlement Board is important in explaining the 
i ntroduct io n of admin i stratio n boards two decades 1 a ter: fi rs tly, because 
it served as a model for the structure and powers of the boards --
appoi nted by the Minister; vested with local authority powers; given 
powers over municipalities, if these were needed to implement policy, and 
most importantly because the Resettlement Board was seen as having been a 
success. Secondly, it showed that the Department of Native Affairs was 
prepared to remove responsibility for the implementation of policy from 
municipalities and to centralise it more tightly under the Department's 
aegis to ensure more efficient administration of policy if this was 
deemed necessary. 
Verwoerd's remarks duri ng debate on the Natives Resettlement Bill in 
Parliament were to set the tone for relations between some of the 
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municipalities and the Department of Native Affairs for the rest of the 
decade and during the 1960s - as the Van Rensburg Committee of inquiry 
was to show in the mid-60s. 
"If there is a local authority which tries to obstruct that 
policy, the government is not exercising dictatorship when it 
makes the national policy compulsory, applicable even in that 
city ... Therefore when it may become necessary to compel a ci ty 
council which is not prepared to implement the policy of 
apartheid, to do so, I shall do so ... " (Hansard, 1954: 4111) 
Two years later, Verwoerd again publically criticised Johannesburg, 
and other unmentioned Opposition controlled municipalities, for deviating 
from policy, with the important exception of Benoni, which he singled out 
as obeying policy even though it was United Party controlled. 
Johannesburg and these other municipalities, he said, had opposed the 
site and service housing scheme ':with almost vitriolic hatred" and had 
contested policy over the Services Levy Act, ethnic grouping and the 
locations-in-the-sky legislation. The task of the municipalities was, 
"to put it bluntly", the implementation of policy on an agency basis for 
the Department. 
"They (State policy) are not just casual ideas touching an odd 
poi nt here and there, but is a programme extending its fingers 
deeply and affecting the circumstances in the lives of 
people ... It is to be accepted that the various directives are 
not just random ideas but part of a comprehensive all-embracing 
programme, then you will understand why deviations cause 
confusion irrespective of whether the deviations are caused by 
expecting concessions from me or by Local Authorities wishing 
to pursue their own direction ... Concessions may at times 
superfici ally appear to be reasonable but one has to bear the 
results in mind ... lf one deviates from the policy laid down in 
the Urban Areas Act that this is not allowed, then one can 
expect the logical consequences, to be a general deviation on a 
broad basis. The Government is not prepared to allow this. 
(lANA, 1956: 108) 
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Relations between the Johannesburg City Council and the Department 
of Native Affairs remained strained; the latter suspicious that policy 
was being undermined because the ci ty was controlled by the United Party. 
In 1958, the Department took the unusual step of appointing an Inter-
departmental committee under F.E. Mentz, newly appointed Deputy Minister 
of Bantu Administration and Development, to ensure that state policy was 
implemented by the municipality. A particular focus of the committee was 
to check whether municipal administration of the pass laws was effective 
and inspectors were stationed in the municipal labour bureaux to this 
end. The committee continued in existence for a number of years and 
although it smoothed relations between the Department and the 
municipali ty, evidence from the Van Rensburg Committee of the mid-60s 
shows that the degree of municipal autonomy was still resented by the 
Department. 
The introduction of the Resettlement Board was the result of the · 
major conflict of this period and only brief aspects of the conflict and 
of the functioning of the Board have been drawn out. It is of more 
importance to illustrate the tightening of influx control in the late 
1950s in reaction to unintended loopholes in legislation and the 
municipal reaction to these changes. 
Five years after the introduction of the revised Section 10 
qualifications in 1952, major amendments were made to Section 10 with the 
aim of restricting still further the class of persons who could qualify 
for urban residence and movement between urban areas. These amendments 
were the result of a court case which started in Ermelo in 1955: at issue 
was whether a person who had been born in a proclaimed area, but who had 
subsequently left it, could return after a period of absence and claim 
the qualifications because of birth or length of employment or residence. 
The Appeal Court ruled that such a person could obtain Section 10 
qualifications in the area of his birth and it was the prospect of 
municipalities being obliged to provide accommodation for persons who had 
not worked in their area of jurisdiction since birth that the amendment 
was introduced in Parliament. Verwoerd argued: 
"Must every town in South Africa simply wel come back Natives 
who flock back to the town in their 01 d age, even if the 
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1 oca t ions of the se towns the n h ave to be used to accommoda te 
all those who flock back in this way! ... That is why we make 
provision in this Clause to check that automatic influx back 
into the city." (Hansard, 1957: 4385) 
The amendment put it beyond doubt that Section 10 qualifications 
were forfeited if the hol der left the proclaimed area in which they had 
been granted and could, furthermore, not be granted to persons who 
returned to the proclaimed area in which they were born without having to 
wait 10 or 15 years to qualify under Section 10 (1) (b). Thus Section 10 
(1) (a) qualifications were in future only to be granted to persons if 
they had "since birth, resided continuously" in a proclaimed area while 
previously it had read "was born and permanently resides". Similarly, 
Section 10 (1) (b) was amended to prevent qualifiers retaining their 
quali fications if they left the proclaimed area. In essence, the 
amendments meant that Section 10 qualifications to a particular 
proclaimed area could not be held by persons who did not work or 
continuously reside in that area. It served, too, to restrict even 
further the mobil i ty of blacks -in this case urban blacks - so trapping 
such persons in one proclaimed area. 
The lANA congress the following year (1958) developed into a wide-
ranging examination of State pol ici es in the decade since 1948. The 
debate is important because it reveals the divergent emphases placed by 
municipal offici al s upon the di fferent findings of the Fagan and Sauer 
reports of a decade earlier, and which continued to shape their reactions 
to policy issues. 
The debate was started by A.S. Marais, manager of Boksburg's Non-
European Affairs Department and a strong supporter of government 
policies. His speech - "Native labourer problems from a local authority 
offici al1s poi nt of view" - contained a strong attack on those municipal 
offici al sand industri al i sts who encouraged the development of a 
stabilised urban workforce. 
He asserted that some of his colleagues "slavishly follow the policy 
of encouraging every Native employed in their area to become urbanised, 
to welcome him with his family and to provide him with accommodation in 
74 
their Bantu Townships" so circumventing the intention of labour control 
measures. Instead, he proposed strict limits to the discretionary powers 
Section 10 (1) (d) gave municipal officials, in order to restrict the 
entry of women and chil dren. 
"Apart from Government pol icy, it is in the 1i ght of the 
social, including the economic problems that arise from the too 
rapid urbanisation of the Bantu, essential that these problems 
be limited to the existing settled Bantu population . Such 
limitations are possible only when every local authority with a 
uniform policy, limits the urbanisation of Bantu families that 
comply wi th the stabil i ty test as set out in Section 10 (1) 
(a), (b), (c) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. 
In other words, no Bantu women or child must be allowed to take 
up residence in the area of any authority, except during a 
bona-fide visit for a limited time, unless she and her 
dependent children are joining her husband, parent or guardian 
who possess the qualifications as set out in the above 
mentioned legislation." (emphasis added) (lANA, 1958: 114) 
Marais' fundamental reason for advancing such arguments was his 
belief that the "success or failure" of government policy would be 
deci ded in the "ci ties and towns ·of the Union". Under these condi tions, 
the importance of local authority administration became crucial: "the 
local authorities with their relevant officials, in terms of existing 
legislation are in a position to bring about the success or failure of 
Government policy by the application of their own policy." For their 
part, industrialists, Marais declared, should accept that the family 
accommodation of their workers in urban areas did not promote the 
stabili ty "which the country's economy as well as he himself demands" . 
Rather, compound accommodation as developed by the mines ought to be 
emu1a ted . 
"He cannot expect, on the one hand, an adequate local source of 
labour to be built up and then prefer the migratory labourer 
from outside the urban area on the other hand. He will have to 
face the fact that the annual Bantu labour turnover in our 
cities and towns varies from seventy to over a hundred per 
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cent. A large portion of the turnover is attached to the so-
called stable local established Bantu communities ... The critic 
who rejects, for humanitarian reasons, the separation between 
the Bantu in the urban area and his wife in the rese rve mus t 
still learn his lesson from the Gold Mining Industry in South 
Africa ... The method of employment and accommodation of Natives 
by the gold mines does not deserve to be assailed and 
criticised. On the contrary, it is by virtue of human rights 
that we can learn, with gratitude, our lesson from the gold 
mines. With this tested method of the gold mining industry as 
an example, we have no other choice than to persist with the 
principle of uniform action on the part of urban local 
authorities against the too rapid urbanisation of the Bantu." 
(lANA, 1958: 119) 
Marais' statements drew an angry response from officials from United 
Party controlled municipalities but was supported by representatives from 
Nationalist municipalities. For example, both J.E. Mathewson · (Benoni) 
and S. Bou rqui n (Du rban) proferred the classic Fagani st statement about 
the inevitabilit;y of urbanisation ("You can regulate it but you can't 
stop it" - Bourquin). And with regard to Marais' plea that the entry of 
women and children be more strictly controlled, Bourqui n, in a rather 
contradictory argument, recognised that economic pressure in th~ reserves 
was an important factor causing urbanisation but then also blamed the 
State's failure to move faster on the issuing of reference books to women 
as having hampered municipal control over the entry of women. ("Again 
why blame local authorities for shortcomings on the part of the State"). 
Bourquin al so fulminated against Marais' suggestion that the 
discretion of municipal officials ought to be replaced by a "more legally 
prescribed" approach - a response which was probably shared by Carr and 
Mathewson. 
"We (lANA) might as well become an "Institute of Rubber 
Stamps". What differentiates an Administrator from a junior 
clerk, the fact that he has discretion, the fact that he has to 
think for himself, the fact that he has to direct, manage and 
administrate. If you remove those poi nts then you may as well 
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staff your departments with automats, grade three clerks ... who 
will just go ahead and comply with state policy as laid down in 
the book. Now that is not my idea of administration. It is a 
right which we must jealously guard ... which we must keep at all 
costs." (lANA, 1958: 151) 
The fi nal example of wha t I have called the Faganist approach of 
Opposition controlled municipalities is provided by ILJ.P. Carr. His 
address to the Institute of Race Relations in January 1961 shows the 
extent to which these municipalities were in agreement with the necessity 
for maintaining influx control while accepting the permanent residence of 
blacks in urban areas. He argued that for as long as municipalities had 
an obligation to house persons employed in their areas, "then there is an 
implied right to control the influx of such would-be-entrants." (Carr, 
1961: 2) Carr also justified influx control because of the protection it 
afforded the permanently urbanised worker from competition for employment 
and the maintenance of wage levels - a justification which administrators 
were arguing in the 1940s. 
The "vastly improved conditions" in the townships si nce the Second 
Worl d War were "due in part to the limitation on the size of the 
population which has made it possible for the authorities to cope with · 
the housing needs of the people as well as the provision of the essential 
amenities of life". 
"I am aware that the whole position is an artificial one and 
that conditions in Johannesburg are probably more favourable 
for the ordinary Native family than anywhere else in South 
Africa at the moment, and that the people living and working in 
the ci ty who manage to comply wi th the nar row a nd res tri ct i ve 
provisions of the law are a favoured class who enjoy a standard 
of living superior to that enjoyed by their compatriots outside 
the city. It is for this reason that Johannesburg is the Mecca 
of every workseeker in the country and this is doubtless too 
the reason why these men will resort to literally any means of 
gaining entry into the town, but until conditions elsewhere are 
at least as attractive as the minimum standards available in 
Johannesburg, influx control, with all its difficulties, does 
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in my opinion benefit the population now resident in the cities 
and must continue if there is not to be a general depressing 
effect on wages and standards which will tend to place cities 
on a par with standards seen outside these areas." (Carr, 1961: 
10-11) 
Impl ici t in the' above statement is an argument that the facilities 
provided by the municipali1;y were "more favourable" than in other cities, 
because of the liberal attitude of the municipality in not going along 
with the official notion of financial self-sufficiency for the Native 
Revenue Account. Johannesburg's acceptance of a permanently resident 
black population coupled with the recognition of the need to maintain 
controls on urbanisation was the essence of Faganist philosophy favoured 
by United, Party municipalities. This, it is argued, must be seen as the 
explanation of the conflict between various Opposition controlled 
municipalities and the Department of Native Affairs during the 1950s. 
The persistent conflict raised fundamental questions about the 
continuing use of municipalities as agents of the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development. For, if United Party oriented 
municipalities in the larger metropolitan areas were seen as unreliable 
and untrustworthy, was direct state control not an obvious way of ending 
the conflict, as the creation of the Resettlement Board had done? This 
question, was being asked during the mid-1950s but Verwoerd, in his 
speech to lANA's 1956 conference, rejected it. 
"In saying this, the question may be posed, as it often is, why 
then are these Municipal Administrators not Government 
officials? Why are they Municipal officials if such functions 
are entrusted to them by 1 icense and they have certai n 
s ta tuto ry dut i es to perform? Oft times the question is posed 
more pertinently that that, viz; why doesn't the State -through 
its Native Affairs Department, undertake the management of all 
Native Affairs in the various towns? Why are the Municipal 
Offici als concerned not Government offici al s? Or to put it 
more forcibly why doesn't the State place the functions of all 
the urban local authorities under its own control?" (lANA, 
1956: 99) 
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Yet Verwoerd rejected such suggestions, for reasons which do not 
emerge clearly from his speech; instead he forcefully asserted the pol icy 
making role of his Department while municipalities were to implement 
policy, whether they agreed with it or not. Perhaps he expected his long 
and thorough exposition of the duties of municipalities and municipal 
administrators, who after all were licensed by his Departement, to be 
sufficient to persuade them to unquestioningly implement policy with 
which they di sagreed. 
Although Verwoerd rejected such suggestions, the continuing conflict 
in the late 1950s (the appointment of the Mentz committee was an 
indication) again saw these questions being debated within the National 
Party and presumably within the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development. The 1960 Parliamentary session saw Durban criticised for 
its unwillingness to co-operate over the development of Umlazi and the 
removal s from Cato Manor: " ... as is typical of the attitude which all 
Uni ted Party controlled Ci ty Counci 1 s have adopted whe never we want to 
remove black spots." (Hansilrd, 1960: 7170) 
Later in the debate, the issue of ending municipal administration 
and centralising it under the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development was pertinently raised by F.S. Steyn, MP for Kempton Park. 
"Experience has taught us that certain of our town councils are 
not prepared or are not fitted to convey the authentic views of 
the Native masses who are living under their jurisdiction, to 
the Central Government, and I bel i eve that the time has come 
when the Central Government will have to be most cautious in 
using town councils merely as its agent in administering the 
Natives in the peri-urban areas. The necessary powers should, 
as far as possible be exercised by the Central Government and 
only delegated to town councils as a favour and an exception, 
when such a town council has shown that is fi tted to exerci se 
that delegated power." (Hansard, 1960: 7180-8ll 
While these comments drew no direct response from the Minister, Daan 
de Wet Nel, they do suggest that such an option was being increasingly 
considered during this period as a means of gaining tighter control over 
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the implementation of policy in the metropolitan areas . 
D. Conclusion 
The importance of the 1950s in post-War legislation is due to the 
various developments affecting housing. influx control and the stormy 
relationship between Opposition-controlled municipalities and the 
Department of Native Affairs during the decade in response to aspects of 
these new policies. The importance of the legislation affecting housing 
and influx control is established through the answers it attempted to 
give to the problems which had been a recurring issue in urban 
administration si nce the 1920s. at least. while at the same time allowing 
the municipalities to restrict future demand for housing. which could be 
provided on easier financial terms than in the past . The conflict 
between the United Party oriented municipalities - generally the larger 
urban metropol i tan areas - and the Department of Native Affairs 
anticipates further developments in the 1960s against the background of 
an urban areas pol icy which was to take on a much greater ideological 
sharpness as a result of the unfol ding of the homelands pol icy which had 
started to emerge by the end of the 1950s after the report of the 
Toml inson Commission. It is to the developments duri ng the early 1960s 
that we now turn. 
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III RECONSIDERING MUNICIPAL CONTROL, 1960-1967 
During the 1960s, National Party policy towards urban blacks took on 
a number of new dimensions as a result of the gradual unfol ding of the 
homelands policy. The consequences for urban black residents included a 
much tougher Government attitude towards Section 10, whose provisions 
were seen as at variance with the notion of temporary sojourners and as 
providing political rights in urban areas, while it is during this period 
tha t the use of frontier commuter labour begins to be developed with its 
consequences for urban blacks in certain metropolitan areas. These 
aspects will be examined " in turn after which attention will be paid to 
the report of the Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into Control 
Measures which provided the justification for removing municipal 
administration of legislation on behalf of the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development. 
A. New Emphases in State Policy During the Early 1960s 
i) Urban Blacks and Homeland Links 
The passage of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill through 
Parl i ament in 1959 marks the start of the attempt by the National Party 
to give SUbstance to the notion of a separate political future for blacks 
in different ethnic homelands whether resident in these homelands or not. 
Offi ci al i deol ogy, whi ch had duri ng the 1950s emphasi sed the temporary 
nature of the residence of blacks in urban areas, now began to link the 
future of urban blacks to ethnic homelands created during the 1960s. An 
exposition of this attitude was spelled out by the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development, Daan De Wet Nel, during debate on the 
Bill in Parliament in 1959: 
"But there is another important principle embodied in th i s 
legislation, and that is for the first time official links are 
being instituted between the Bantu territories and the Natives 
in the ci ties. For the first time! I admit at once that here 
we are facing a very great problem •.. But that does not detract 
from the fact that there are al so large numbers of our own 
Natives in the cities, and that is a very important problem. 
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The question which is frequently asked is this: What is to be 
their future? .. The fact of the matter is that links will now 
be created between the Bantu areas and the people in the 
cities." (Hansard, 1959: 6020-21) 
The cardinal link created by this legislation, and ultimately by the 
Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970, between blacks resident in urban 
areas and an ethnic homeland was enforced citizenship of one of the 
homelands for all blacks on the basis of language, regardless of whether 
they were born in the homeland or not. Thus M.C. Botha could state: 
"The presence of the Bantu in the whi te u rba n areas is f or a 
limited purpose and of a casual nature. The Bantu in the white 
urban areas cannot be dissected from their national relatives 
in the homelands, not even if they were born here in the whi te 
area. The Bantu in the white urban areas and those in the 
Bantu homelands, are linked together into one nation by bonds 
of language - perhaps the most important tie - descent. 
kinship, tradition, tribal relations, customs and pride, 
material interests and many other matters. The national 
consciousness of the Bantu is more deeply rooted than many 
people reali se and are prepared to accept." (Senate Hansard: 
1967: 2830) 
This emphasis on the homeland links of urban black residents led to 
a renewed examination of legislation and the conditions and nature of 
their residence in urban areas. Of particular importance was the 
interpretation of Section 10 qual ifications and the need to extend 
migratory labour as a means of meeting the labour needs of urban based 
industries. This re-examination of the conditions of residence of urban 
blacks was stressed by M.C. Botha to the 1962 conference of lANA, when he 
held out the possiblity of changes in legislation to establish the point: 
" •.. Bantu administration must be seen within the dynamics of an 
evolutionary administration ... within the context of homeland 
conceptions . . . entailing the implication that (the) Bantu's 
presence with the Whites is on a loose or temporary 
basis •.. This often involves the revision of prevailing 
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standards, procedures and technigues because new reguirements, 
fresh perceptions and modernised forms of application come to 
the fore. Thus it has happened that we can consider afresh the 
presence of the Bantu in the White area, in conjunction with 
the development of the Homelands in respect of economic, 
physical and constitutional developments there." (emphasis 
added) (lANA, 1962: 85) 
As remarked above, the most important consequences of the above 
statement involved the nature of the qualifications created by Section 10 
(1) (a), (b) and (c); secondly whether or not Section 10 should be 
amended or scrapped and thi rd ly the emphasi s on mi grant 1 abour, and mo re 
especially frontier commuters, as a means of labour supply to urban 
areas . These three aspects were important and crucial components of 
policy considerations leading up to the introduction of administration 
boards in the early 1970s. An indication of how those aspects interlock 
can be seen in the following statement by M.C. Botha, taken from his 
address to the 1962 lANA conference on "Present and Future Trends in 
Bantu Administration", which also illustrates the preoccupations of 
policy-makers during the 1960s and 1970s. 
"Labour shortages which occur as a result of expansion and a 
natural increased demand, should wherever possible, be met on 
the strict basis of migratory labour. Such labour can be 
accommodated on a single basis, whilst their families remain in 
the homelands. In this way they will retain their ties in their 
homelands without involving the provision of further family 
housing in the White urban areas. Urban Bantu residential 
areas should house the maximum number of labourers and the 
minimum number of unengaged dependants and disabled persons. In 
the above connect io nit must be poi nted out tha t the entrenched 
provisions (sic) of Section 10 of Act No. 25 of 1945, in 
respect inter al i a of Bantu who have 1 i ved in an urban area 
since birth, are often abused and that the basic principle that 
the Bantu's presence in the White sector can be justified only 
by the need for his labour is thereby thwarted. It should 
however, be noted that there are also other impl ications that 
arise from this provision of the law. The most important of 
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these, is the phenomenon of a continuous growth of the urban 
Bantu population as a result of natural increase, irrespective 
of whether or not the labour requirements of a particular urban 
area justifies such a large urban Bantu residential area. 
Further, the admission into urban areas of Bantu women whose 
husbands qualify, is virtually unavoidable, whilst a squatter 
community providing an urban area with labour can compel the 
local authority to provide an urban Bantu residential area 
because of the fact that in the ranks of such a squatter 
community there are bound to be Bantu who qualify for such 
accommodation. In the light of this situation, the time has 
now apparently arrived for the revision of the legal position." 
(emphasis added) (lANA, 1962: 89) 
But Botha went on to argue that influx control during the period 
1951 to 1961 (effectively since the introduction of the revised Section 
10 and the establishment of labour bureaux) had been successful in 
restricting the movement of blacks to urban areas. According to liotha, 
the rate of increase in the urban black population had dropped by 0,75% 
per annum " .. . which tends to show that the measures directed at 
controlling the influx to urban areas have born fruit, especially when 
regard is had to the fact that the rate at which the Bantu population as 
a whole increased had been higher during this period than in the former 
years." (lANA, 1962 : 86) Complementary to this, the number of blacks 
living on white farms had increased during the same period and Botha 
concluded that blacks "who prevlously came from farms to urban areas are 
at prese nt be i ng compelled by the various control measures to return to 
the rural areas or to remain there". (lANA, 1962: 87) Notwithstanding 
the success of the labour bureaux system and Section 10 in slowing down 
the rate of increase in the urban population, the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development was committed to intensifying restrictions 
on mobil i ty, and resi dential qualifications in urban areas for both men 
and women 
The goal was to become one of tightening influx control to the point 
of denying entry of addi tional blacks (both males and females) to urban 
areas. For example, in 1967, Botha argued that influx control had worked 
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"as well as it was physically possible for it to do and that the time has 
now almost arrived where influx control need not allow a single 
additional Bantu into the white areas because the birth machine is 
al ready supplying an ever-increasing number." (Hansard, 1967: 744) 
With this as a brief introduction to official attitudes to influx 
control during the early 1960s, it is necessary to turn to two aspects of 
influx control to show how these attitudes \~ere transformed into policy 
and legislation. The two aspects are Section 10 qualifications and 
mi gratory labour. 
ii) Redefining Section 10 qualifications 
The rationale for introduci ng the 72 hour restriction and the 
different qualifications for urban residence were examined in the 
previous chapter. Suffice to repeat that whereas Verwoerd's explanation 
of the attainment of these qualifications had stressed the need to give 
"certain definite classes, guarantees, security and stability" in urban 
areas, from the 1 a te 1950s offici al atti tudes towards these 
qual ifi ca tions had di stinctly changed. 
Official spokesman referred to them rather as "exemptions from 
influx control" and began to argue that Section 10 created qualifications 
which conflicted with the official policy that blacks were only temporary 
residents in white areas for purposes of selling their labour, as Botha 
had argued in his address to the 1962 lANA conference quoted above. 
These atti tudes fi gured prominently in the deba te on the Ba ntu Laws 
Amendment Bill of 1964 which introduced important new measures relating, 
inter alia, to Section 10 qualifiers. Section 10 qualifiers were now 
specifically subject to removal from prescribed areas under the 'idle and 
disorderly' clause (Section 29) and the definitions of idle and 
disorderly were drastically widened to achieve this. The previous 
wording of Section 29 had not specifically excluded Section 10 qualifiers 
from removal under Section 29, presumably the express inclusion of 
Section 10 qualifiers was to establish the issue beyond doubt. The crux 
of this major change in the status of Section 10 qualifiers was explained 
by M.e. Botha when piloting the Bill through Parliament. 
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"All these Bantu (Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c)) are not 
affected at all as long as they are not there ill egally, as 
long as they are not work-shy, as long as they are not 
undesirable, and as long as they are not superfluous." 
(emphasis added) (Hansard, 1964: 1862) 
The new provisions introduced by the amendment which could secure 
the removal of a person, including Section 10 qualifiers, included : being 
removed if such a person refused employment offered by the labour bureau 
on three occasions; if such a person lost their employment twice within 
six months through their own fau It; and if they had been di smi ssed on 
three occasions within a short period owing to misbehaviour. A range of 
new measures designed to remove persons for political reasons were laid 
down. The effect of thi s amendment was thus that the temporary sojourner 
principle was now fully translated into law, in that all urban black 
resi dents were subject to the possibil i ty of removal if they were deemed 
idle, undesirable or redundant . 
Despite the significance of the 1964 amendment to the status of 
persons possessing Section 10 qualifications, the precise political and 
legal nature of these qualifications remained a source of contention 
within National Party ranks. Even though conservative municipal 
administrators reluctantly accepted that, in effect, they entailed 
permanent residence in urban areas outside the homelands (Kotz!!, 1964: 
25), National Party spokesmen denied they had political connotations of 
"entrenched civil rights" and "citizenship rights" enjoyed by blacks in 
urban areas outside the homelands. Amendments to legislation to make 
this clear were threatened by senior National Party spokesmen but never 
carried out, possibly because throughout the 1960s the scrapping of 
Section 10 was seen as imminent. 
The other important aspect of the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill of 1964 
relates to the entry of women to prescribed areas. As discussed in the 
last chapter, this was a point of major concern to municipal officials 
because the entry of black women to urban areas increased the housing 
commitments of municipalities. Section 10 (1) (c) - the clause which 
governed the entry of women and children to prescribed areas - was 
amended by the requirement of "lawful entry" of such persons. The 
amendment was introduced to restrict still further the possiblity of 
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entry of women and children. The attitude of the Gover nment to the need 
to restrict the right of qualified men to introduce wives and children 
was expressed by G. F. Froneman. a member of the Bantu Affairs Commission. 
duri ng debate on the Bill: 
"I want to ask him (member of the Opposition) : Does he want 
every Bantu in the city who is qualified in terms of the ten-
year or 15-year provision to have the right. if he wants to 
marry a woman in the Bantu areas. to bri ng that woman in in 
terms of the pol icy of the Uni ted Party. yes or no? .. for the 
sake of the undisturbed family life of the Bantu ... . If that is 
the case. I can give him the assurance that there will no 
longer be anything such as a Bantu area and a White area, 
because then everythi ng will be simply Bantu area. That will 
be the result of such a policy." (Hansard. 1964: 3215-16) 
The importance of the debate over Section 10 qual i fications duri ng 
this period lies in the attempt by the Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development to reconcile these qualifications with the belief that 
blacks were only in the urban areas to sell their labour. and hence 
temporarily. While the Bantu Laws Amendment Act certainly reconciled 
these two aspects. through making Section 10 qualifiers subject to 
removal from prescribed areas. this did not see the end of antagonism 
towards these qualifications . 
Botha's remarks on Section 10 qualifications during the Senate 
debate on the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill - with specific reference to 
mobility of holders of such qualifications - foreshadowed new measures 
which would make mobility of such persons virtually impossible. 
specifically in .the Witwatersrand region. Declared Botha: 
"The implication of that Section 10 privilege is specifically 
to give the Bantu no freedom of movement possibilies. for they 
remain anchored to these places where they were born ... It is 
therefore wrong to go and interpret these privileges of Section 
10 as being privileges that gives freedom of movement ." 
(emphasis added) (Senate Hansard. 1964 : 3313-14) 
87 
Botha's statement was supported by his Minister, Daan de Wet Ne1, 
when reject i ng United Party arguments that the Witwatersrand be declared 
one influx control area, so allowing mobility betwen prescribed areas . 
The suggestion was raised by the United Party MP for Benoni: 
"Where does this policy bring us from the practical angle? 
Industry as a whole wants to build up as stable a labour force 
as possible. What earthly reason is there for stopping a man 
living in Benoni from working in Boksburg or Springs or 
Brakpan? .. The Chambers of Industries and the Chambers of 
Commerce all agree that the Reef be one influx control area." 
(Hansard , 1964 : 6168) 
This plea for greater mobility between prescribed areas was rejected 
by De Wet Ne1 primarily on the grounds that it would lead to the 
possibility of obtaining Section 10 qualifications in two prescribed 
areas . 
"The hon. members want to make it one large area , with the 
deliberate object that the benefits conferred by Section 10 (1) 
(a) and (b) of the Group Areas Act (sic) will then be doubly 
applicable ... The hon. members opposite want to have the 
position where a Bantu can have his birth qualifications in one 
area and his long residence qualifications in another area, 
because then he qualif i es for the whole large metropolitan 
area. We do not want that ... Does the hon. member want one 
municipality to provide housing on a large scale, with the 
people going to and fro to work in other areas? ." (Hansard, 
1964: 6172) 
Within two or three years, this aspect of orthodox National Party 
objections to Section 10 qualifications was to be replaced by a 
realisation that allciwing greater mobility between prescribed areas would 
not be without its advantages, namely that it could allow more efficient 
usage of urban based labour so reducing the need to utilise contract 
labour. These arguments were advanced by the Van Rensburg Committee 
report and appear to be the first official realisation of the advantages 
of allowing greater mobility in urban areas. De Wet Ne1 ' s reference to 
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municipal housing commitments seems to indicate that certain 
municipalities feared that if mobility was allowed, they would be faced 
with providing housing for persons who worked in other prescribed areas 
but that it would be the latter municipalities who would reap the 
financial reward of the employers's service levy without having incurred 
any housing costs. IA~lA had at some time during this period come out 
against allowing greater mobility and it is possible that this was the 
reason for it 
In the following year freedom of movement for Section 10 (1) (a) or 
(b) qualifiers between prescribed "areas on the Witwatersrand was made 
condi tional upon such persons being regarded as Section 10 (1) (d) cases 
in the areas to which they moved. A circular from the Chief Commissioner 
to local authorities on the Reef made this clear and pointed out that 
such persons, as Section 10 (1) (d) persons, could then not take up other 
employment in the prescribed area without the permission of the Chief 
Commissioner and not from the municipal labour bureau who handled Section 
10 (1) (a) and (b) labour. 
"U aandag word dringend daarop gevestig dat as magtiging vir 
die toegang van die applikant in die nuwe voorgeskrewe gebied 
toegestaan sou word die Bantoe hom dan op 'n voorwardelike 
basis ingevolge die bepalings van Artikel 10 (1) (d) ... in die 
nuwe voorgeskrewe gebied sal bevind. Gevolglik kan die Bantoe 
by be-eindiging van sy dienste nie in ander werk geplaas word 
of terugkeer na sy vori ge voorgesk rewe gebi ed of na eni ge ander 
voorgesk rewe gebied gaan om werk te aanvaar nie alvorens 
goedkeuring deur hierdie kantoor verleen is." (lANA, 1968f: 6) 
It is not clear from the circular whether or not the person would 
have sacrificed his Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) qualifications in the urban 
area he had previously worked in, but fear of this happening would 
certainly have prevented any movement. But, in any case, such a person 
woul d not easily have obtained access to family housing in the area he 
moved to which would also have discouraged movement . This circular was 
to figure prominently in the late 1960s in municipal reaction to the 
response of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to the 
report of the Van Rensburg committee. Presumably before this circular, 
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movement between prescribed areas on the Reef was conditional upon 
agreement between neighbouring labour bureaux and not of the Chief 
Commissioner. 
Thus, not only did Section 10 restrict movement from non-prescribed 
areas to prescribed areas - as it was originally intended to do - but it 
was now used to prevent movement between prescribed areas. Elements of 
this latter aspect were of course, contained in legislation through the 
1957 amendment to Section 10 discussed in the previous chapter. That 
amendment did not specifically prevent administrative arrangements 
between neighb6uring labour bureaux which would allow movement for 
employment purposes (and not necessarily involving rehousing) but this 
was ruled out by the 1965 circular. 
By the mi d-1960s therefore the Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development had succeeded in making significant inroads into the 
legal status of Section 10 (1) (a) and (b) qualifying persons to the 
extent that a senior offica1 in the Department could argue that the 
immediate scrapping of Section 10 (c) would be contemplated with no 
adverse consequences for influx control. Section 10, as Dr P.S.F.J. Van 
Rensburg correctly noted, embodied two aspects, which he called its 
protectionist and control aspects. Both elements had either been made 
redundant or neutralised by legislation since 1952. Van Rensburg's 
motivations are quoted at length. 
"Daardie artike1 is 'n tweesnydende swaard. Aan die een kant 
gee hy regte d.w. s. die man wat gebore is, ens, het dan sekere 
regte. Aan die ander kant gee hy beheer. Die ander man wat 
daar nie kwa1ifiseer nie, mag nie dit en dat doen nie ... Het ons 
nie a1reeds 'n ander Wet1ike masjinerie geskep waardeur ons 
se' watter omstandighede 'n Bantoe binne 'n beheerde 
. gebi ed .•• mag ingaan en onder wat omstandi ghede hy daar mag werk 
nie? Ons het a1reeds spesifiek voorgeskryf. Dit b1y dan 
onveranderd. Ons het dit nie net voorgeskryf vir die werker 
n ie, 0 ns he t dit ook voorgesk ryf vi r di e besoeker . Mi sk i en is 
dit dan net die afhank1ike wat daar bygevoeg kan word. Met 
ander woorde, die beheer-aspek van Artike1 10 is tans a1reeds 
oorbodig en onnodig ... Dan kom ons by die beskermende of die 
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reggewende deel van Artikel 10 . Nou, dit het ook alreeds 
verval, want wie beskerm Artikel 10 nou eintlik op die oomblik? 
U sal vir my sl! di t beskerm die man wat daar gebore is en 
deurlopend daar gebly het. Hy beskerm hom net solank as hy 
beantwoord aan die arbeidsmark, want die moment wat hy 
oortolli g word, die moment wat hy 'n werkskuwe, 'n probleem-
tipe word, dan het ons alreeds weer Wetsmasjinerie om met hom 
te handel en hy verbeur alreeds weer daardie regte wat hy gehad 
het. Met ander woorde, ook daardie sogenaamde reg wat Artikel 
10 gee, het alreeds verval." (emphasis added) (lANA, 1966: 71l 
The 1964 amendment discussed earlier had eroded what Van Rensburg 
called the protectionist element of Section 10 while the other 
legislation that could be used to control influx included Section 10bis 
of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act and elements of the 1965 
labour regulations. (Government Gazette, 1965) The advantage of Section 
10, though, for influx control purposes, was that it allowed a quick 
check on identification and residence rights via the reference book 
rather than via labour bureaux records which other legislation would 
have had to depend on unless such records were also entered into the 
reference book. 
The second important aspect of conservative criticism of Section 10 
involved access to family housing in prescribed areas or more 
s pecifi ca lly, the exte nt to whi ch hous i ng coul d be used as an ins trument 
of influx control; in other words, who ought to qualify for family 
housing. This issue was important because the future growth of the 
urban black population was closely linked to the extent to which men who 
possessed Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) qualifications were able to have 
their wives join them in prescribed areas and hence undermine attempts 
to but tres s the use of mi grant 1 abou r. 
Two articles by prominent conservative municipal administrators 
from the Transvaal, which appeared in the SABRA journal in 1964 and 1966 
respectively, illustrate these concerns which were soon taken up by the 
Department along the 1 i nes suggested by them. 
C.H. Kotze, of the Transvaal Peri-Urban Areas Board. argued that 
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the provlslons of Section 10 prior to the amendments of 1952 did not 
contain any provisions which municipalities could link with access to 
housing. The amendments introduced in 1952 could however be used in 
this way and a few municipalities - he did not mention which - had taken 
advantage of this to control access to family housing in this way. The 
location regulations of these municipal i ties made access to family 
housing dependent on the attainment of Section 10 (I) (a) or (b) 
qualifications . (Kotzi, 1964) 
It was however A.S. Marais, manager of Boksburg's Non-European 
Affairs Department who - as usual - most forcefully stated the case and 
chastised municipalities on the Witwatersrand for failing to limit 
access to family hous i ng. According to Marais, there were 400 000 males 
in registered employment in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeeniging 
region by the mid-1960s. Of these an estimated 16 per cent, or 64 000, 
possessed Section 10 (I) (a) or (b) qualifications yet an estimated 200 
000 of them had access to family housing. Thus some 130000 persons 
were housed in family conditions when they did not possess these Section 
10 qualifications but most importantly the chil dren of these persons 
would be eligible for Section 10 (I) (a) qualifications because of birth 
in urban areas. Marais estimated that about 300 000 males would, after 
10 years, accordingly be of workseeking age, having been born to these 
parents . He blamed both Section 10's provisions and politicial 
opposition from some of his fellow colleagues for th i s state of affairs : 
"Artikel 10 van die Bantoe (Stadsgebiede) Konsolidasie Wet 
neutraliseer uiteindelik toestromingsbeheer ten opsigte van 
Bantoegesinne in die Blanke stadsgebiede, en die Bantoe kan na 
aanleiding van die bepalings van die artikel met sy gesin 
domicilium in die Blanke gebied verkry. Na skatting het 
o ngeveer 16 perse nt van di e geregi streerde manl ike arbei ders 
tot dusver ingevolge Art ikel 10 gekwalifiseer vir domicilium in 
blanke stadsgebiede in die genoemde grootstedelike kompleks. 
Daar behoort dus 64 000 en nie 200 000 gesinne nie, in die 
gebied onder bespreking te wees. Die fout ll! nie soseer by 
Artikel 10 nie, maar by die toepassing van die nodige maatreels 
om doeltreffendheid ingevolge hierdie beleidskonsekwente 
artikel ten minste te bereik. Die toepassing van die maatreels 
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word dikwels slaphandig toegepas, en vir politieke redes soms 
glad nie werklik toegepas nie, en bring mee dat die gevesti ge 
stedelike bevolkings steeds groter word tot die mate waar 
stedelike Bantoewoongebiede op 'n vergelykende basis met reg 
beskryf kan word as Bantoetui slande in Blanke stadsgebiede." 
(Marais, 1966: 39-40) 
This concern by conservative administrators that the allocation of 
family housing was undermining influx control was mirrored by similar 
concerns within the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. 
The result was a general circular issued in October 1966, indicating to 
municipalities the Section 10 qualifications needed by blacks for access 
to family housing or to get on a waiting list for such housing. Amongst 
the condi tions speci fi ed by the Department were: 
(i) Only Section 10 (1) (a) and (b) males could be put on a waiting 
list for housing; 
(ii) No women, irrespective of whether they possessed Section 10 (1) 
(a) or (b) qualifications, could put their name on the waiting 
1 i st; 
(iii) Men in (i) above had, at the time of application, to be legally 
married to a woman who normally lived in the prescribed area with 
him; and 
(iv) With minor exceptions no Section 10 (1) (d) person could qualify 
for family housing. (lANA, 1966: 79) 
These conditions were announced by F B. du Randt - a senior head 
office official - who made it clear that they were introduced because of 
their capaci t;y to aid influx control. These conditions were later to be 
superceded by the 1968 township regulations which contained similar 
condi tions but presumably, because they were prescribed by regulation and 
not via a circular were mandatory hence ensuring uniform appl ication by 
all municipalities. 
This discussion again reveals how closely tied the pursuance of 
influx control is to housing, and particularly the availability of 
hous i ng. These concerns were tak en up by the Van Rensburg Commi ttee 
whose findings were identical to the above. 
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iii) Promoting Mechanisation and Surplus Labourers 
Another new policy emphasis during this period was to see a 
concerted attempt by the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development at trying to reduce the numbers of blacks employed in white 
urban areas. Throughout the 1960s, Departmental spokesman and National 
Party public representatives consistently argued that extensive "over-
employment" of black labour was taking place in urban industries because 
of low productivity of black workers. For example, M.e. Botha told the 
1962 lANA conference that it could be said without "fear of 
contradiction" that a 10 per cent reduction in the urban labour force 
coul d be ach i eved wi thout any adverse economi c effects. Such a reduct ion 
would have displaced an estimated 280 000 persons. (Van Rensburg, 1967: 
47) 
Botha and other spokesmen on this theme - notably Dr P.F.S.J. Van 
Rensburg, deputy-secretary 
cons tantly urged employers 
unskilled black labour. 
two aspects 
in charge of black labour in the Department -
during this period to mechanise and so replace 
Explanations for this policy emphasis involve 
Firstly, it can be seen as an extension of the ideological basi s of 
i nfl ux control; in that infl ux control duri ng the 1950s had aimed at 
stemming the movement of blacks to the ci ti es, whi 1 e duri ng the 1960s 
these interests were often expressed in attempts to reverse this movement 
and reduce the numbers of blacks in white areas. This explanation is 
essentially an ideological one formulated, for example, by Dr Van 
Rensburg in terms of the dangers to white political interests through 
dependence on black labour. 
"lndien aanvaar word dat die Blanke se volkshuishouding nie 
sonder Bantoe arbeid kan voortbestaan nie, dan moet ook aanvaar 
word dat die Westerse lewenswyse in Suid-Afrika 'n onseker 
toekoms regemoet gaan. 'n Gemeenskap wi e se ek onomi e in di e 
vorm of van kapitaal of van arbeid dus van ander gemeenskappe 
afhanklik is, loop gevaar om uiteindelik onderwerp te word aan 
sy kapitaal-of arbeidsbronne. Ekonomiese selfstandigheid is 
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dus nie beperk tot kapitaa1selfstandigheid maar berus eweseer 
ook op arbeids-onafhanI:1ikheid." (Van Rensburg, 1964: 40) 
The second explanation stress ~ s the changes the South African 
economy was undergoi ng during this period with increasing mechanisation 
and technological change. Departmental spokesmen were certainly aware of 
these changes and wished to promote mechanisation as much as possible. 
For example, M.C. Botha's successor as deputy minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development, B1aar Coetzee, used a National 
Development and Management Foundation seminar in June 1966 to illustrate 
the extent of mechanisation which had already taken place in private 
manufacturing industries on different areas on the Witwatersrand. 
Table 8 
Black/White Ratio in Manufacturing Industries on the Witwatersrand Region 
Area All Races Whites 
East Rand 100 29,4 
West Rand 100 20,1 
Central WWR 100 31,4 
Vanderbi j1 park 100 49,5 
Source: Coetzee, 1966: 8 
Coloured 
and Asians 
1,3 
1,5 
8,6 
0,2 
Blacks 
69,3 
78,4 
60,0 
50,3 
Ratio of 
B1 ack to Whi te 
2,4: 1 
3,9:1 
1,9:1 
1,D:1 
Coetzee concluded that the above figures were "indicative not only 
of the extent to which manufacturing industries in the different areas 
rely on Bantu labour, but also of the desirability of decentralising some 
of them to the border areas. The figures in respect of Vanderbij1park 
area, are proof of what can be achieved by means of mechanisation and the 
discreet use of bantu labour." (emphasis added) (Coetzee, 1966: 8) 
It is against this background that the border industry programme and 
the restrictions on black employment contained in the Physical Planning 
Act of 1967 must be seen. Quotas on the employment of blacks in urban 
areas had been he1 d out as an option si nce at least 1961 and were 
contained in the provisions of the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill of 1963 but 
later withdrawn. They were found in the draft Bill to create Bantu 
Labour Boards, drawn up on the basis of the Van Rensburg report, and in 
the first draft of the Bantu Affairs Administration Board Bill in 1968 
but were exc1 uded from the fi na1 draft of the bill. 
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The importance of the 1964 amendment bringing Section 10 (1) (a) and 
(b) persons under the "idle and disorderly clause" becomes more 
significant when viewed against this background. For to the extent that 
the stress on promoting labour saving devices succeeded and new 
employment opportunities in urban areas were restricted, "surplus" or 
unemployed blacks would have been created who could then be removed, 
irrespective of what Section 10 qualifications they held. M.C. Botha 
acknowledged as much in his address to a SABRA conference in 1963 - the 
year before the amendment - held to discuss the replacement and reduction 
of blacks in white areas: 
"Daar sal toegegee word dat arbeidsgeskikte Bantoe wat uit die 
Blanke gebiede in Bantoetuis1ande hervestig word, daar in die 
tuis1and werk behoort te kry. Bantoe wat uit die b1anke 
gebiede hervestig word, behoort ook te kom uit die ge1edere van 
surp1usarbeiders, wat oortol1ig geraak het vanwee vervanging 
deur ander kwa1ifiserende arbeiders - soos byvoorbeeld 
K1eurlinge in die Wes-Kaap1and - of vanwee arbeidsbesparende 
tegni eke en beter bedryfras i ona 1 i sas i e . " (emphas is added) 
(Botha, 1964: 14) 
The logic of the 1964 amendment is thus clear: it represents the 
extent to which influx control during this period was designed to adapt 
to expectations of large-sca l e redundancies through the promotion of 
mechanisation in urban based industries besides being designed to 
translate the temporary sojourner policy into law. 
iv) The Emergence of Frontier Commuters 
The origins of the frontier commuter system must be sought in the 
report of the Tomlinson Commission which recommended the establishment of 
more than 100 villages and towns in the homelands. (Tomlinson, 1955 : 150) 
The Commission recognised that migrant labour could form the basis for 
many of the proposed towns to which future urbanisation of blacks could 
be channelled instead of to existing towns in "white" South Africa. These 
proposals were accepted by the Government and by 1963 the Department of 
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Bantu Administration and Development was involved in the planning of 53 
such towns involving a minimum of 81 000 houses. (Moolman, 1964: 53) A 
further 20 were under consideration at that stage. The occupants of 
these new towns were to be resettled from townships in "white" South 
Afri ca. 
"When the scheme is complete, the 81 000 houses should normally 
house half a million people. Where will these people come 
from? Surely the majority will come from White areas! It will 
be the resettlement of the urban Bantu in Bantu areas and 
without much fuss. I think we may justifiably draw the world's 
attention to this." (Moolman, 1964: 57) 
The most important of these early examples of border towns were 
Umlazi near Durban, Garankuwa near Pretoria and Mdantsane near East 
London. As Moolman recognised, no such solutions could easily be used 
for the other major metropolitan areas of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port 
Elizabeth and Bloemfontein. It could however be used to supply the 
labour needs of many medium and smaller sized towns and virtually all of 
the black townships in Natal could be removed in this way. (Moolman, 
1964: 55-56) 
It must be noted that the development of these border towns with the 
resettlement of already urbanised persons from white urban areas, served 
as a major vehicle in the neutralisation of Section 10. Not only were 
persons who already held such qualifications moved, but such removals 
prevented the further attainment of these qualifications on the basis of 
birth or length of residence or employment in prescribed areas. 
The severe and precarious conditions of residence in townships in 
"whi te" South Africa were expressly linked with the opportunities to own 
land in these new towns. Indeed, the former was seen as absolutely 
essential to the success of the scheme. 
" ... if you want to di vert a trend in population movement you 
must make the desired direction attractive and easy, and hamper 
the undesired direction by making it less attractive and more 
difficult. Hence all the influx control measures, the no-
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ownership clauses and the absolute ban on foreign Bantu . " 
(Moolman, 1964: 62) 
Official planners expected these less onerous conditions of 
residence to prove sufficient to lead to voluntary resettling on a large 
scale in these new towns by persons living in urban white areas. That it 
understandably did not do so seems to have been the reason for the ban on 
the further provision of family housing in urban areas in "white" South 
Africa in 1967. M.C. Botha's remarks to the 1962 lANA congress 
anticipate the curtailment of urban townships because of this voluntary 
resettling: 
" •.. it is anticipated that in the case of urban areas within 
convenient proximity of Bantu towns in the Bantu homelands, 
Bantu will move from the urban residential areas to the Bantu 
towns in question, where they can acquire full title to land as 
well as any such civic rights as they may aspire to. In other 
words, if the Bantu towns are near, and sufficiently 
attractive, we have every reason to believe that urban Bantu 
will gradually transfer themselves to such towns, particularly 
by way of establishing their families there while they 
themselves remain, as breadwinners, in the urban areas on a 
daily, weekly or monthly basis, as the case may be. The 
results of this anticipated development will be:- a) that it 
will be possible for the existing urban Bantu residential areas 
concerned to be curtailed instead of extended ..• " (lANA, 1962: 
91) 
Municipalities were warned in the same address by Botha to guard 
against undertaking any new developments in the urban townships which "in 
the circumstances must be regarded as excessive or too luxurious." (lANA, 
1962: 91) 
It was, however, the housing freeze announced in 1967 which provided 
the biggest stimulus to the resettlement of urban blacks in homeland 
towns such as Mdantsane. Its effects were to be most pronounced in those 
towns near homeland boundaries. Brief aspects of the frontier commuter 
system and its development under administration boards duri ng the 1970s 
will be examined in a later chapter. 
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Having briefly discussed these new policy developments during the 
earl y 1950s - which must all be seen against the unfolding of the 
homel a nd pol icy - it is now necessary to examine the report of the 
Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into Control r4easures which is an 
important landmark in the unfol ding of future policy directions leading 
eventually to the introduction of administration boards. 
B. The Van Rensburg Report - A Justification for Ending Municipal 
Control 
i) General Framework 
Because the report of the Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry 
into Control Measures has never been published, it is necessary to 
summarise the findings and recommendations in some deta i l . 
The committee was appointed on 22 May 1955 under the chairmansh i p of 
Dr P.S .F.J. Van Rensburg, whose attitudes to influx control have already 
been noted. The other members of the committee were Brigadier F.J.A. 
Rossouw, representing the South African Police; Brigadier F.J. Coetzee, 
representing the Department of Prisons and Mr J.P .J. Coetzee, a deputy 
secretary in the Department of Justice. Mr (later Dr) P.J. van der 
Merwe, then a research officer in the Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development, and later to playa major role in the formulation of the 
Riekert Commission Report, was appointed secretary to the committee. 
The committee was instructed to investigate and report on, amongst 
other aspects; the procedures relating to the admission of blacks to 
prescribed areas; the tracing of blacks illegally employed or resident in 
prescribed areas ; the judici al procedures relating to persons illegally 
resident in prescribed areas; and to the involvement of black authorities 
in the supply of labour to the urban areas. The committee was thus to 
investigate and appraise virtually all aspects of State policy towards 
urban blacks in the decade and a half since the National Party had 
introduced the major new legislative measures discussed fn the previous 
chapter . 
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Two aspects, in particular, informed the approach of the committee, 
influencing its recommendations. Firstly, it accepted, without 
discussion, that the presence of blacks in urban areas could only be 
justified because of the employment opportunities available in white 
areas. The commi ttee quoted Verwoerdls address to the IANA congress in 
1956 on this issue and then argued that the solutions to the problems of 
i nfl ux control, illegal residence and employment, and "workshyness" had 
to be found in the homelands " .. . en dat die Bantoe-owerhede in die 
tuislande aktief daarby betrek moet word. II (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 4) 
Secondly, the committee noted that the proportion of the black 
population living in white urban areas was continuing to increase, even 
though the rate of increase had declined during the 1950s. Since 1936, 
the proportion of the black population living in either white rural areas 
or the reserves had declined with a commensurate increase in the urban 
population. The following table, quoted in the report, illustrates this. 
Table 9 
Percentage Distribution of Black Population 
White Areas 
Year Total Urban Rural Black Areas 
1936 100 18,9 36,2 44,9 
1946 100 24,3 34,0 41,7 
1951 100 27,9 33,4 38,7 
1960 100 31,8 30,3 37,9 
Source: Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 36 
On the basis of the above table, the committee argued that this 
emphasised that the homelands were still discharging population onto the 
white areas, and particularly the urban areas. The growth in the urban 
black population not only created housing problems but, more importantly 
" •.• genoodsaak ook In steeds omvattender administratiewe masjien om 
beheer to kan ui toefen." (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 40) 
These two aspects, the one demographic and the other more manifestly 
ideological, served as the points of departure for the findings and 
recommendations of the committee. These findings and recommendations 
will now be discussed. 
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i) Strengthening Homeland Links: Influx Control and Urban Representation 
It has already been noted that one of the new policy emphases of the 
1960s saw the urban black community as an integral part of the various 
ethnic homelands. These links were closely scrutinised by the committee 
and found to be wanting. Contrary to public declarations by official 
spokesmen during this period, the committee noted - with slight alarm -
that the reality of a separate political future for urban black residents 
ina homeland was very far from being accepted by these residents. With 
the possible exception of the Transkei, the committee said it could find 
no evidence that urban blacks saw themselves as being subordinate to 
tradi tional authori ties in the homel ands. If anythi ng, the contrary was 
happening. 
"Trouens, die bantoes in die Blanke sektor sterk in toenemende 
mate hierdie stamgesag af, vanwee 'n kloof wat tussen die twee 
groepe Bantoes bestaan en geleidelik vergroot."{Van Rensburg, 
1967: para. 166) 
The committee argued that the administrative arrangements within the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development contributed to this 
situation, but, more importantly, argued that the creation of any further 
advisory boards or Urban Bantu Councils or the delegation of further 
powers to these structures would exacerbate the problem. Furthermore, 
members were using the councils as a platform for condemning policy 
matters and the granting of further powers " ••. sal net die posisie 
vererger deurdat hulle in toenemende mate pleitbesorgers van 
"veronregdes" sal word en in 'n groeinde mate die beheermatreils as 
onderdrukkend en diskriminerend sal bestempel, met die gevolglike 
vertroebeling van verhoudings." (Van Rensburg, 1967: 169) 
The committee accordingly recommended the abolition of the Urban 
Bantu Councils and their replacement by a system of homeland 
representatives in urban areas, " ... om die kloof tussen Bantoes in die 
Blankegebied en diE! in die tuisland te oorbrug .. . ". This proposed 
extension of the authority of homeland governments to urban areas in 
whi te South Africa was recommended not only because the committee wished 
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to give more substance to the notion of these links but was, more 
importantly, proposed because of perceived advantages for influx control 
purposes. The homeland authorities were only "spectators" to the whole 
labour bureau process and the implementation of influx control was in 
"white " hands. This, the committee argued, needed to be rectified if 
more efficient influx control was to be attained. 
"Vir sover beheermatree1s dus 'n aange1eentheid is wat suiwer 
en a1leen deur die Blankegesag daargestel en toegepas word 
sonder dat die Bantoe, op wie dit van toepassing is, ingeskake1 
is by 'n Bantoegesag wat die oogmerke van beheer begryp en 
praktiesbevorder, sal die Bantoe alles in sy vermoe doen om dit 
te omsei1 . " (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 170) 
And further 
"Di e samewerk i ng van Bantoe-owerhede sowe1 bi nne as buite Sui d-
Afrika om die wette van die Blanke Regering te gehoorsaam in 
rui1 vir die vooreg om in die Blanke dee1 van die land te werk, ' 
moet dus as 'n voorwarde vir sukses beskou word." (emphasis 
added) (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 340 (3)) 
To achieve the incorporation of the homeland governments in the 
influx control and labour regulation process, the commi ttee recommended 
the extension of labour bureau system into the homelands where bureaux 
should be established at every tribi\l and regional authority, funded by 
contributions by employers of black labour. Illegal entrants and 
"surplus" labourers in urban areas should be referred back to these 
homeland labour bureaux. 
iii) Legal Obstacles to Influx Control 
It has already been noted that a marked hardening of official 
attitudes towards Section las provisions can be traced during the early 
1960s . The amendments to Section 29 introduced during 1964 are a case in 
pOint. These concerns were taken up by the committee whose report 
provided the definitive expression of these hard1ine attitudes. 
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The committee recommended that Section 10 be amended to do away with 
residential qualifications attained on the basis of birth, length of 
residence or employment in urban areas because, it argued, these 
provisions undermined the whole basis of separate development. (Van 
Rensburg, 1967: para. 343 (4)) Efficient influx control was hindered by 
Section 10 - it -argued - because of numerous factors: it was "almost 
impossible" to prevent wives and children from joining their husbands if 
the husbands possessed Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) qualifications; it 
encouraged the attainment of these qualifications through malpractices; 
the 72 hour provision was difficult to enforce and "endless" 
representations from legal specialists and "leftists" hampered 
administration. Thus the committee concluded: 
"As beheerinstrument het artikel 10 eintlik net die 
teenoorgestelde uitwerking as wat ingevolge landsbeleid beoog 
word. In plaas daarvan om Bantoes uit die stede te hou, poog 
Bantoes om op groot skaal verblyfsregte daar te kry." (Van 
Rensburg, 1967: para. 179) 
The crux of these critici sms was that Section 10 endowed residential 
qualifications which were not solely dependant on continued employment in 
prescribed areas; thi s meant that unemployed or redundant persons could 
only be removed from urban areas if they were found by the courts to be 
idle or undesirable. But Section 29's provisions were held by the 
committee to be unsatisfactory in achieving the desired objectives of 
policy. Not only were local authorities not actively pursuing removals 
but administrative difficulties caused by court decisions complicated 
admini stration. 
In particular, the committee noted the implications of an Appeal 
Court decision which, they argued, meant that Section 29's provisions 
coul d not be invoked against a person who was employed in an urban area 
without the permission of a labour bureau, amongst other implications. 
(Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 186-871 On this basis, Section 29 did not 
provide a satisfactory means of acting against blacks who sought 
employment in prescribed areas without recourse to the prescribed 
channels and concluded: 
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"Aangesien ledigheid die grootste euwel is waarmee die 
inspektoraat van plaaslike besture in die voorgeskrewe gebiede 
te kampe het, is dit ontmoedigend dat wetswysigings nie die 
gewenste stukrag aan die administratiewe masjien verleen soos 
daardeur beoog word nie." (emphasis in the original) (Van 
Rensburg, 1967: para. 189) 
This condemnation of Section 29's effectiveness, it must be noted, 
came only a few years after the 1964 amendments which had considerably 
strengthened the powers of Section 29 to deal with persons deemed idle 
and undesirable. The other major criticism of Section 10 concerned the 
extent to which it bottled up labour in urban areas in watertight 
compartments compartments in prescribed areas, so necessitating the 
introduction of contract labour while unemployed persons were to be found 
in neighbouring prescribed areas. Evidence by employer organisations to 
the committee had stressed the lack of mobility and the difficulties 
encountered as a result of the 1965 circular, noted earlier in this 
chapter. 
"As gevol 9 van hi erdi e beperk ing is werksoekers ni e ui truil baar 
nie en sal elke voorgeskrewe gebied afsonderlike werksoekers 
vanaf die tuisland aanvra, terwyl daar in 'n nabygelee 
voorgeskrewe gebied weI werksoekers mag wees. Elke 
voorgeskrewe gebied werk dan min of meer in 'n waterdigte 
kompartement en sal liefs sien dat daar 'n groot aantal 
werklose Bantoes rondstap as om hulle vir 'n ander gebied aan 
te bied." (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 181) 
This "entrenchment" of Section 10 promoted idleness. Instead of 
proposing the withdrawal of the 1965 circular as a means of increasing 
mobili ty of urban blacks, the committee took the extreme step of 
proposing that urban residence be made solely conditional on continued 
employment. It also recommended that workseekers be allowed to move 
between magisterial districts and municipal areas on the basis of supply 
and demand within labour categories, i.e. within the building industry, 
to overcome the problem. It did not mention whether this would have been 
made dependent on the loss of Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) qual ifications 
but presumably the proposal to amend Section 10 would have made any 
comment along these lines unnecessary. 
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These were the major comments and findings of the committee on the 
legal machinery governing influx control. These arguments were to figure 
prominently in the response of the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development - as expressed in the proposal to introduce labour boards and 
later administration boards - which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
iv} Labour Recruitment and Control in the Homelands 
The committee's discussion of recruitment procedures in the 
homelands must be seen as closely complementing its di scussion on the 
need to strengthen links between homeland governments and urban black 
dwellers • 
The major theme which pervaded the committee's discussion in this 
section was of the need for more comprehensive control over the 
recruitment and allocation of labour from the homelands. At the time of 
writing, the homeland governments played no part in the recruitment, 
allocation and canalisation of workseekers. Instead this was undertaken 
by the labour bureaux under the control of the Bantu Commissioners. This 
system, the committee argued, increased the choosiness of workseekers to 
the detriment of recruitment of labour to agriculture and mining, which 
were unpopular choices amongst workseekers. 
"As gevolg van die groot aanvraag vir Bantoewerkers uit die 
voorgesk rewe gebi ede he t da ar 'n toes ta nd van bi e!!ry om di e 
beskikbare werksoekers by die verskillende arbeidsburos 
ontstaan. Dit het ook onder die aandag gekom dat Bantoeklerke 
aan werksoekers meedeel dat hulle nie werk in die landbou- of 
mynbousektor moet aanvaar nie, omdat daar baie werk in die 
stedelike gebiede is en hulle maar net 'n bietjie moet wag 
totdat die volgende rekwisisie vir arbeid kom. As gevol g van 
hierdie bovermelde praktyke., het daar 'n geweldige 
kieskurigheid by Bantoewerkers onstaan. Baie is sel fs bereid 
om vir weke of maande sonder werk te sit eerder as om werk in 
die landbou- of mynbousektor te aanvaar . " (Van Rensburg, 1967: 
para. 197-98) 
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The quote above implies the cardinal principle upon which the labour 
bureau system rested: namely severe State imposed restrictions upon the 
ability of blacks to choose employment opportunities. Voluntary 
ab s te nt ion from the 1 abou r market was seen as undes i rab 1 e and had to be 
coma tted. 
The committee noted a further consequence of existing labour 
allocation machinery which undermined the essence of control; a tendency 
to promote the use of "personal initiative" in homeland workseekers which 
led them to· by-pass the bureaux and seek work in the urban areas 
illegally. This was the result of a "loss of confidence" in the existing 
procedures. 
To overcome these shortcomings, the committee proposed that 
recruitment from the homelands be permitted only from labour bureaux 
established under the control of the homeland governments. (Van Rensburg, 
1967: para. 345 (2) (il) According to the committee, their proposal to 
establish such bureaux under control of the Bantu authorities was 
unanimously accepted by such authorities during the committee's 
deliberations with them. 
"Sonder enige uitsondering het hu11e a1ma1 te kenne gegee dat 
hu11e baie graag self 'n aandee1 wou he in verband met die 
mobilisering en aanbieding van Bantoe-arbeid. Hulle het ook 
bek1emtoon dat werksoekers wat in voorgeskrewe gebiede be1and 
het sonder die nodige vergunning, nie vervo1g moet word nie 
maar na hu11e teruggestuur moet word." (Van Rensburg, 1967: 
para. 202) 
This suggestion was acted upon within a year of the completion of 
the report and became known as eff1 ux control. 
Finally the committee recommended that employment contracts for 
contract labourers from the homelands ought to include a provision for 
their repatri ation at the end of the contract; that a proportion of their 
wages be wi thhel d subject to payment in the homelands at the end of the 
contract and that employers be made responsible for ensuring that 
contract workers returned to the homeland at the end of each contract. 
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v) Influx Control in Non-Prescribed Areas 
The unpopularity of farm labour amongst workseekers in the homelands 
was noted above; this unpopularity pervaded the committee's discussion of 
the farm labour question. 
Influx control procedures were also applicable. in white rural areas, 
though they were not as comprehensive as those in force in urban areas 
Farmers were obliged to register the employment of new employees within 
14 days of date of employment but workseekers di d not have to seek the 
approval of the district labour bureaux when seeking work. The committee 
estimated that the service contracts of as many as 25 per cent of farm 
labourers were not registered with the district labour bureaux, for which 
it blamed the "individualism" of farmers. This also reflected on the 
efficiency of the bureaux system in non-prescribed areas. 
"Dit wil voorkom of distriksarbeidsburo's nie 'n saambindende 
faktor in die Blanke platteland is vir sover dit Bantoe-arbeid 
betref ni e. Daar word 'n groot i ndiw i dua 1 i sme by werk gewers 
ondervind deurdat werkgewers dikwels op hul eie na tuislande 
gaan om arbeid te gaan werf. Hulle omseil nie net die arbeids-
buroregulasies nie maar is ook geneig om op 'n kooperatiewe 
grondslag hul arbeid te bekom en aan te wend nie." (Van 
Rensburg, 1967: para. 206) 
This reluctance to register the service contracts of farm workers 
gave ri se to numerous malpractices - the recruitment of child and female 
labour without permission and the reneging of agreed upon conditions by 
the farmer once he had recruited workers. It was not however the failure 
of farmers to register their workers which was of greatest concern to the 
commi ttee, but rather the need to refi ne the influx control system to 
ensure more adequate farm labour supplies for the farming sector. It 
noted that it was at the insistence of the organised agriculture that a 
policy of separating farm labour from urban labour was introduced, as 
described in the previous chapter. However, even though the bureau 
system had been of major importance in ensuring better labour supplies 
during the 1950s, the committee heard evidence from farmers that they 
were suffering from a labour shortage. In effect, the labour shortage 
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was blamed on two factors - inefficient influx control in urban areas and 
the competition of urban employers caused by higher wages payable in 
u rba n areas. 
"Die geweldige nywerheidsuitbreiding, gepaardgaan met hoe lone 
het in die afgelope dekade Bantoes in die tuislande in groot 
getalle gelok ten koste van die boerdery en mynbou . .• Boonop is 
daar 'n algemene neiging by jong Bantoes om hul weg vanag plase 
na die stede te vind ... Dikwels kla boere dan ook dat hulle net 
met die ou Bantoes op die plase sit. Baie keer is die boer se 
enigste houvas op jong Bantoes om die ouers met afsetting te 
dreig indien die jong Bantoe nie terugkeer nie, al is dit dan 
net bepaalde tydperke elke jaar. Die neiging van Bantoes vanaf 
sowel die tuislande as boereplase om na die stede te gaan, 
veroorsaak 'n lugleegte op plase wat op sy beurt weer deur 
vreemde Bantoes gevul word." (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 215-17) 
Farmers were also blamed for the. shortage because the poor housing 
conditions on farms made employment unattractive. "Sommige boere kan nie 
die noodsaaklikheid van 'n beter tipe Bantoehuis insien nie, aangesien · 
hulle van sienswyse is dat die Bantoe die gelukkigste is in sy 
sel fgeboude hut." (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 21B) 
The recommendations of the committee to overcome the shortage of 
labour and ensure the better registration of workers by the farming 
sector were intricately bound up with its recommendations for influx 
control in prescribed areas. These will be discussed together after a 
brief discussion of influx control in urban areas, to which we now turn . 
vi) Influx Control in Prescribed Areas 
The most important aspect of the committee's report was its critique 
of influx control in urban areas. As the committee acknowledged, a 
commitment to restricting rural-urban mobility and to ensuring the 
efficient functioning of the labour bureaux system rested entirely on the 
capability and commitment of the municipalities in enforcing influx 
control in urban areas. 
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In the previous chapter the conflict during the 1950s between the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development and various 
municipalities over aspects of the new policy dir.ections were discussed . 
It was shown that by the end of the decade, suggestions had been made 
that responsibility for implementing influx control ought to be removed 
from the municipalities which provided the starting point to the 
committee's discussion on influx control. It declared: 
"Dit is vanselfsprekend dat indien 'n plaaslike bestuur wat vir 
die administrasie van die plaaslike arbeidsburo verantwoordelik 
is nie die sienwyse toegedaan is dat 'n Bantoe in die 
Blankegebied terwille van sy arbeid is nie, so 'n plaaslike 
bestuur noodwendig op 'n beleid van integrasie in sy gebied sal 
afstuur. As hierdie gesindheid bestaan, kan eintlik verwag 
word dat daar ook ander probleme in verband met die distribusie 
van die arbeid in daardie voorgeskrewe gebied sal ontstaan. 
Daar sa 1 byvoorbeel d nie veel ·moeite gedoen word om leegleers 
aan te keer nie of om inkruipers in die lokasies en agterplase 
aan di e man te bring nie. · Daar sal ook nie veel druk op 
kieskeurige werksoekers uitgeoefen word nie met die gevolg dat 
daar groot getalle werksoekers gereel d sonder werk in die 
gebied sal rondstap. Dit is bekend dat Johannesburg enige jare 
gelede 'n werksoekerskorps van twee-en-twintig duisend as 
heeltemal normaal beskou vir sy daaglikse omset. Onder druk 
van die Departement het hierdie getal nou glo gedaal na 
ongeveer sewe duisend werkloses per dag. Voeg hierby die feit 
dat stadsrade dikwels die belange van plaaslike werkgewers bo 
beleid stel en dan kan dit begryp word dat munisipale amptenare 
dikwels onder druk verkeer om ook plaaslike belang bo nasionale 
belang te stel." (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 219-222) 
This statement encapsulates the concern of the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development that some municipalities - specifically 
Johannesburg - were more interested in satisfying the local interests of 
industrialists than in enforcing influx control. Industrial interests 
were seen as requiri ng a large labour pool in urban areas from which to 
draw labour while some categories of industrialists preferred to employ 
109 
labour from the homelands rather than to employ available local labour. 
Reasons advanced for this preference for homeland labour included cheaper 
wages; that they were more amenable to discipline; and were less choosy 
about employment involving physical labour, i .e . domestic servants , 
construction and manual labour. Both these aspects were directly 
contrary to policy; with consequences which were unacceptable: 
"Die gevolg van die voorgaande is dat werkgewers nie genoop 
voel om die plaaslike arbeidsbronne ten volle te benut ni e, dat 
hulle werksoekers vanuit die tuislande onwettig aanmoedig en in 
diens neem en dan later druk op die Departement van Bantoe-
administrasie en-ontwikkeling uitoefen om kondonasies toe te 
staan . " (Van Rensburg, 1967: para . 229) 
The criticisms were elaborated on by the committee . For example 
police inspections at a few large employers in Johannesburg had found 
that 16 per cent of the labour force was illegally employed while the 
figure for the buildi ng industry in Johannesburg was estimated at 5 000 
persons . Randburg and Sasolburg were specifically mentioned as having 
ignored the regul ations with regard to the employment of domestic 
servants . With further reference to Johannesburg it was noted that 
during 1964 about 26 000 of the 34 974 requisitions for contract labour 
dealt with persons who were already in urban areas " . .• nieteenstande die 
feit dat daar op elke rekwisisie gesertifiseer is dat die betrokke Bantoe 
nie onwettig in die gebied was ten tye van di e aansoek nie . " (Van 
Rensburg, 1967: para . 226) 
These criticisms were pointing directly to the extent to which , in 
general, municipalities were seen by the Department as not implementing 
influx control as properly as they i ntended it to be performed. This 
realisation - which dates back to the 1950s - raised two issues: ought 
the Department to remove responsibility from the municipalities for 
implementing policy and secondly, what were the consequences for the 
function i ng of the labour bureaux system. 
Both these furidamental poi nts were grasped by the commi ttee. To 
take the latter first : 
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"Die sukses waarmee baie Bantoes vir maande en selfs jare 
onwettig in voorgeskrewe gebiede kan vetoef en werk, ondergrawe 
die doeltreffendheid van die arbeidsburo - en beheerstel en 
maak dit gebiedend noodsaaklik dat metodes in werking gestel 
word om behoorlike kontrole en beheer uit te oefen oor die 
onwettige binnekoms, verblyf en indiensneming van Bantoes in 
die voorgeskrewe gebiede." (emphasis added) {Van Rensburg, 
1967: para. 2271 
The committee was thus facing the inevitable conclusion that the 
entire labour bureaux system was in jeopardy because of defici encies in 
influx control, the result of municipal inefficiency or indifference to 
policy directives. 
The issue of whether or not municipalities ought to remain 
responsible for implementing policy drew no direct recommendation but the 
committee certai~ly raised alternatives to the existing system. 
" •.. die administrasie beheer word deur Of die Departement van 
Bantoe-administrasie en-ontwikkeling of die plaaslike bestuur 
6f 'n benoemde liggaam wat 'n arbeidsraad soos voorsien in 
hoofstuk 4 van Wet No. 18 van 1936 mag wees. Waar van 'n agent 
gebruik gemaak word, moet hy vertrou word en vi r al di e 
werksaamhede verantwoordelik wees soos byvoorbeeld die aansoeke 
vir bewysboeke en dies meer." {Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 3471 
The thrust of the recommendation was not favourable to continued 
muniCipal control; it was to be acted upon by the Department which 
produced a draft bill within a year of the conrnittee's report, removing 
responsiblit;y for labour matters from municipalities. This will however 
be discussed in the next chapter . 
The role of employers in abetting contraventions of influx 
regulations was an important component of the committee's discussion of 
influx control. The extent of employer evasion of these regulations has 
already been briefly mentioned but deserves more detailed treatment. 
Employers, it was argued, were perfectly aware of the regulations. 
Contraventions were caused not through ignorance but because employers 
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considered the contravention of the legal requirements as being of little 
importance, partly because penalties were not severe enough. 
"Getuienis dui oorwe1digend daarop dat Blanke werkgewers 
geensins saamerk om die onwettige binnekoms van Bantoes in 
voorgeskrewe gebi ede die hoof te bied nie. Inderwaarheid wi1 
dit voorkom asof di e meeste B1ankes onwettige indiensnemings as 
onbenullig beskou . Die komitee is dan ook oortuig daarvan dat 
hierdie houding van Blanke werkgewers nie in 'n geringe mate 
verantwoorde1ik is vir die instroming van Bantoes nie." (Van 
Rensburg, 1967: para. 316) 
The ease with which employers could engage and continue. to employ a 
person illegally resi dent in a prescribed area, escaping the attention of 
the inspectorate, meant that influx could not be stopped nor enforced. 
The inspectorate of most of the larger municipalities was understaffed . 
It was unpopular work and did not attract suitable candidates, all of 
which reduced the abi1it¥ of the municipa1it¥ to counter influx . 
A series of wi de-rang i ng recommendations des i gned to shift the focus 
of legal action from the black worker to the employer was proposed . The 
committee argued that the police and the municipal inspectorates ought to 
concentrate on action against employers rather than the black employees 
" •• . omdat optrede teen werkgewers gouer resultate in verband met beheer 
sal 1ewer as optrede teen Bantoe-oortreders". (Van Rensburg, 1967: para . 
355 (2» Only "dramatic action" would however succeed in preventing 
employers from employing persons without the approval of the labour 
bureau: admission of guilt fines of RiO were ineffective . 
"Die enigste effektiewe prosedure sou wees om hulle te verp1ig 
om voor die hof te verskyn en om deur tussenkoms van die 
Departement van Justisie 'n beroep op die howe te doen om swaar 
vonnisse op te 1e . Onder andere kan die howe versoek word om 
die werkgewer kragtens Artike1 14(4) van Wet No. 25 van 1945 te 
ge1as om die koste van die Bantoe en sy gesin se verwydering te 
betaa1 . " (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 318) 
It was also proposed that employers ought to be subject to annual 
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reg is tra t ion; a t the same time provi ding deta il s of blacks in employment 
and of persons who lived on land under an employer's control. These 
details would have to be produced on demand when asked for by authorised 
officials. 
Finally, the committee turned its attention to housing as a 
barometer of the success of influx control. Its discussion was pervaded 
with the notion that blacks were only in white South Africa to sell their 
labour - thus housing ought to only be provided to persons who were 
employed by whites and on a single basis as far as possible. 
However in Pretoria - the only example mentioned - while at least a 
third of registered workers were housed on a family basi s, many of them 
were not fully employed in the urban area. 
"Uit hierdie gegewens blyk dit dus dat gesinsarbeid in 
stedelike gebiede maklik so hoog as 50 persent van die totale 
arbeidsmag kan beloop en dat 'n aansienlike groep in Pretoria -
sowat 14 persent - wat wel huise beset nie as voltydse werk-
nemers in die stedelike gebiede geregistreer is nie. Benewens 
die feit dat Bantoewoonbuurtes herberg bied aan groot getalle 
Bantoes wat nie hulle arbeid aan die Blanke ekonomie afstaan 
nie, vorm hierdie Bantoewoonbuurtes ook ekonomiese groeipunte 
vir die Bantoes .. . " (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 23B-39) 
Contrary to policy, urban areas were thus providing a home to 
persons who wer~ 
family conditions. 
"redundant" to the "white" economy and often housed in 
This finding drew various recommendations. Firstly, 
the committee recommended that "attractive" facilities and privileges -
better housing and higher pensions - be provided in the homelands to 
attract "non-productive" persons occupying housing in urban areas to the 
homelands. But most importantly a ban on the provision of further family 
housing in urban areas "where it was practical" was recommended. At the 
same time, a campaign to combat illegal backyard accommodation and 
squatting was urged because such illegal accommodation would increase as 
a result of a housing freeze, unless energetically combatted . 
The committee stressed that housing could, and should, be used as an 
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influx control weapon. However it noted that the availability of housing 
was not being used to proper effect to control influx - it was not a sine 
gua non for entry - because of doubts over the legal status of regulation 
27 of Chapter VIII of the Bantu Labour Regulations of 1965. The 
availability of approved housing should be an "absolute precondition" for 
the granting of permission to allow new entrants to prescribed areas and 
the doubts over the legality of Regulation 27 should be cleared up, the 
committee urged. 
These findings and recommendations will be placed in context in the 
di scussion of the importance of the Van Rensburg report at the end of 
this chapter. It remains to summarise a few of the remaining issues to 
conclude this summary of the report's findings. 
vii) Passes, Police and Prisons 
Legislation apart, influx control revolves around the reference 
book. For it is the reference book which provides the necessary 
identification and documentation of an individual's rights to be in a 
prescribed area. The role of the reference book came under searchi ng 
scrutiny from the committee: but a basic dilemma over the role of the 
reference book is apparent throughout its discussion. The problem was ' 
one of whether the reference book ought to testify to citizenship of a 
homeland or whether it was an instrument of influx control testifying to 
the nature of res i dence ri ghts in urban areas. 
The committee acknowledged the dominant role of the reference book 
in influx control and that, because it was a symbol of influx control, it 
was di scredi ted and resented. 
"Instede dat die beeld wat oor die bewysboek opgebou is die van 
bewys van lidmaatskap van 'n volkseenheid is, het dit die 
simbool van beheer en obstruksie geword. As gevolg van hierdie 
beel d van die bewysboek is die Bantoe wat sekere vooregte wil 
bereik enersyds teen die bewysboek gekant, en andersyds is hy 
in 'n wedloop met die gereg gewikkel om al die hindernisse wat 
die bewysboek meebring, te omseil .•. Die komitee wil dus 
benadruk dat tensy die klem van beheerinstrument na 'n bewys 
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van 1idmaatskap van 'n vo1ksgemeenskap verskuif word, daar 
voortgegaan sal word om die bewysboek in 'n ongunstige 1ig te 
sien." (emphasi s added) (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 251-54) 
The committee accordi ng1y sugges ted that the reference book ought to 
be given the appearance of a passport for the separate ethnic groups 
(" •.. die bewysboek die voorkoms van 'n passpoort vir e1ke afsonder1ike 
vo1kseenhied moet kry . . • ") and that entries in reference books be 
restricted to details of movement, labour and approved residence. 
These sugges t io ns wou1 d not however ha ve changed the es se nce of the 
reference books : for as long as it, or a replacement document, testified 
to rights of residence in a prescribed area and was subject to production 
on demand, the stigma attached to it as an instrument of control would 
remain. 
These were not the only doubts raised by the committee about the 
functioning of the reference book . It argued that the whole system had 
been reduced to- the level of "paper control" as a result of the large 
number of entries which could be made in a reference book. The emphasis 
on " paper control" negated the intention of the system, created 
loopholes, and diverted attention away from securing the permanent 
removal of influx control offenders from the prescribed area in which the 
offence was committed. 
"Solank die inskrywings i n bewysboeke in oenskyn1ik orde is, 
word die draer nie 1astig geva1 nie. Onder hierdie "papier-
beheer" slaag die 1eeg1eer, die werk10se, die misdadiger, die 
verbode persoon en ander ongeoor100fdes in die stede dikwe1s om 
hu1 verva1ste ident i te i te, dokumente en inskrywings vir In tyd 
bo a11e twyfe1 te hou." (Van Rensburg, 1967 : para . 348 (5)) 
The uti 1 i ty of the reference book as an ins trument of i nf1 ux control 
was greatly hindered by forgeries, destruction of reference books and the 
widespread non-production of the books on demand. That these were 
manifestat ions of antipathy by blacks towards the reference books was 
fully real i sed by the committee. For example, the committee noted after 
a discussion of the use and abuse of temporary reference books -
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particularly the advantages attached to use of them when compared to the 
permanent document - that : 
"Getuienis dui daarop dat onreelmatighede van tyd tot tyd 
opduik en tensy die aangeleentheid deurlopend bestudeer word, 
kan die bewys boek se waarde as beheerinstrument baie verswak 
word." (emphasi s added) (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 258) 
The above aspects, while causing administrative complications, 
hampered police and legal action against possible offenders of influx 
control laws. Even though some 250 000 persons contravened various 
aspects of the gamut of influx control legislation, the committee argued 
that these fi gures were not a true reflection of the real extent of the .. 
contravention of influx laws. 
The enforcement of influx control laws was regarded as "absolutely 
essential" by the police to ensure the removal of persons who did not 
work, to prevent crime and to maintain law and order. But the pursuing 
of these tasks was a "fruitless goal ". 
" . • . dit tans min doel dien om Bantoes wat onwettiglik stedelike 
gebiede binnekom te arresteer . Die vonisse is as 'n ret\l nie 
swaar nie en hulle word in plaaslike gevangenisse gehou en weer 
in die gebied losgelaat. Dit beteken dat daar net 'n kringloop 
van arrestasie - verskyning voor die hof -loslating uit die 
gevangenis en herarrestasie plaasvind. Selfs verwydering laat 
min, want hulle keer net weer terug. Die polise se 
bedrywighede beoog dus slegs om te verhoed dat die toestroming 
van Bantoes nie 'n vloed word en deur ' n vlaag van misdaad 
gevolg word nie." (Van Rensburg, 1967: para. 354 (2)) 
·Court proceedings were almost totally futile, it argued, and did not 
succeed in breaking the cycle of illegal entry to prescribed areas. 
Furthermore, the influx legislation and court sentences were regarded 
with "absol ute contempt" by blacks who accepted them as a ri sk whi ch they 
necessarily took if they wanted to work in prescribed areas. A court 
appearance provided experience and knowledge which could later be used to 
avoid police on release. 
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Despite these problems, the police and municipalities annually 
referred some 250 000 persons to the courts on charges of contravening 
aspects of the influx control legislation. 
An indication of the number of persons convicted on these charges 
was provided by the report : of a group of 108 899 male parolees who had 
been sentenced to four months imprisonment for the year ending 30 June 
1966, 42 per cent were influx control offenders. 
It has already been mentioned that the commi ttee argued that more 
success would be achieved in stemming influx control if action were taken 
against employers rather than against blacks found illegally in 
prescribed areas. The important nature of these recommendations becomes 
more apparent when it is realised that very few prosecutions against 
employers were undertaken during this period. In the first six months of 
1965 only 1 439 cases involving whites were brought before 26 Bantu 
Commissioners offices for sentencing compared to 105 836 cases involving 
blacks. 
viii) The Task Ahead 
The committee's concluding remarks that its recommendations were an 
inter-dependant whole illustrates its awareness of the magnitude and 
comprehensive nature of the task of clamping down still further on 
ill egal entry to the towns. The report is notable for its frank 
appraisal of the problems of influx control implementation but this did 
not lead it to the conclusion that influx control was, by nature, 
difficult to enforce. Instead, the realisation that influx control had 
lapsed into a system of "paper control" of bureaucratic routine served 
o~y to spur the committee on to advocate still tougher and more 
systematic procedures on a wide range of issues. The removal of 
municipal control over labour regulation, to get around the alleged 
indifference of Opposition controlled municipalities, was a direct 
consequence of the report. 
C. Conclusion 
The importance of the Van Rensburg Committee in formulating future 
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Departmental policy cannot be stressed sufficiently even though not all 
of its recommendations were acted upon by the Department. On the basis 
of these recommendations the Department set about introducing new 
legislation and regulations during the last few years of the 1960s which 
culminated in the introduction of administration boards . These 
developments will be examined in the next chapter but for the sake of 
chronology, developments during 1967 are discussed here. 
The first major step the Department took was to define those 
categories of persons who it regarded as "superfluous" to the labour 
process and hence as candidates for resettlement in the homelands. The 
Van Rensburg committee had argued that the urban areas were sheltering 
and accommodating persons who were not employed or were self-employed 
outside of the "white" economy. The definition of these redundant 
persons came with the distribution of General Circular No. 25 of 1967 
(Mare, 1980: 75-87) to municipalities which informed them of the 
Department's determination to proceed with the resettlement in homelands 
of redundant persons. The circular identified three categories of 
persons who were to be resettled: firstly, the aged, unfit, widows, women 
with dependant children and families who did not qualify for family 
housing in urban areas; secondly, blacks on farms who were either aged, 
or di sabled or who were affected by the application of Chapter Four of 
the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936, or were squatters from mission 
stations and black spots which were being .cleared and finally, 
professional blacks such as doctors, lawyers, and traders . This last 
category were candi dates for resettlement because they were "not regarded 
as essential to the labour market". 
The Department instructed municipalities to make quarterly returns 
of the numbers of persons who could be resettled in the homelands and 
within a year of the distribution of the circular, Departmental 
cal culations provi ded for the removal of an enormous 100 000 famil i es 
from urban areas. These estimates were presumably based on returns by 
municipalities. Within the next few years over 100 000 persons were 
removed from urban areas on these grounds but this will be more fully 
discussed in the next chapter. The application of Chapter Four of the 
Bantu Trust and Land Act to 13 di stricts in Northern Natal alone was 
expected to see the removal of over 100 000 persons. (lANA, 1968: 30-31) 
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It is now necessary to chart the developments in the years 1968 to 
1971, when the administration board bi 11 was passed by Parl i ament so 
providing the highlight of the implementation of the Van Rensburg 
Commi ttee report. 
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IV . THE INTRODUCTION OF ADMINISTRATION BOARDS: 1968-1971 
This chapter wi ll discuss the major changes which the Department of 
Bantu Administration and Development began to implement on the basi s of 
the findings of the Van Rensburg Committee. Important new developments 
in legislatio'n, and in regulations designed to tighten influx control 
were made during this period; this culminated in the vesting of 
responsibility for urban black administration in especially created 
administration boards. The cha.pter begins by examining the changes in 
policy and regulations - to Section 10, influx control and housing - and 
then attention will be paid to the process of ending municipal control 
and the issues and problems raised during the search for new 
administrative structures in both urban and rural areas to implement 
these changes. 
A. Policy Developments 
i) Section 10 
The recommendation of the Van Rensburg Committee that residential 
rights be based solely on continued employment in urban areas heralded 
the start of a concerted attempt by the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development to remove Section 10 from the statute 
book. During 1968 and 1969, the Department proposed legislation which, 
in the first instance, scrapped Section 10 while the freezing of further 
qualifications was proposed in the second piece of draft legislation. 
These Bills - to introduce Bantu Labour Boards and the first draft of the 
Bantu Affairs Administration Board Bill - were the closest the Department 
came during this period to either expunging Section 10 from the Statute 
Book or preventing the attainment of Section 10 qualifications by persons 
on the grounds of birth in urban prescribed areas. But they had backed 
down by late 1969, on both counts, for reasons which will be shown . 
These developments must be traced through, although the details of 
the two bills and how they affected Section 10 will be discused later in 
the chapter. For the moment it is necessary to discuss the policy and 
attitudes of senior representatives of the Department of Bantu 
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Administration and Development towards Section 10 during this period. 
The 1968 lANA congress - restricted to municipal officials and 
Departmental representatives and which excluded municipal council 1 ors -
was held against the background of the draft legislation to remove the 
administration of influx control and labour regulation from the 
municipalities and to vest it instead in new administrative structures, 
Bantu Labour Boards. During the congress long, sometimes heated, debate 
over Section 10 emerged, with the Department determined to get rid of 
Section 10, while municipal administrators were split into two camps on 
the issue. 
M.C . Botha ' s opening address to the congress set the tone for a 
concerted Departmental attack on Section 10. He repeated the by then 
standard assertion that Section 10 only existed to give blacks already 
resident in urban areas preferential access to the labour market and an 
exemption from influx control. Botha was backed up by three senior 
representatives from his Department who indicated that if Section 10 
could not be scrapped outright, then, at the very least, a freeze on the 
further acquisition of such qualifications should be instituted. 
The address by one of the senior representatives - F .B. du Randt -
provides a perfect example of the dilemmas and problems which the 
Department was facing as a result of the introduction of Section 10 
qualifications in 1952, and what courses of action were open to them to 
overcome these problems. Du Randt's explanation of the origin of Section 
10 and subsequent attempts by the Department to restrict its provisions 
is quoted at length because his statement summarizes the changed 
Departmental attitudes towards it, and the determination to either repeal 
or drastically amend it. 
"Ek het op een stadium 'n studie probeer maak om vas te stel 
waar hierdie berugte, of beroemde artikel 10 nou eintlik 
vandaan gekom het, en ek het ook die debatte in die Volksraad 
gelees en die motivering daar was pragtig. Die groot gedagte 
was (a) om darem nou onnodige krapplekke te verwyder deur die 
toelating van die 72 uur en tweedens - om 'n taamlike stabiele 
gemeenskap daar te stel uit hoof de van artikel (a) en (b), en 
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ook in 'n mindere mate (c). Min het ons destyds geweet dat ons 
hierdie prob1eme gaan opte1 wat ons we1 opgete1 het in die 
proses sedert 1952. Ons het die artike1 nou a1, meen ek, op 
vier ge1eenthede sedertien gewysig, maar desondanks b1y dit nou 
nog 'n steen des aanstoots en sal seker 'n steen des aanstoots 
b1y omdat dit reel reg indruis met ons be1eid soos ons hom 
verstaan ... Trouens, ons werk a1 jare aan 'n aftake1ingsproses. 
U kry dit, byvoorbee1d, in artike1 29 dat as 'n persoon 
verk1aar word as 'n 1edig, of 'n ongewenste persoon, dan kan sy 
kwa1ifikasie onder 10 (1) (a), (b) of (c) verbeur word. 
angel ukki g, om dinge nog erger te maak - en ek se dit ni e by 
wyse van kri tiek nie - het die howe snaakse uitsprake gegee, 
snaakse verto1kings gegee aan artike1 10, verto1kings wat ons 
bes1is nie daarmee bedoe1 het nie en vera1 gaan dit oor artike1 
10 (1) (c). Ons het hom probeer afwater oor die jare 
heen .•. maar desondanks word di t ui tge1€ by howe asof 'n vrou 
so 'n reg outomaties het die dag wanner sy met die man 
trou ... Gevo1g1ik b1y daar nou vir ons geen ander weg oop 
aangesien die bestaan van -artike1 10 reel reg strydig is met 
be1eid, met die tyde1ikheid van die verb1yf van die Bantoe. 
Daar b1y dan nou vir ons geen ander weg oop nie as hom of 
hee1tema1 te heroep, of af te water. Gevo1g1ik b1y dit nou oor 
om te oorweeg wat ons beste strategie is." (emphasis added) 
(lANA, 1968: 111-12) 
Du Randt proposed two courses of act ion: creating somethi ng more 
"positive" than Section 10 which would link every black person, whether 
born in a homeland or not, with an ethnic homeland, after which Section 
10 could be scrapped, or secondly freezing further acquisitions of 
Section 10. The Department had earlier in 1968 circulated a draft bill -
the Bantu Population Registration Bill - which, it felt, could serve as a 
forerunner to allow for the expunging of Section 10 from the statute 
book: 
" ... en dit dan tuisbring onder ons stede1ike bevo1king dat jou 
hei1d nie hier te vinde is nie, dat jou heil in jou tuis1and is 
- daar kan jy jou pol i tieke regte ui toefen - en dat as onsself 
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in daardie verband kon verkoop, dan kon ons artike1 10 skrap. 
(lANA, 1968: 112) 
Besides these symbolic aspects, the scheme had very real practical 
advantages for influx control. Ou Randt appeared to compare the 
advantages which would follow after establishing homeland citizenship 
with the repatriation of unwanted foreign nationals from South Africa to 
their country of origin. In the eY'es of the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Deve10pme.nt, homeland citizenship would allow the 
internal repatri ation of unwanted blacks from urban areas to the 
homelands. 
" ..• dat e1ke Bantoe wat die Bantoetuis1and ver1aat in besit 
moet wees van In paspoort uitgereik deur sy land van herkoms. U 
sal nou die ana10gie sien tussen die ste1se1, byvoorbee1d, met 
die Ma1awiers en die ste1se1 wat ons beoog vir ons eie 
tuis1and. Eerstens word die man geidentifiseer as In onderdaan 
van die Tswanavo1ksgroep, afgesien van waar hy gebore is. Dit 
beteken dat as hy nie meer in die b1ankesektor aanvaarbaar is 
nie, dan moet daardie Tswanavo1ksowerheid hom aanvaar . Dan kan 
daar nie geargumenteer word wie se baby hy nou eint1 ik is nie." 
(emphasis added) (lANA, 1968: 113). 
The Department had hoped to push the Bill through Parliament in 1969 
but it was o~y in 1970 that the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Bill was 
passed by Par1 i ament, establishing homeland ci tizenship for every black 
South African regardless of whether he was born in a homeland or not. In 
the meantime the Department had dropped plans to remove or freeze further 
attainment of Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications on the basis 
of birth in urban areas but it still remained a policy objective. 
Du Randt I s second opt ion was to freeze all further attainments of 
Section 10 from an unspecified future date - so that Section 10 would 
eventually disappear. He denied however that as soon as such an 
amendment was passed, that "the next day" a million blacks in urban areas 
would be arrested and sent to the homelands. 
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"Trouens, soos iemand vanoggend gesi het, ek voorsien dat dit 
ook sal gebeur dat daar eint1ik niks sal gebeur nie, dat 
dieselfde swart gesigte nog op die vo1gende dag daar sal wees, 
maar ons het dan minstens die sie1kundige dee1 van die oor10g 
gewen sodat niemand by ons aanspraak kan maak dat dit nou sy 
reg is om hier in Johannesburg of Pretoria te wees nie. "I am 
here only on sufferance"." (lANA, 1968: 113) 
But immediately having said that, Du Randt proposed an amendment 
which would allow easier removal of unwanted blacks from urban areas. 
"Ons sal dus in elk geva1 'n aanpassing moet maak, iewers in 
ons 10kasie-regu1asies of as In wysiging van artike1 10, om 
voorsiening te maak daarvoor dat die mense wat dan nou die 
kwa1iflkasie het -10 (1) (a), (b) of (c) - nog daar kan 
aanb1y, maar hierdie keer vol gens een of ander magtiging wat in 
elk geva1 ingetrek kan word." (emphasi s added) (lANA, 1968: 
113-114 ) 
Bearing in mind that removal from a prescribed area in terms of 
Section 29 also affected persons who held Section 10 qualifications, 
although the Van Rensburg Committee had testified to the difficulties and 
obstacles faced in invoking Section 29, it seems that Du Randt might have 
been proposi n9 that these removals by-pass the courts and be undertaken 
purely by regulation at an administrative level. If so, influx control 
would have entered a new era. 
Even though Du Randt denied that wholesale removals of persons 
regarded as redundant to the economy would take place if Section 10 was 
repealed, substantial numbers of persons were being removed during this 
period on these grounds. Between 1968 and 1971 (inclusive), according to 
the annual reports of the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development, 132 255 persons who were not productively employed in urban 
areas were removed to the homelands. It is not clear from the annual 
reports whether these persons possessed Section 10 qualifications, but 
the general tenor of the announcements seems to indicate that they did. 
Du Randt's recommendation that plans to remove Section 10 be delayed 
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until the homeland ci tizenship issue was solved were supported by I.P. 
van Onselen, soon to become secretary of the department.(IANA, 1968: 117) 
These Oepartmental proposals were met with mixed feelings from the 
municipal administrators. On the one hand, they found enthusiastic 
support from some administrators who, at times, were less patient and 
more determined than the Department to get rid of Section 10. On the 
other hand, the lANA Council, largely at the urging of W.J.P. Carr from 
Johannesburg, while recognising that ultimately any decision to amend 
Section 10 was a policy matter for the State to decide on, warned against 
hasty action summarily removing Section 10. 
Carr, in a forthright statement, stressed that "the rights which are 
enjoyed by people in terms of Section 10 are very real ones and that they 
wei gh heavily wi th the people who enjoy these ri ghts. " 
"So therefore, I say to you that the abolition of the rights 
such people enjoy in Section 10 is a very serious thing indeed. 
A very serious thing indeed, if taken away from the people, can 
only result in deep disappointment and bitter distrust of all 
of us and I ask you to most earnestly consider this seriously 
before you do it."(IANA, 1968: 106) 
Faced with more fundamental criticisms of the Bantu Labour Boards 
Bill - detailed later in the chapter - the Department withdrew the 
measure. The following year - 1969 - the first draft of the Bantu 
Affairs Administration Board Bill was circulatedto the muniCipalities 
for comment; it contained a clause - Section 23(3) - freezing all further 
attainments of Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications from 
whenever the Act would have commenced. In the meantime the Department was 
putting the finishing touches to the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Bill, 
creating compulsory citizenship of one of the various homelands for every 
black South African. In effect, the Department was implementing both of 
Du Randt's options. 
However, by the end of 1969, although the Department had decided not 
to proceed with plans to freeze Section 10 it remained a policy 
objective. Dr P.G.J. Koornhof, deputy minister of Bantu Administration 
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and in charge of negotiations with the municipalities over the 
Administration Board Bill, affirmed this when he opened the 1969 lANA 
conference. 
"Ek ·het my dusver beperk tot die werker. Wat van hu11e 
gesinne, vera1 die wat nie geskik is vir die arbeidsmark nie? 
Solank ons natuur1ik artike1 10 (1) (a), (b) of (c) op ons 
wetboek het, het ons 'n prob1eem in hierdie verband en dit spyt 
my om u mee te dee1 dat ons nog nie nou kan kom met wysigende 
wetgewing om hierdie kwa1ifikasies te beperk of te verwyder 
nie, dog di t sa 1 seker ter ge1egener tyd kom. Ons wi 1 eers di e 
positiewe doen om nie besku1dig te word as sou ons mense as t 
ware in die lug en sonder 'n tuiste 1aat nie . " (lANA, 1969; 7l 
The extent of the frustration which this back down by the Department 
over Section 10 must have caused administrators, both in the Department 
and in the municipa1i ties, who were committed to the idea of resettling 
unproductive persons · in the homelands, can be gauged by estimates that 
there were 3,8 million "superfluous" blacks in urban areas during this 
period. This was the rather official sounding estimate provided by G.F. 
Froneman, deputy chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission. (South African 
Institute of Race Relations, 1969: 150) 
While this wrangling over proposed legislation affecting Section 10 
continued throughout 1968 and 1969, it was at the administrative level 
that the most important medium term consequences for Section 10 were 
undertaken by the Department. This occurred as a result of changes in 
regulations which affected the ability of persons to qualify for Section 
10 (1) (b) on the basis of length of service or residence in urban areas. 
The Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas) introduced with effect from 1 
April 1968, (Government Gazette, 1968b) amongst other aspects, aimed at 
promoting the use of contract labour in urban areas through restrictions 
on the ability of such persons to qualify for urban residence. This was 
achieved by limiting the length of a contract to one year or 360 shifts. 
At the end of the contract period the employee had to return to the 
homeland and this enforced break from the urban areas was used to prevent 
further qualifications of Section 10 (1) (b). 
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A continual cycle of migrancy from the homelands to urban areas has 
been the consequence of this aspect of the regulations. Further detail s 
of the regulations will be di scussed below in the section dealing with 
labour allocation. 
To restate, it is possible to identify four inter-rel ated aspects 
which explain the Department of Bantu Administration and Development's 
hostile attitude to Section 10. Firstly, the qualifications were seen as 
bestowing political rights on blacks outside the homelands (which in any 
substantial sense they did not); secondly, that it was a reaction and 
resentment against court decisions which upheld the rights of women to 
join their husbands in urban areas and qualify for Section 10 (1) (c) 
qualifications; thirdly, that it was to prevent the urbanisation of 
blacks in "white" South Africa while still allowing continued flows of 
single labour via the labour bureaux system and, fourthly, that the 
removal of Section 10 from the statute book would have made the removal 
of unwanted blacks from urb"an areas much easier. Even though the 
Department was unable to succeed in all these aims, the success of the 
1968 labour regulations in preventing the attainment of Section 10 
qualification by many hundreds of thousands of males must be seen as a 
major victory for the Department. Nevertheless, the commitment to 
repealing Section 10 was carried into the 1970s. 
i i. Hou sing and I nfl ux Control 
The importance of housing as an instrument of influx control has 
al ready been discussed in some depth duri ng the previous two chapters. 
The recommendations of the Van Rensburg Committee had been the most 
recent urgings in this regard and during 1968 and 1969 the Department set 
about utilising housing to its fullest possible extent as an agent of 
influx control. This was achieved through two actions in particular -the 
ban on the further provision of family housing in urban areas and 
secondly through regulations restricting access to housing in urban areas 
to certain narrow categories of persons. 
To take the latter case first. It will be remembered that late in 
1966 the Department of Bantu Administration and Development had issued a 
gener~ circular to local authorities delineating the categories of 
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persons who could occupy housing or be placed on a waiting list. It was 
made quite clear at the time that these restrictive categories were a 
valuable aid to influx control. 
However, in June 1968 the Department went a stage further and 
promulgated a set of regulations for the "control and supervision" of 
urban residential areas which, amongst other aspects, also delineated 
access to housing. (Government Gazette, 1968a) 
Four categories of housing permits were recognised by the 
regulations - si te permi ts, residential permits, certificates of 
occupation and lodgers permits. While it is not necessary to spell out 
all the condi tions under which a person could qualify for housing under 
one of these categories, brief details of each will be given to show how 
influx control had become so closely allied to access to housing . 
. "
Site permits were permits granted by local authorities to persons 
enabling them to build a house on a site provided by the local authority 
in an area zoned for the ethnic group of the applicant. Such permits 
could only be issued to persons who, most importantly, were (i) males 
over the age of 21, (iil were qualified under Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) 
to remain in the prescribed area and if his dependants were qualified 
under Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) to remain as well, and ( i ii} if the 
applicant was not a citizen of a foreign state. A site permit could be 
granted to a woman who had dependants to support, but was subject to the 
approval of the Minister. These permits were however conditional upon 
the local authority providing sites - thus if a local authority did not 
wish to make si tes available, no permits could be granted. 
Residential permits ~ere the most important form of access to 
housing, involving the renting of housing from the local authority. " These 
permits could be issued to persons who were, inter alia, (i} males over 
the age of 21, (iil if they were qualified under Section 10 (1) (a) or 
(b) and their wife was domiciled in the prescribed area, and (iii) if the 
applicant was employed or performing a lawful occupation. 
Persons who di d not meet the stipulated conditions - adult women 
with dependants or males with dependants (presumably whose wife had died 
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or if he was di vorced) - coul d, with the permission of the Chief Bantu 
Affairs Commissioner, be granted a permit. 
The third possibility of access to housing was through the local 
authori1;y selling the right of occupation of a house. These certificates 
of occupation could only be issued to males who met the conditions 
summarised immediately above. No mention was made of the conditions 
under which a woman with dependants could obtain rights to such housing, 
unlike the categories dealt with above. 
Restrictive though the qualifications needed before a person could 
qualify for one of the above three categories were, the continued 
residence of a permit holder was also subject to stringent conditions. 
The permit could be revoked by the township superintendent on 30 days 
notice on one of no less than 15 counts but most importantly if the 
permit hol der was (i) unemployed for more than 30 days (unless on grounds 
of il lness), (ii) being in unauthorised employment for more than 30 days 
outside the prescribed area in which his housing permit was granted, 
(iii) lost the Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) qualification or (iv) was, in 
the opinion of the superintendent, no longer a "fit and proper person to 
res i de in the Bantu reside nt i al area". 
Women who had been granted these permits stood to lose them if they 
married; entered into a customary union or lived in a state of 
concubinage. In addi tion, hol ders of residential permits had to renew 
their permits every 30 days and these could be cancel led if the hol ders 
di d not continue to meet the conditio·ns under which they were granted . 
I f the permi t, for wha tever reason, was revoked the hol der and hi s 
dependants had to leave the residential area unless given permission to 
remain. It was thus possible for a person who lost his housing permit -
not necessarily because he had lost his Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) 
qualifications - to be ordered to leave the prescribed area. This is an 
example of how the township regulations could be used as an agent of 
influx control to deny continued residence in prescribed areas on grounds 
which had no real connection with influx control. The importance of 
gaining access to family housing was made all the more crucial since 
families who did not qualify for family housing were liable to be 
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resettled in homelands in terms of the 1967 circular referred to in the 
previous chapter. 
Besides site and residential permits and certificates of occupation, 
the local authority could issue lodgers permits allowing families or 
i ndi vi dual s to share accommodation with families granted houses. Lodger 
permits cou1 d only be granted subject to virtually the same condi tions 
applicable to the other categories of permit holders and were, likewise, 
renewable monthly. The effect · of these housing regulations has been 
illustrated by the Black Sash in detailed comments. (Black Sash, 1971; 
Black Sash, 1974) These regulations ensured a country-wi de uniformity 
where previously municipalities had been able to set their own conditions 
which had varied considerably, as shown by the comments by Kotze and 
Marais quoted in the previous chapter. 
It was also during this period that the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development, in pursuing the policy of promoting 
frontier commuters and migrant labour as the basis of supplying labour to 
urban industries, clamped down on the provision of further family housing 
outside the homelands. Local author.ities could not build more family 
houses without the prior permission of the Department which would only 
grant such permission if it was not possible to build the houses in a 
nearby homeland. (Smit and Booysen, 1977: 10) In a further refinement of 
this policy, the Department announced in 1969 that (i) blacks employed in 
a town near a homeland should be housed on a family basis in a township 
within the homeland from where they had to commute to work and (ii) where 
such distances were too great to allow daily commuting, then the persons 
employed should be housed on a single basis in the urban area while their 
families remained in the homelands. (Morris, 1981: 76) Thus policy, in 
certain instances, aimed at the removal of whole black residential areas 
to the homelands - such as Duncan Village in East Lonon - or where this 
was not possible then to remove wives and dependants to the homelands. 
Just as municipal administrators were divided in their response to 
the proposa 1 s of the Department over Sect ion 10, so too were they di vi ded 
on this issue. The majority certainly welcomed it: one of the most 
outspoken was A.S. Marais of Boksburg, a senior municipal official . 
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lOOns doelwit is vestiging van die misplaasde duisende gesinne 
in ons stadsgebiede - merk my woorde, vestiging nie 
hervestiging nie - vestiging van misplaasde gesinne in ons 
stadsgebiede; dat dit ons doelwit is en dat ons doelwit 
uiteindelik trekarbeid is en trekarbeid alleen . • Waarom se 
ons nie hier nie, kyk dit is ons doelwit, trekarbeid, vestiging 
van misplaasde gesinne Bantoebevolkings in ons stede."(lANA, 
1969 :· 106) 
Marais was the most outspoken member of lANA with an uncompromising 
commitment towards this aspect of Departmental policy based on his 
experience in Boksburg. Boksburg, with 58% of its workforce consisting 
of contract labour by 1969, had one of the highest proportions of 
contract labour of the Witwatersrand towns. Marais' address to lANA in 
1971 - after his retirement from municipal administration - was a 
hardline speech detailing his persona] philosophy, reflected above, and 
lashing out at liberal "cliches" and criticisms of National Party policy. 
He was thanked by another prominent conservative municipal offici al, Dr 
P.J. Riekert of Potchefstroom in the following terms: 
IOU siening van die stelsel van trekarbeid getuig nie net van 
deeglike kennis van die praktyk nie, maar is die siening van 'n 
Christenmens en 'n patriot duidelik losgemaak van 'n sieklike 
sentimaliteit en filantropisme." (lANA, 1971: 18) 
But other administrators were seriously concerned about the 
difficulties which the implementation of the policy would cause, 
especially in towns which were not close to homeland boundaries, or where 
gross overcrowding of existing housing already . existed and would be 
severely aggravated by a ban on further housing. J.C . Taljaard, deputy 
di rector of Pretori a's Non-European Affairs Department, estimated that 
about 7 000 of the 22 000 family houses in Pretori a were al ready 
i nhabi ted by more than one family, largely as a result of natural 
increase and not through influx from outside. (lANA, 1968: 43) Taljaard 
pleaded the difficulties such a policy would cause in Johannesburg but 
recognised that the situation was slightly different in Pretoria because 
of its proximi ty to a homeland. Nevertheless, he argued that the 
Department had not reali sed the full extent of the probl ems and 
difficulties the policy would cause to municipalities. 
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"Dit is dinge hierdie wat vir my tot groot onrus stem. Eerlik 
waar - en ek se weer, met al die erns tot my beskikking - dink 
ek dat ons hierdie probleem en die omvang van die probleem glad 
nie vasgestel het nie, en ek di nk voordat ons iets kan doen, 
werklik waar in die ware sin van die woord kan aanpak en 
deurvoer, behoort ons vas te stel wat is die omvang van ons 
probleem. "(lANA, 1968: 43) 
In Soweto, "literally thousands " of houses were occupied by two or 
three families living in four roomed houses . This was not only the 
result of a general shortage of houses but was due to the housing 
regulations which prevented many thousands of families from gaining 
access to a house of their own. T.W.A. Koller, deputy director of 
Johannesburg's Non-European Affairs Department, came out strongly against 
the pol icy and warned of its consequences. 
" . .. I want to assure you that a most serious position is 
developing in Soweto ... This position is .getting worse and 
worse. I have heard some talk from the floor • .. that there 
shoul d not be anymore family accommodation allowed to be 
erected or built in the urban areas. This sort of talk 
frightens me to death because I see the position in 
Johannesburg deteriorating so rapidly, that in no time we are 
going to have one of the worst and greatest slums that this 
country has ever known if it is allowed to continue .. . you will 
never be able to accommodate thes.e people in the Bantu 
homelands at . the present rate at which .they have been 
developed. You will never be able to do it." (lANA, 1968: 44) 
The colltlined housing shortage of persons qualified to be in Soweto 
or Pretoria was an estimated 17 000 family houses in 1969. (lANA, 1969: 
3D) That these critic i sms made some slight impression on senior 
Departmental representatives at the 1969 conference was indicated by the 
remarks of LP. Van Onselen. He admitted that "no provision can be made 
for any satelli te or dormitory town as far as Johannesburg is concerned 
in its relation to its nearest homeland", but these apparent second 
thoughts about the national applicability of the policy were not 
sufficient to cause changes to the policy. 
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Departmental approval of urban housing schemes was still granted in 
certain cases, but it remained a general principle that housing should 
first be provided in the homelands. Four years after the introduction of 
the policy, the president of lANA, J.C. de Villiers from Johannesburg, 
stressed that the provision of houses in the homelands had not been 
sufficient to make possible a significant movement of families from the 
urban areas to the homelands and he urged that housing should again be 
provided in urban areas to eliminate over-crowding. (lANA, 1972: 81) De 
Villiers' statement testified to the failure of the policy when judged 
against declared intentions; the decision in 1976 to once again approve 
large scale housing schemes in urban areas was the final admission of 
failure. This should not obscure the fact that many urban townships were 
removed to nearby homelands during this period and even after 1976; the 
further provision of housing is still frozen in certain townships. 
To conclude: this discussion has shown how housing policies during 
this period were adapted to fit more closely with the designs of influx 
control. The dual aims of influx control - the traditional focus of 
preventing rural-urban migration and secondly the more recent aim of 
channeling urbanisation to homeland towns - were facilitated by the 
restrictive conditions governing access to housing in urban areas in 
"white" South Africa and through the general prohibition on th~ 
provisions of further family housing in such areas. It is now necessary 
to examine the developments in labour regulation during this period to 
show how they were likewise adapted to refine influx control. 
iii) Labour Regulation 
The most important change to the system of labour regulation during 
thi s period was caused by. the March 1968 proclamation (Government 
Gazette: 1968b) establishing a network of labour bureaux in the homelands 
- excluding the Transkei which already had a system of bureaux. One of 
the two major aspects of these regulations, the institution of one year 
contracts has already been mentioned and should be born in mind. In this 
section the establishment of labour bureaux in the homelands will be 
di scus sed. 
« The importance of extending the labour bureaux system into the 
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homelands had been stressed by the Van Resnburg Committee who saw this 
step as essential if the influx control net was to be tightened and more 
efficient recruitment of labour ,was to be obtained . The Department 
invoked powers of the Bantu Administration Act of 1927 to promulgate the 
Bantu Labour Regulations to create a network of bureaux in the homelands. 
These regulations which came into force on 1 April 1968, created tribal 
and territorial labour bureaux at the offices of each tribal and 
territorial authority established under the Bantu Authorities Act of 
1951. All workseekers had to register at a tribal labour bureau where 
they would ... c l assified by the labour officer into employment categories 
according "as far as possible" with the wishes and qua.1ifications of the 
workseeker. But the regulations gave labour officers powers to allocate 
workseekers to categories of labour on the basis of the availability of 
labour in these categories . Thus a workseeker could be restricted to 
taking up employment in the less popular categories of farm and mine 
labour if l abour was needed by these sectors. The evidence suggests that 
this classification of workers was designed to channel labour to 
unpopular categories of employment. Dr P.S.F.J. Van Rensburg, whose 
division in the Department drew up the regulations, explained the need 
for this classification in 1969: 
"Een van die belangrikste redes vir werkloosheid en 'n hoi 
arbeidsomset is die kieskeurigheid van werkers. Eintlik is dit 
die gesindheid teenoor arbeid wat onrealisties is omdat dit op 
onkunde en vooroordeel gegrond is . Die rede waarom werksoekers 
in werkskatogoriee verdeel moet word, is juis om hulle te laat 
besef dat die arbeidsmark so 'n indeeling vereis. As 
werksoekers hulself na wense kon indeel, sal daar gereeld 'n 
groot aantal werkloses enersyds en miskien nog 'n groter aantal 
vakatures andersyds bly bestaan." (emphasis added) (Van 
Rensburg, 1969: 2) 
Not only was influx control and labour allocation facilitated by the 
physi ca 1 extens i on of the 1 abour bureaux system into the home 1 a nds, but 
also through forbidding workseekers from leaving the area of juri sdiction 
of the tribal labour bureau without its perm i ss i on. In Departmental 
jargon th i s was seen as shifting the emphasi s from influx control in 
urban areas to efflux control in the homelands . (Department of Bantu 
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Administration and Development, 1970: 14) 
In an important related development, Section 9 of the regulations 
gave the Director of Bantu Labour powers to zone employment areas. This 
meant that workseekers from a particular homeland or section of a 
homeland could be restricted to employment opportunities in a specific 
region - so creating defined feeder zones for particular industrial 
areas. Whether these powers have ever been formally invoked is not 
known, but the Department did face pressure from some administration 
boards during the 1970s to adopt labour zoning as official policy. 
(Riekert, 1972; Van Der Merwe, 1977) 
To minimise the disruption caused to employers through the 
introduction of mandatory one year contracts for employees from the 
homelands, the regulations contained a provision creating call-in cards. 
Thi s system all owed employees to retu rn to the same employer with the 
minimum of bureacratic delay as the call-in card constituted a 
requisition from an employer. 
The intention, and effect, of the regulations was to promote the use 
of contract labour from the homelands. Van Rensburg, who during the 
early 1960s had been an enthusiastic advocate of mechanisation as a means 
of reducing the use of black labour in the economy, was by the late 1960s 
a rgu in g tha t the success of the pol i cy of apart he i d shoul d not be judged 
by the numbers of blacks working in urban areas. With specific reference 
to the goal s of the 1968 labour regulations in promoting contract labour, 
he argued a year after their introduction: 
"Dit maak hoegenaamd nie saak hoeveel werksoekers deur die 
stamarbeidsburo's in die blanke gebied geplaas word nie, solank 
hulle in hul tuisland geanker bly." (emphasis in original) (Van 
Rensburg, 1969: 7l 
Similarly, in 1971 he argued that: "Die aantal werkers wat tydelik 
of deurlopend buite hul tuisland is, moet nie as norm gebruik word 
wanneer die ontplooing van 'n veelvolkige Suid-Afrika beoordeel word 
nie." (Van Rensburg, 1971: 131) 
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This significant switch in emphasis by Van Rensburg in judging the 
success of policy is explained by the anticipated success of the strategy 
of the 1968 regulations in preventing further attainments of Section 10 
(1) (b) qualifications. More sophisticated definitions of success had 
begun to replace an earl ier cruder stress on numbers and reversi ng the 
flow of blacks from urban areas to the homelands. It is also significant 
that formal references to encouraging labour saving devices had been 
dropped from the aims and objects of the proposed administration boards 
by 1970. Such aims had been incl uded in the ill-fated labour boards bi 11 
and in the first draft of the administration board bill . 
To conclude : the 1968 labour regulations thus ensured a continuing 
cycle of oscillating migrancy from the homelands to the urban areas for 
employees in the non-mining sector of the economy while also creating 
increased controls on the movement of persons out of the homelands. Thus 
a dual system of movement controls existed to check influx to urban areas 
in "white" South Africa with a new set of structures having been created 
in the homelands to extend control over workseekers. It is now necessary 
to turn to the change in influx control structures which the Oepartment 
of Bantu Administration and Development wished to institute in urban 
areas to complement these regulations. 
B. Bantu Labour boards - A Failed Attempt at Direct State Control of 
Influx 
Important though the changes in legi slation and regulations that 
took place during the 1960s were, perhaps the most important development 
of this period was the decision by the Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development to remove responsibili1;y for influx control and labour 
regulations from the municipalities and to vest it with a new statutory, 
state appoi nted, body more directly under the control of the Department. 
The Van Rensburg Committee had already provided the rationale for such a 
step which the Department set about implementing through the proposed 
1 abour control boards. 
The public announcement of these intentions came during a private 
member's motion in Parliament in February 1968. A senior National Party 
parliamentarian, G.P.C . Bezuidenhout, urged that legislation be 
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consi dered to provi de "for the control and management of Bantu 
Administration by local authorities (to) be taken over by a board or 
boards under the Department of Bantu Administration and Development." 
(Hansard, 1968: 1231) 
In reply, the deputy minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development, Dr P.G.J. Koornhof, announced the broad outlines of the 
provisions of the draft bill to create labour control boards. The debate 
is of importance for it provided the first public confirmation of what 
had long been the intention of the Department. A brief account of the 
issues rai sed duri ng the debate by National Party parl i amentari ans wi 11 
be given after which the provisions of the Bill and lANA's reaction to it 
will be discussed. 
The motivations presented by the National Party speakers for the 
removal of municipal control over labour regulation were almost 
exclusively party political in nature; unlike the more sophisticated 
motivations, such as the need to allow greater mobility, which implicitly 
accepted that aspects of policy were at fault and not necessarily the 
implementation of it by selected municipalities. Criticisms of the 
United Party controlled municipalities of Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town 
and Port Elizabeth dominated the debate; they were accused of a "wilful 
and malevol ent" opposition to National Party policy since 1948 on issues 
such as the site and service housing schemes, ethnic grouping and 
locations-in-the-air. (Hansard, 1968: 1233-34) Another National Party 
speaker, J.C. Otto, spoke of an "unwillingness, and sometimes even the 
summary refusal" of these local authorities to contr~ influx to the 
towns. (Hansard, 1968: 1251-52) 
The Johannesburg City Council and its municipal administrators 
received the major share of this criticism. In particular a 1967 report, . 
prepared in part by its Non-European Affairs Department, which had warned 
against too severely restricting influx to the city was extensively 
criticised because it contained aspects "diametrically opposed" to 
National Party policy. 
"Where the Government accepts as principle that tile numbers of 
Bantu in the urban areas must be decreased, this report adopts 
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as principle that the numbers should be increased ... it also 
amounted to a plea ... for work to be supplied for the Bantu who 
were born in the urban areas .. . here the principle is obviously 
being disregarded." (Hansard, 1968: 1252) 
A. L. Raubenheimer estimated that between 150 000 to 200 000 persons 
were illegally resident in Soweto because: 
" ... the City Council of Johannesburg refuses to apply influx 
control consistently. On the contrary they are doing 
everything in their power to sabotage that policy. They come 
along in season and out ' of season and plead for more Bantu in 
Johannesburg." (Hansard, 1968: 1245) 
Durban's director of Non-European Affairs, S.B. Bourquin, was 
specifically mentioned for a report he had prepared for the Durban City 
Council which critici sed recent amendment-s to legislation. Such 
criticisms of policy by administrators who had been licensed by the 
Minister in terms of Section 22 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation 
Act was strongly resented. The inference was that municipal 
administrators, having been licensed, ought to implement policy and not 
criticise it. Even though Bloemfontein, a National Party controlled 
municipality, was also criticised for inefficient influx control, the 
major focus of attention remained the United Party controlled 
municipalities. 
The importance of ensuring that policy would be implemented by 
municipal administrators and not opposed was crucial since the "second 
phase" of apartheid was about to begin, according to the proposer of the 
motion. This second phase entailed: 
"We ha ve i nf 1 ux control prop"erly under control. We have 
brought about segregation between Whi tes and Non-Whi tes. Now 
the Government's greatest and most responsible task begins, and 
that is to cause the Bantu to flow back to their homelands in 
an orderly way. We are already finding that the United Party 
and its United Party orientated city councils are trying to 
obstruct us. We are already noticing the strong opposition on 
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their part and on the part of certain businessmen in connection 
with the Physical Planning Act which is already on the Statute 
Book .. . We do not want a repitition of what occurred in the past 
20 years in connection with the implementation of the various 
Acts .. . It is of little concern to members of the United Party 
if a non-white proletariat is developing in our ci ties which 
will present the greatest threat imaginable to our white 
civilisation." (Hansard, 1968: 1237-38) 
It is interesting to note that the three National Party 
parliamentarians who spoke in support of the motion all represented 
constituencies in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand region, illustrating the 
sensitive focus of National Party concerns about influx to the region. 
In reply to the motion Dr Koornhof, besides announcing the broad 
details of the draft bill, pointed to the operations of the Resettlement 
Board as evidence of the practicality and viability of vesting 
responsibility for urban black administration with such boards. He went 
further to argue that the Resettlement Board had "done much better work" 
than the Johannesburg City Council. Not only did the Resettlement Board 
generate a considerable profit each year, mainly through the charging of 
economic rentals, but it also made substantial donations to the 
Department for use in homeland development. Johannesburg, by contrast, 
spent a "lot of unnecessary money" subsidising the major portion of 
Soweto which it administered. (Hansard, 1968: 1262-63) This issue of 
subsidisation will be returned to during discussion on the financial 
provisions of the Bantu Affairs Administration Board Bill. With the 
determination of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development 
to proceed with legislation ending municipal control over influx control 
publically confirmed, it set about finalising the provisions of the draft 
bi 1 1 • 
On the 3 January 1968 the Department ci rculated the draft bil 1 to 
amend the Bantu Labour Act of 1964, allowing for the establishment of 
Bantu Labour Boards in areas outside the homelands. The functions of the 
proposed boards reflected the concerns detailed in the previous chapter. 
They were to: 
139 
" . . . ensure as far as practical an even distribution of Bantu 
labour in its area in accordance with supply and demand, a 
reduction of the turnover of Bantu labour, the appropriate 
canalisation of redundant Bantu labour to the Bantu areas, 
shall promote sound relationships between employers and Bantu 
workers, shall ensure compliance by employers and Bantu workers 
of the relevant legal requirements regarding the employment of 
Bantu workers and shall encourage the introduction of labour 
saving devices." (Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development, 1968: 3) 
The board was to consist of a chairman - who would be a State 
official - with representatives from urban local authorities, urban 
employers and farming representative, all appointed by the Minister. 
Deci si ons made by the board were to be implemented by exi sting muni ci pa 1 
or government labour officers although provision was made for the Board 
to appoint its own staff. The board was to have no juri sdiction over 
matters of housing, location administration or other functions then 
performed by municipalities: its sole focus was to have been influx 
control and labour regulation. 
The bill specified no precise area of jurisdiction for the boards 
but the explanatory memorandum circulated with it indicated that 
magisterial district boundaries would have been used. For the first time, 
employers in urban and rurl areas would have been subject to control 
exercised by the same authority over labour regulation as the bill made 
provision for existing Bantu Labour Control Boards and labour tenants 
control boards, established in terms of the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 
1936, to be subsumed under the new boards. 
The final point to be noted about the provisions of the bill is that 
the area of jurisdiction of the proposed board would have become a 
prescribed area, thus incorporating rural areas in prescribed areas. 
However, these new larger prescribed areas would only have been 
prescribed for the purposes of Section's 10bis, 11, 12 and 14 of the 
Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act and not for Section 10. The 
importance of this step will be examined below. 
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il Departmental Justifications 
The Department hoped that the introduction of Bantu Labour Boards 
would ensure stricter influx control on three accounts - namely because 
of perceived municipal and employer indifference towards influx control 
requirements and to meet the demands of the agricultural sector for 
stricter influx controls to prevent the draining of rural labour to the 
urban areas 
The Department's criticisms of municipal performance of influx 
control have already been noted, making it unnecessary to examine this 
motivation for the Bantu Labour Boards in any great detail. Suffice to 
note that this perception was 1 inked to a belief that the other influx 
control authorities - namely the Bantu commissioners and the existing 
labour control boards, which both operated in rural areas, were also lax 
in their implementation of influx control. The inefficiencies of all 
three authori ties made it necessary to fi nd alternative structures to 
ensure that labour di stribution worked as intended, as F .B. du Randt 
motivated the Department's case to meeting of Transvaal municipal 
administrators: 
"Ons insiens stel die Plaaslike Bestuur werklik nie belang in 
die behoorlike benutting van arbeid in sy gebied nie; vir hom 
is dit net 'n lastige affere en hy sal dit eerder gebruik as 
'n stok om die arbeidsbeampte mee te slaan en gevolglik vind 
ons dat die Arbeidsbeampte baie min kan kers opsteek by die 
munisipaliteit. Die selfde is die posisie van die Bantoesake-
kommissarisse. Die Bantoearbeidsbeheeraad bestaan hoofsaaklik 
op papier wat tot gevolg het dat ook daar nie die nodige 
distribusiewerk gedoen word nie, omrede hierdie liggaam hierdie 
beheerstel sel nie sy eie maak nie." (Du Randt, 1968: 2-31 
Du Randt categorised the proposed boards as "watch-dogs" who would 
give instructions to municipal labour officers and decide on policy 
matters affecting their area of jurisdiction. He stressed that the 
boards would have no responsibility towards an electorate; an argument 
closely linked to the Van Rensburg Committee's remark that opposition 
controlled municipalities were more responsive to the interests of 
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employers than towards meeting State policy . These two remarks, taken 
together, explain why the Department insisted on making the proposed new 
boards subject to Ministerial appointment. 
The inc 1 us ion of emp 1 oyer rep rese nta ti ves on the proposed boards 
caused much dispute during negotiations with lANA over the Bill. Their 
i ncl usion was justified by the Department on the grounds that it was 
necessary to bring home forcefully to employers the necessity of influx 
control. The best way of doing this was to make them share the 
responsibility of implementing legislation. M.C. Botha made the point 
forcefully in hi s opening address to the 1968 lANA conference where the 
provisons of the Bill were discussed. 
7'J 
ro . 
~ bour is seen more and more as a sheer commodi ty whil st 
12, )ur bureaux are required to make progressively available 
larger numbers of this commodity. The social, political and 
economic problems emanating from this are conveniently lost 
sight of. Employers can no longer, in respect of these labour 
implications, perform as mere spectators and leave it to the 
administrative sector to deal with the consequences of an 
erroneous labour pattern . The labour bureau system can also 
not remain a willing co-partner in this process .. . Much more 
time is necessary to get employers and their organisations to 
adopt a different frame of mind. Room will have to be found in 
our admin i stration for the respective business organisation . We 
cannot see employers as providers of work opportunities only. 
They shoul d, in one way or another, concern themselves in the 
administration of labour so that they can shoulder co-
responsibili1;y in the application of policy .. . lf employers thus 
enter into the administration, important matters such as 
housing on a single basis, medical services, the remittance of 
a portion of the wages to the homelands, weekend transport, 
training and suchlike could be brought home to the employer." 
(emphasis added) (lANA, 1968: 9-10) 
The Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for the Witwatersrand concurred 
with these assessments of employer resistance to influx control: "Ons kry 
net nie die samewerking van die werkgewers nie, ek is jammer om dit te 
se" . IANA, 1968: 88) 
142 
The proposed inclusion of agricultural representatives must be seen 
against the background of complaints by farmers of shortage of labour 
during the 1960s . The Van Rensburg Committee had heard evidence by 
farmers who complained of a shortage, which was a topic of some concern 
to agricultural unions during this period, as Greenberg has shown. 
(Greenberg, 1981: 98) According to the Department, it was being 
"inundated" with complaints by farmers that they were losing their labour 
to the cities. (lANA, 1968a: 1) 
This determination to protect farmers from competing with urban 
employers over labour supplies is intricately bound up with the 
maintenance of a distinction between prescribed and non-prescri bed areas 
which figured prominently in discussions over the Bill's provisions. This 
issue is however not very clear - both from the wording of the draft bill 
or from explanations by Departmental representatives . The relevant 
section of the draft bill read: 
"When a Bantu 1 abour board is estab 1 i shed for an area - •• . 
(b) any prescribed area within the area of such Bantu labour 
board shal l cease to exist; 
(c) such areas shall be deemed to be a prescribed area for the 
purposes of sections 10bis , 11, 12 and 14 of this Act;" 
From this reading, then, the distinction between prescribed and non-
prescribed areas would have disappeared , instead the ent i re area of the 
board would have become prescribed but subject only to the influx control 
measures of Section 10bis 11, 12 and 14 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act. Section 10 qualifications would have disappeared, as 
Section 10 wou1 d not have been applicable in the new, larger prescribed 
areas, as Du Randt explained: 
"Ek weet nie of u dit a1ma1 opgemerk het nie dat hierdie gebied 
nou ophou om 'n voorgeskrewe gebied to wees vir doe1eindes van 
Artike1 10, en die imp1ikasie daarvan is natuur1ik dat Artike1 
10 verdwyn want di e 72 uur konseps i e word weer vo orgesk ryf in 
die regu1asies. Die kwa1ifikasies val nou weg en die 
voorgeskrewe gebied se waarde b1y nog vir doe1eindes van 
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Artikel 10 (bis), artikel 11, 12 en 14. Ek weet nie of die 
kabinet daardie besondere gedagtes sal aanvaar nie, aangesien 
daaroor nog geen finale besluit geneem is nie. Ons het eintlik 
maar gehoop om hierdie aspek uit te hou as 'n soort voeler ten 
einde die publiek se reaksie te bekom." (Du Randt, 1968: 5) 
This was a clear indication that the prescribed/non-prescribed 
distinction would have become redundant. Section 10 was not made 
applicable to the larger areas, not only because it presented an 
opportunity to do away with Section 10 qualifications, but also because 
if it was made applicable in rural areas, farmworkers would have become 
eligible for Section 10 qualifications. In Du Randt's words: " •.. it 
(was) unthinkable that a Bantu born on a farm within the board's area, 
shoul d be granted Section 10 qualifications for the urban areas" (lANA, 
1968a: 2) However, in the same speech Du Randt, when stressi ng the need 
to protect farm labour supplies, acknowledged the necessity of preserving 
existing prescribed boundaries in order to restrict rural-urban mobility 
in the interests of the farming sector. 
"Nou was die eerste vraag wat by my opgekom het di t, naaml ik 
hoe gaan ek di t nou bewerkstellig? Moet ek nou die 
voorgeskrewe gebied wat tans bestaan laat verdwyn of moet ek 'n 
vrye beweging tussen Stad en Platteland toelaat? Ek sou dit 
graag wou gedoen het, maar die ding sou in eenrigting gewees 
het en nie 'n tweerigting soos die Boere voorsien nie. Ek weet 
dat sodra die Stad sy voorgeskrewe gebied ophef dan gaan 
daardie plaasarbeid na die Stad toetrek en gaan jy nooit 
daardie teenoorgestlde kry nie. Gevolglik is dit noodsaaklik 
om noodgedwonge die Stad se voorgeskrewe gebied net terwille 
daarvan behou ten einde die Bantoe kunsmatig op die plaas te 
hou. Die twee voorgeskrewe gebiede bly dus nog bestaan vir 
doeleindes van Artikel 10 (bis), artikel 11, artikel 12 en 14 
van die Stadsgebiedewet." (Du Randt, 1968:3) 
Whatever the technicalities of the distinction were the decision by 
the Department to drop the Bill makes further speculation unnecessary. 
Nevertheless the essential reason for the maintenance of a distinction 
between urban and rural labour was once again re-affirmed. Wi th thi s as 
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a description of the Bill's provisions it is now necessary to discuss the 
reaction of the municipalities to it . It was as a result of their 
reaction that the bill was withdrawn and replaced by the bi 11 to create 
administration boards . 
ii) Municipal Reaction 
As will be shown, the municipal i ties comprehensively rebutted 
virtual ly all the premises and assumptions of the Department which led it 
to draw up the Bill even though they did agree that greater mobility 
ought to be allowed to blacks in urban areas. These must be examined in 
turn. 
The most critical municipal response went to the heart of the bill's 
provisions - namely the expectation by the Department that stricter 
influx control could be enforced solely through controls over employment. 
The proposed boards were only to administer legislation relating to 
employment of blacks; issues of housing, and genera l location 
administration were to remain under the municipalities. It was this 
separation of housing and labour controls which provided municipal 
administrators with their most important grounds for condemning the Bill. 
J.e. Taljaard, president of lANA duri ng 1967-68, drew on the lessons 
Transvaal municipal administrators had learnt as a result of separated 
housing and labour control duri ng the 1930s and 1940s (detailed in a 
previous chapter) to warn: 
"If such legislation is placed on the statute book it will mean 
that one authority will be responsible for influx control and 
regi stra tio n of servi ce contracts and another authori ty for the 
provision of housing, welfare services, liquor and Bantu beer 
provision et cetera. If this should happen, then we will go 
back to the period before 1945 when such divided control led to 
absolute chaos . It was for this particular reason that the 
government considered it adv i sable to place local 
administration in toto under the control of local authorities 
in their capaci ty as the agents of the State . " (lANA, 1968: 
130) 
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The force of this argument was soon accepted by the Department 
during negotiations with lANA and used as a justification to remove all 
vestiges of municipal administration so that housing and labour controls 
could resort under the proposed boards. When the Department withdrew the 
Bill, these criticisms were heeded and the drafts of the administration 
board bi 11 saw responsibiltiy for housing and labour going to the 
proposed administration boards. 
The second major point of municipal criticism of the measure was 
that, instead of streamlining urban black administration as proposed, an 
addi tiona1 statutory structure would be created, complicating 
administration. Not only was there the possib1ity that the proposed 
boards cou1 d c1 ash with the municipalities but municipal staff could be 
put in a position where they had to carry out instructions from the 
proposed boards while remaining in the employ of the municipalities . 
(lANA, 196Ba: 6-7) Furthermore, the municipal i ties di d not accept that a 
better utilisation of black labour could not achieved within existing 
provisions of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act without it being 
neces sary to create new statutory structures. Consi stent argument by both 
the Institute of Administrators and from representatives of the United 
Municipal Executive that these aims could be satisfied without recourse 
to further legislation were disputed by the Department. 
The municipalities argued that agreements between municipalities in 
terms of either Sections 9 bis, 40 or 41 bis of the Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act would meet the needs of the Department. Examples of 
regional co-operative administration in terms of these provisions of the 
Act existed; lANA argued that such regional administration held definite 
advantages and could be realised with a few changes to location 
regulations. (lANA, 1968a: 4-5l These suggestions were not accepted by 
the Department, for reasons which are not clear from available evidence, 
although it was argued during parliamentary debate on the Bantu Affairs 
Administration Board Bill that too many practical difficulties were 
involved to use these provisions to allow greater mobility of labour. 
Secondly, the municipalities argued that greater mobility in urban 
areas could be achieved if the Department withdrew the 1965 circular 
referred to earlier which governed movement for employment purposes 
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across prescribed areas. Municipal labour bureau officials argued that 
prior to this circular, transfers of labour had been fairly easily 
arranged between labour bureaux without having to insist on the 
conditional re-classification as a Section 10 (1) (d) case. Given that 
the Department was set on abolishing Section 10 qualifications, this 
suggestion did not carry much weight. 
The other major Departmental justification - that large scale 
damming up of labour was occuri ng in watertight prescribed areas - was 
similarly disputed by the municipalities. lANA agreed that the better 
utilisation of labour from blacks already resident in urban areas was 
desirable and that it could lead to a reduction in the necessity to 
import contract labour. However, on the basis of the information provided 
by labour bureau officials on the Witwatersrand, lANA argued that the 
labour surplus was minimal, at just over 1 per cent. (lANA, 1968f: 1) 
lANA had previously argued against allowing greater mobility of labour in 
urban areas - however no indication is available as to when this decision 
da ted from. 
The proposals to incorporate employer representatives on the labour 
boards also met with stern opposition. It will be remembered that the 
rationale for this step was that it would serve to "educate" employers on 
the need to accept pol icy. Thi s justification was roundly disputed by 
the municipal officials who argued that if employers were allowed to 
deci de on labour matters, they would jeopardise policy decisions through 
a "subjective" approach to labour matters. An lANA memorandum declared: 
"Ondervinding in Wes-Kaapland het getoon dat werkgewers wat In 
stem gegee word op In Arbeidsorganisasie, gedurig neig om In 
subjektiewe beskouing daarop na te hou, veral wanneer hulle 
saak geraak word; getuienis is ••. gelewer dat die 
Arbeidskomitees wat in Wes-Kaapland bestaan vir die vervanging 
van Bantoe-arbeid deur Kleurling-arbeid, in wese ontaard het in 
In platform vir die invoer van meer Bantoe-arbeid." (lANA, 
1969a: 7l 
Dr P.J. Riekert, director of Potchefstroom's Non-European Affairs 
Department and a well known advocate of labour zoning, tol d of how his 
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department's labour zoning policy of restricting employment in 
Potchefstroom to Tswana's was opposed by employers wishing to employ 
Shangaans and Zulus. This pressure had been successfully resisted by his 
department but if agricultural and industrial employers were given a 
voice in policy decisions then this policy would be prejudiced. (lANA, 
1968d: 3) W.J.P. Carr, likewise, opposed giving employers representation 
on the proposed boards on virtually the same grounds which Riekert had 
advanced. 
"Mr Du Randt made the extraordinary statement that one of his 
justifications for setting up this Board, is to prevent the 
possibility of a Town Councillor having his arm twisted by an 
employer, and then in the same breath he suggested that this 
very employer shoul d be a person to serve on thi s Board. Who's 
going to twist whose arm? Who's going to be their to see that 
the interests of the · town, and not the interests of a 
particular group of employers, is to be preserved?" (lANA, 
1968: 8S) 
Carr also opposed the suggestion that farmers should serve on the 
boards on the grounds that the boards would be dealing with 'a purely 
technical problem' which did not concern the farmers. 
Riekert's statement was however used by the Department as further 
evidence of the need to involve employers in the proposed boards and to 
further Government policy. 
" ... Muni sipale amptenare lynreg teenoor die werkgewers staan en 
dat hulle nie daarin geslaag het om die werkgewers saam met 
hulle in die uitvoering van beleid te neem nie .•• 
Munisipaliteite het nie hierdie steun van werkgewers nie en 
daarom moet hulle altyd walgooi. As ons nie nywerhede met ons 
saam neem nie, kan ons vergeet om ons beleid ui t te voer. Ons 
moet nywerhede derhalwe betrek by die uitvoering van ·beleid." 
(lANA, 1968d: 3) 
Both sides stuck to their viewpoints on the issue and ministerially 
appointed employer representatives were included in the prOVisions of the 
administration board bill which later became law. 
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The other major aspect of municipal reaction to the various 
provisions of the bill involved the Department's insistence on abolishing 
Section 10. The lANA council came out strongly against these plans 
al though at least one prominent member, Dr P.J. Riekert, sided with the 
Department. The Department's att i tude towards Section 10 has already 
been explained but it must be added that it saw the opportunity to scrap 
Section 10 as closely linked to the granting of greater mobility to urban 
blacks. Increasing mobility was seen as a concession which had to be 
matched by the surrender of these qualifications by urban blacks. Thus 
Dr Koornhof explained that "die groter beheergeb i ede, die voorgestelde 
Arbeidsrade en Artikel 10-optrede gaan hand-aan- hand . " (lANA, 1968e : 9) 
The Department faced strong warnings of the possible adverse 
consequences which the abolition or freezing of Section 10 might cause in 
urban black areas . T.W.A. Koller, from Johannesburg, tol d senior 
representatives of the Department, including Dr Koornhof, that "daar in 
gedagte gehou moet word dat oor die 600 000 Bantoes in Johannesburg is en 
da t daar tans vrede heers. Indi en daar aan bes taande en geves t i ge regte 
geraak sou word, kan moeilikheid verwag word . • . As ons 10(1) (a) en (c) 
regte terugtrek, kan ons moelikeid verwag." (lANA, 1968b : 5) 
Such warnings found support within the Department - a senior 
offici al adopted a more pragmatic approach contrary to his Department's 
a tti tude. 
" •.. almal besef dat Artikel 10 nie met beleid versoenbaar is 
nie. Mense wat in die praktyk met die Bantoe te doen het, moet 
daagliks aan hom veranderings in Wetgewing verduidelik en dit 
word ook gedoen . Somtyds gaan di t moeil ik om veral di e 
intelligentsia i n hierdie verband te oortuig. As hy • •• die 
skrapping van Art ikel 10 (1) (a), (b) en (c) moet verduidelik 
en goedpraat, sien hy dat ons aan mense wat reeds teen ons is 
baie goeie ammunisie sal gee . " (lANA, 1968d: 8) 
The discussion on Section 10 earlier in this chapter noted the 
di scussion which took place at the 1968 lANA conference. It is not 
necessary to repeat the various poi nts raised other than to note that 
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there was certainly no uniformity within the Department on how to proceed 
on the issue. 
Perhaps though the major force of lANA's criticism on this issue was 
to deny that it was legislation which made Sect i on 10 so sought after a 
qualification, but rather that it was the advantages which the Department 
had attached to it for administrative purposes which made it such a 
highly prized qualification. The most important advantage was access to 
family housing, as has been shown, for which blacks would endure a lot 
from one employer to qualify for a Section 10 (1) (b) qualification and 
the possibil i ty of a house. An lANA memorandum established the point 
rather succinctl'y ' , although it nevertheless contained an implicit 
suggestion that this aspect of Section 10 ought to be neutralised . 
"Die waarde van Artikel 10 is ontleen aan administratiewe 
opdragte; nie aan die Wet nie. Dit is die Department wat 
waarde aan Artikel 10 gegee het deur die toekenning van huise 
en ander gesogte voorregte aan Artikel 10 (1) (a) en (b)-houers 
te heg. lndien ander maatstawwe vir die voorregte wat dusver 
deur Artikel 10 (U(a) en (b) houers geniet is, gevind kan 
word, kan Artikel 10 heeltemal ontwapen en sy waarde afgetakel 
word sonder Wetwysi ging . " (lANA, 1968f: 1) 
This suggestion ignored though the employment advantages which 
Section 10 (1)(a), (b) and (c) qualifications brought which was the other 
reason why possession of these qualificati ons was striven for by 
outsiders, including using illegal means. Lastly, lANA suggested that 
any amendment to Section 10 should be closely linked to an "accelerated 
tempo of development" in the homelands which local authorities could be 
i nvo 1 ved in. 
To conclude this discussion of lANA's reaction to the proposed 
removal of labour regulation from the jurisdiction of the municipalities 
it must be noted, that even though the report of the Van Rensburg 
Committee had not been released to them, the municipalities had a shrewd 
suspicion that the proposal was in fact a vote of no confidence in their 
performance of influx control. The Department played this motive down 
during the negotiations but it did admit to an lANA delegation that " i t 
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was felt that municipal Councils perhaps did not concern themselves with 
labour matters." (lANA, 1968a: 4) 
T.W.A. Koller from Johannesburg, which the Van Rensburg Committee 
had singled out as not implementing influx control efficiently, denied 
that the blame for illegal employment in Johannesburg rested with the 
municipality; rather employers were the cause. The minutes record Koller 
as having said: 
" ... nobody could say that Johannesburg was not carrying out the 
policy. He was satisfied that influx into Johannesburg was 
more strictly applied than anywhere else. The trouble lay with 
the approach of employers to this problem ••• Many employers •.• 
engage illegal workers to avoid the payment of fees. Mr Koller 
submitted that one of the reasons for the illegal employment in 
Johannesburg was the fact that there was no large labour area 
in Johannesburg •.• He therefore would plead for a larger labour 
area which would enable him to draw labour from adjoining areas 
rather than to bri ng in new labour from the outsi de .•. he 
doubted very much whether the proposed Labour Board would be 
better able to control the situation than the existing Urban 
Bantu Administration machinery." (lANA, 1968d: 6-7) 
In response, Dr Koornhof denied that individual municipalities were 
being singled out as having failed to implement policy but added a new 
explanation as to why the Department wished to end municipal control of 
labour regulation: 
"Wanneer hy (Dr Koornhof) praat van beleid en hy se dat ons nie 
slaag nie, bedoel hy nie daardeur dat een spes i fi eke 
Munisipaliteit nie die beleid van die Staat uitvoer nie. Daar 
is baie munisipaliteite wat die Staat se beleid geheel-en-al 
gunstig gesind is en ondersteun, maar waar beleid nie uitgevoer 
word ni e omrede die besondere omstandighede in daardie gebied. 
As voorbeeld het hy genoem die neiging van Stadsrade om uit 
hulle pad te gaan om nywerhede daar te vestig ten einde hulle 
eie gebiede te vergroot en te ontwikkel." (lANA, 1968d: 7) 
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Faced with this opposition by lANA to virtually all the motivations 
for the draft bill and particularly to the separating of control of 
labour and housi ng between the proposed boards and the municipalities, 
the Department withdrew the measure. lANA's opposition and suggestions 
tha t greater mobil i ty - which the Department had presented as a major 
goal of the measure - could be achieved without reeourse to new 
legislation was brushed aside. The Department had already decided to 
remove responsibility for urban black administration from the 
municipalities and was not going to be defiected by opposition from 
within municipal ranks. Accordingly the draft bill was withdrawn and 
replaced by the first draft of the administration board bill which 
provided for responsiblity of housing and labour regulation to be taken 
over by the proposed administration boards, so meeting the warnings of 
municipal authorities on the importance of joint housing and labour 
control s. 
c. Bantu Affairs Administration Boards 
Although the Department of Bantu Administrtion and Development 
circulated the first draft of the administration board bill to the 
municipalities in May 1969, it was only to be published in the Government 
Gazette on 15 Decenber 1970. During this period it underwent numerous 
revisions. This section will discuss issues raised during this period 
and will end with a discussion of the provisions of the Bantu Affairs 
Administration Board Act. 
i) The Draft Bill 
The first draft differed from the labour boards draft bill in two 
important respects - firstly in that responsiblity for both housi ng and 
labour was to be removed from the municipalities and secondly that 
further acquisitions of Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications 
were to be frozen rather than repealed. The reasons for these changes 
were discussed earlier in this chapter and will not be repeated here. The 
formal aims of the proposed administration boards remained the same as 
those proposed for the labour control boards . 
Further insights into Departmental justifications for the Bill 
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become apparent through an examination of Dr Koornhof's opening speech to 
the 1969 lANA conference. He stressed that the existing labour pattern 
"must be changed in accordance with the demands of our country" with the 
use of contract labour from the homelands. In line with previously 
quoted policy on the importance of disciplining employers to achieve 
pol icy goal s, Koornhof argued that there were sectors of urban employers 
who were not subject to restrictions on their use of black labour. 
Controls on employment of blacks existed for farmers, through the farm 
labour control boards; for employers in the coloured labour preference 
area and for urban industrialists through the provisions of the Physical 
Planning and Development of Natural Resources Act of 1967. 
"But we still have the large number of employers who do not 
fall within the jurisdiction of the three organisations I have 
referred to and who also have to become labour saving 
conscious. And here I particularly have in mind construction, 
commerce and domestic service. We still have to devi se ways 
and means as to how we can bring home to these employers that 
Bantu labour is not just there at their beck and call but that 
they must also bear in mind that these workers have to be 
housed and have to be commuted inan orderly manner." (lANA, 
1969: 7l 
In similar vein Koornhof urged municipal administrators to prevent 
the "blackening of our white areas" by regular inspections on employers 
who undermined job reservation by employing blacks on the grounds that a 
shortage of whi te labour exi sted. 
On the housing front. he rejected arguments in favour of a 
stabilised urban workforce and reaffirmed as crucial to policy that 
further family housing should only be provided in the homelands. 
"Ons kan nie en durf nie hier kop gee nie, want dit druis 
reel reg in teen ons beleid wat bepaal dat die bewoner van die 
Bantoe se tuisland net as 'n toevallige bewoner of gas in die 
Blanke se tuisland mag wees en dan slegs solank sy arbeid daar 
behoef word. Daar kan dus nie sprake wees van steeds groeiende 
gesinsbehuising in blanke gebiede nie, daarom het ek reeds by 
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'n ander geleentheid daarop gewys dat gesinsvestiging in ons 
groot stede sover prakties ui tvoerbaar beperk word . " (lANA, 
1969 : 7) 
The corollary of the housing freeze, namely the resettlement of 
"redundant" persons from white urban areas, received a powerful new 
impetus from Koornhof when he redefined the categories of persons 
regarded as redundant to include persons born in urban areas i.e. the 
natural increase in urban population. The 1967 circular which had 
del i neat ed the categories of redundant persons had not specifically 
mentioned persons born in urban areas as liable for resettlement . 
Koornhof made a vague reference to introducing legislation which would 
make it easier for municipal administrators to resettle such persons in 
homelands. 
"Sover dit voorgeskrewe gebiede aangaan, noem ek vier groepe 
waaraan by vestiging voorkeur verleen moet word: . • . 
(3) Die natuurlike aanwas in stede of dorpe. Onbeperkte 
uitbreiding van bantoewoongebiede kan nie toegelaat word nie en 
hoewel hulle deur oorreding in die tuisland opgeneem moet word 
sal beoogde wetgewing in die toekoms sake vergemaklik." (lANA, 
1969: 9) 
If the resettlement of "redundant" persons was just to keep pace 
with the natural increase of blacks in the white areas, Koornhof said 
consideration would have to be given to the construction of at least one 
city in each homeland. None of the legislation passed during the 1970s 
appears to have been designed to facilitate this goal - it was presumably 
never proceeded with. This redefinition of "redundancy" to include 
persons born in urban areas, i.e. persons who would qualify for Section 
10 (1) (a) is not surprising when vi ewed aga i nst the determination of the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development to have repealed 
Section 10 completely . The extent of the commitment to resettle 
"redundant" persons in the homelands is fully illustrated by Koornhof' s 
announcement that the natural increase of the black urban population was 
al so to be regarded as candi da tes for resettlement. 
Some of the issues highlighted in this chapter to explain the 
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origins of administration boards are thrown into rather stark relief when 
examining labour statistics of Witwatersrand municipalities as at June 
1969. The figures quoted below are derived from the report of a sub-
committee of the Transvaal provincial division of lANA appointed in 
October 1969 to investigate the productivity of blacks in white urban 
areas . This report, known as the Steenhuizen report, and the official 
lANA response to it will be examined in the following chapter but the 
labour statistics quoted in the report are of more interest at this point 
for they provide a rough barometer of how the success of municipalities 
in implementing policy could have been gauged by the Department of Bantu 
Admini stration and Development. 
Perhaps not unexpectedly, after the amount of criticism which had 
been directed at Johannesburg for not implementing policy, the city used 
proportionately less contract labour than all the Witwatersrand 
municipalities quoted in the report. The municipalities are ranked in 
order of the proportion of contract labour they utilised to meet their 
male labour needs. Figures for Nigel, Randfontein, Edenvale, Bedfordview 
and Heidelberg were quoted in the report but have been excluded from the 
table below because of their much smaller black population and employment 
figures. 
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Table 10 
Male Contract Labour Utilisation in Witwatersrand 
Municipalities (1969) 
Town Total Reg. Labour Total Contract % Contract 
Randburg 14 653 12 748 87 
Sandton 15 433 12 346 80 
Germi ston 68 000 42 160 62 
Witbank 9 500 5 605 59 
Boksburg 24 350 14 123 58 
Alberton 15 325 8 122 53 
Vereeni ging 39 300 16 113 41 
Krugersdorp 12 834 4 620 36 
Roodepoort 14 829 5 041 34 
Kempton Park 30 189 6 943 23 
Spri ngs 28 711 6 316 22 
Benoni 26 435 5 287 20 
Johannesburg 254 303 45 774 18 
Total: 553 862 185 198 33 
Source: Derived from Steenhuizen. 197D 
Two points can be made from the above table. Firstly. the enormous 
range in the proportionate use of contract labour between different 
municipalities on the Witwatersrand - from 87 per cent in the case of 
Randburg to 18 per cent for Johannesburg. In the newer towns of Randburg 
and Sandton the overwhelming basis of labour supply was in the form of 
contract labour housed in hostels - 70 per cent of the municipal 
accommodation was in the form of hostel s in both cases. In the 01 der 
established municipalities the opposite situation existed where 
stabilised labour made up the major portion of the workforce. 
Secondly. in terms of numbers. a town like Germiston was importing 
almost as many contract labourers as Johannesburg was. yet it was 
employing only about 25 per cent of the size of the Johannesburg 
workforce. 
While it has been argued that it was figures such as these which 
probably strengthened the resolve of the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development to end municipal control. if this was the 
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case, the figures do not easily lend themselves to such conclusions. For 
a simple compari son between the proportionate use of contract labour in 
Randburg and Johannesburg to ga~ge to what extent Johannesburg was 
"undermining" policy can not be obtained from these figures . The high 
incidence of contract labour in Randburg and Sandton is more easily 
explained by the relatively recent establishment of the municipalities at 
a period when the Department of Bantu Administration and Development was 
exercising strict control over the siting and establishment of locations 
on the Witwatersrand and elsewhere. The much older towns were also the 
recipients of the major influx of black women during the 1930s and 1940s 
which meant that the potenti a1 for urban based population growth was 
greater in these towns, so reduci ng the need to use contract 1 abou r from 
the homelands. 
A marked correlation - not unexpected - between the proportionate 
use of contract labour and the basis of accommodation is also to be found 
from the Steenhuisen report. Without major differences in the ranking of 
the towns in the above table, a similar ranking existed for the provision 
of hostel accommodation in the towns. Nevertheless, these figures do 
serve as valuable indicator of the extent of the variations in the 
composition of the labour force on the Witwatersrand at this period. 
ii) The Bantu Affairs Administration Board Act 
The Bill to create administration boards, so ending municipal 
responsibility for urban black administration, was read for the first 
time in Par1 i ament on 9 February 1971. I ntroduci ng the sec 0 nd readi n g, 
Dr Koornhof - who was still deputy minister - said the Bill was intended 
to "place the administration of Bantu Affairs in white areas on a sounder 
and more efficient basis." (Hansard, 1971: 1962) He stressed, to the 
exc1 usion of all the other motivations dealt with during this chapter, 
that the measure aimed at increasing the mobility of blacks with Section 
10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications to allow "the maximum utilisation 
of Bantu labour". However even while Koornhof ignored and did not mention 
Departmental criticisms of United Party controlled municipalities, this 
issue was rai sed by other National Party speakers. 
Four aspects of the Act will be raised - the functions of the 
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boards, their composi tion, their fi nanci ng and finally Section 10 and 
mobility of labour. A brief overview of their organisational structure 
and the relationship between the boards and the Department is provided in 
Appendix B. Firstly, the functions of the boards: unlike the 
municipalities, the boards were to have jurisdiction over both prescribed 
and non-prescribed areas in non-homeland South Africa. In the urban 
areas the boards took over responsiblity for administering the fol lowing 
acts: the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, the Bantu Services Levy 
Act, the Urban Bantu Councils Act, the Bantu Labour Act, the Sorghum Beer 
Act, the Housing Act (in so far as it affected black housing) and Section 
100bis of the Liquor Act. In the rural areas, where previously the Bantu 
Commissioner had been responsible for administering legislation, the 
boards were to assume responsiblity for the functioning of the district 
labour bureaux (from a date to be deci ded by the Minister) and of the 
provisions of Chapter Four of the Development and Trust and Land Act of 
1936, subject to the Ministerial transfer of these powers from the 
Commissioner or l~bour liaison oficer. Health and transport remained 
under the jurisdiction of the municipalities. 
Secondly, the composition of the boards: the members of the boards 
were to be entirely appointed by the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development, who would also nominate the chairman and deputy chairman. 
The other board members were to be appointed by the Minister to represent 
the interests of local authorities, employers and agricultural interests 
within the area of jurisdiction of the board. 
Despite pleas from the opposition parties during debate on the Bill, 
no allowance was made for any representation by urban blacks on the 
boards. Koornhof put forward two reasons for this: firstly that it was 
"entirely contradictory" to the "standard rule" that Urban Bantu Councils 
should have any representation on local authorities, while the second 
explanation hinged on the differential nature of the powers that either 
body coul d wiel d. 
"According to law an Urban Bantu Council has certain powers. 
Thus in terms of the Act, infl ux control is not one of the 
powers of an Urban Bantu Council. An Urban Bantu Council has 
statutory authority in respect of streets, li ghting and other 
158 
matters normally dealt with by a local authority. But this 
administration board will, after all, have much more extensi ve 
powers than those of an Urban Bantu Council. For this reason 
alone, it is not necessary to grant an Urban Bantu Council 
representation on thi s administration board. This would only 
create problems, because the powers of the one are extremely 
limited while those of the other extend over a much wider 
field." (Hansard, 1971: 3608) 
Indeed, given the entire thrust of pol icy which led to the 
establishment of administration boards, including the recommendation of 
the Van Rensburg Committee that the Urban Bantu Councils be 
disestablished, requests for the representation of urban blacks on the 
boards were diametrically opposed to the intentions of policy. Koornhof's 
refusal to give such representation must also be seen in the light of his 
attitudes towards the tendency of members of Advisory Boards and Urban 
Bantu Councils to adopt critical attitudes towards government policy. For 
example, during debate on the private member's motion in 1968 which was 
discussed earlier, Koornhof claimed that "almost without exception" 
separate development was fully supported by advisory boards, but added: 
"I n the pas t we ha ve had no di ffi culty wi th these boards but it 
is gradually becoming obvious that there is a group of 
agitators who want to make use of these boards to agitate and 
to inci te the Bantu against the government's pol icy of separate 
development. And they are going much further than that." 
(Hansard, 1968: 1264) 
lANA congresses during the 1960s regularly heard from municipal 
administrators of the difficulties they experienced with such boards 
because of their insistence on challenging matters of policy over which 
municipal administrators had no real jurisdiction. Responsibility for 
the functioning of advisory boards and the Urban Bantu Councils were to 
be transferred to the administration boards. 
The most important provision of the Act as regards the financing of 
urban black administration was to entrench in legislation the pri nciple 
of financial self-sufficiency of the Bantu Revenue Account. It was 
159 
pOinted out in a previous chapter how Departmental policy during the 
1950s came to stress the financial self-sufficiency of the locations's 
finances but that some municipalities had chosen to subsidise their Bantu 
Revenue Account. The Act now prevented any possible subsidisation from 
general rates, so ensuring a uniform application of the principle of 
financi a1 self-sufficiency. 
No new sources of revenue were created - the most important sources 
remained limited to rents, service charges, percentages of beer and 
liquor profits (BO and 20 per cent respectively with the rest going to 
the Department) and employment registration fees. Minor sources of income 
included fines, dog license fees and charges for services performed by 
the board over and above service charges . Koornhof argued in response to 
arguments that these sources of revenue were "sufficient for 
administration boards to perform their duties adequately without recourse 
to the State for additional assistance." (Hansard, 1971: 1969) Only 21 
of the approximately 450 local authorities were subsidising their Bantu 
Revenue Account at the time of the Act, as mentioned by Koornhof duri ng 
the debate. It is doubtful, however, whether the full extent of the 
subsidisation is reflected in these figures. For example, "hidden" 
subsidisation of the salaries of officials might have been occurring 
where these were not fully debi ted out to the Bantu Revenue Account. 
The stipulation that the administration boards function without 
State aid, while according with long-held Departmental policy, appears to 
have been insisted upon by the Department of Finance. During 
negotiations with lANA over the Bantu Labour Boards Bill, J.P. van 
Onse1en, deputy secretary of the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development, told an lANA delegation that the ending of municipal control 
would only be considered if the Treasury could be assured that it would 
not have to bear any losses which might be incurred as a result of a 
State takeover. (lANA, 1968c: 3-4) This refusal by the Treasury to carry 
any defici ts was entirely consistent with the long-standing policy of the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development on this issue. 
The use of "White" lOOney to subsidise the locations had long been a 
source of contention to the National Party opposition in the Johannesburg 
City Council. During the 1960s the party opposed the municipal budget on 
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the grou nd s tha t the Bantu Revenue Account was not self-supporting. In 
1969 the Administrator of the Transvaal refused to agree to an increase 
in municipal rates unless none of the extra income so raised went to the 
Bantu Revenue Account. During the last few years of Johannesburg's 
administration of the larger part of Soweto, the subsidy from the general 
rates was in the region- of R250 000 a year. The largest ever deficit 
carried by the general rates was R913 481 in 1963, after which it 
declined steadily. (Lewis, 1969: 43) The example of the Resettlement 
Board which charged economic rentals for its housing and still managed to 
operate at a surplus was used as evidence of the soundness of the policy, 
but it was widely recognised that the facilities it provided were not as 
good as Johannesburg's. By contrast, Johannesburg subsidised the housing 
rentals for sub-economic housing by raising the income limit from R30 to 
R40 - which had remained unchanged at R30 since the mid-1950s so pushing 
more families into the economic category with rising wages. Arguments by 
the City Counci 1 on the need to increase the sub-economic limit to R40 
were rejected by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. 
The confidence of Dr Koornhof that the administration boards could 
function adequately on the existing sources of revenue should also be 
seen against the enormous expansion of the sorghum beer market during the 
1960s and of liquor sales since 1962 when municipalities had been allowed 
to sell liquor. Sales of beer and liquor had increased markedly during 
the decade - as the tables below show - hence lessening the need of the 
general rates to bear deficits on the Bantu Revenu Account. 
Table 11 
Sor~hum Beer Production and Revenue and Liguor Revenue: 1963-1970 
Beer Liquor 
Year Gallons Value Value Tota 1 Revenue 
1963-64 87 451 659 R16 389 664 R5 495 688 R21 885 352 
1964-65 104 029 619 R19 327 076 R7 611 447 R26 938 523 
1965-66 123 365 275 R23 389 512 R12 138 185 R35 527 697 
1966-67 140 578 290 R27 467 420 R13 233 561 R40 700 981 
1967-68 151 676 634 R31 041 942 R13 903 921 R44 945 863 
1968-69 157 627 007 R33 719 895 R19 182 314 R52 902 209 
1969-70 168-708 670 R35 892 411 R26 309 792 R62 202 203 
Total 933 437 154 R187 227 920 R97 874 688 BZa5 lQZ aza 
Source: Derived from lANA, 1971. 
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Beer sales had doubled in seven years and produced an average 27 per 
cent profi t for the Johannesburg, We1kom and Germiston municipalities . 
Liquor sales quintip1ed during the same period and brought in a 12,5 per 
cent profit for the same cities. 
Despi te the tremendous increase in sorghum beer sales in the 1960s, 
the annual growth rate in sales began to show a marked deterioration by 
the middle of the decade. The growth rate over the last five years 
dropped steadily from 21 per cent to 6 per cent - a tendency which began 
to cause concern to municipal administrators who had been used to 
likening beer sales to milking a cow: " ..• vir my is dit daardie bruin 
me1koei wat nooit droog word nie - altyd is sy in melk ... " This decline 
in the annual growth rate of beer sales continued throughout the 1970s to 
the extent that per capita consumption of beer remained virtually 
constant between 1970 and 1980 at 46 1itres. In 1960 the per capita 
consumption had been 22,8 1itres. (Van Vuuren, 1981: Table 2) 
The burgeoning beer and liquor sales during the 1960s saved the 
general rates from meeting any claims for subsidisation. In Durban, for 
example, no increases in rentals took place between 1959 and the 
introduction of administration boards as the losses on service charges 
were carried by the profits on beer and liquor sales. (Maasdorp and 
Humphreys, 1975: 84-89) 
With the possibility of subsidisation ended and faced with declining 
beer sales, the nascent administration boards would have no option but to 
increase service charges if the principle of financial self-sufficiency 
was to be met with any degree of success. This inevitable development 
was expressed by Mrs Helen Suzman during the debate : 
"What is going to happen if this board is going to become self-
balancing? All I can say is that the rent is going to go up, 
because that is going to be the only way the board is going to 
get the revenue. so the screws are going to be turned even 
harder . II (Hansa rd, 1971: 2075) 
Increases in service charges were to be one of the features of the 
1970s as administration boards were faced with the need to increase 
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revenue to meet deficits on housing. 
principle that the poorest section of 
Thus the Act enshrined in law the 
the urban community should pay 
their own way, except for funds for housing developments, without any 
assi stance from the municipal general rates or the Treasury. 
Finally, the provisions of the Act affecting mobility of labour must 
be examined. Paradoxically, while previous drafts of the Bill and of 
the labour boards control bill had either repealed or frozen Section 10 
(1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications, the Act bestowed even greater 
benefi ts on persons ho1 ding these qualifications. In a major departure 
from previous policy, which consistently strove to limit the mobility of 
urban blacks, Section 26 of the Act reversed this trend in two ways. 
Firstly, it allowed persons ho1 ding these qualifications to live and 
work in another prescribed area to the one in which they held their 
qualifications but this mobility was restricted to movement to another 
prescribed area within the area of jurisdiction of the same 
administration board. Movement across administration board boundaries 
was not permitted - it was only as a result of the recommendations of the 
Riekert Commission that this was later adopted as policy. 
Secondly, where previously absence from the prescribed area had been 
sufficient to cause the loss of these qualifications, the Act did not 
make the movement to another prescribed area for employment dependent on 
the surrender of the qualifications in the previous prescribed area. 
However, no person would be allowed to ho1 d Section 10 qualifications in 
two different prescribed areas, as Dr Koornhof made clear in the debate. 
The extent of the importance of these changes to ho1 ders of Section 
10 qualifications can be seen from the number of persons who possessed 
them as es t i rna ted by P.J. van der Merwe who, it wi 11 be remembered, had 
served as secretary to the Van Rens_burg Committee before accepting an 
academic appointment at the University of Pretoria. He estimated that by 
1971 - 19 years after the introduction of the qualifications - 56,5 per 
cent of all registered male employees and 72,65 of all registered women 
employees had obtained the qualifications. Van der Merwe provided no 
basis for these estimates - which possibly came from within the 
Department - but he di d note that more than 2,2 million contracts had 
163 
been regi stereo at local labour bureax by 30 June 1970 . (Van der Merwe, 
1971: 141() 
These estimates, when read against the estimates of A. S. Marais 
quoted in the previous chapter, if both sets are correct, show the rapid 
increase in the number of persons who qualified during the 1960s. This 
rapid growth suggests that it was one of the reasons for the concerted 
a ttempt to remove them from the Statute Book duri ng thi s peri od . 
Contrary to the determination of the Government and the Department 
of Bantu Administration and Development to remove Section 10 from the 
statute book, the United Party urged the recognition of the pol itical 
importance of persons with such qualifications to white interests. W. M. 
Sutton, one of the United Party spokesmen on black affairs, said of 
Section 10 hol ders during the debate: 
"I believe that the Section 10 Bantu are the key to the 
survival of the White man in this country .. . they are the 
settled urban population of Bantu people and they will not be 
repatriated . If they are repatriated, and their rights are 
infringed, then I believe that this is simply inviting disaster 
to all South Africa, white as well as black." (Hansard, 1971: 
2040-41) 
When , after the 1976 riots, it became stated pol icy to develop an 
urban black middle class (Department of Co-operation and Development, 
1979: 29) this statement could well have been made by a National Party 
rep rese nta t i ve. Du ri ng the 196 Os nothi ng was further from the a ims of 
policy than the need to develop a black middle class in urban areas as a 
possible ally of white interests. 
D. Conclusion 
The developments in legislation between 1968 and 1971 were the most 
important developments in urban black administration since the package of 
legislation in the early 1950s. The institution of one year contracts 
and the extension of the labour bureaux system into the homelands; 
homeland ci tizenship for every black South African; and the restrictions 
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on urban housing were important preludes to the introduction of 
administration boards, the culmination of the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Van Rensburg Commi ttee. Not only had a 
comprehensive restructuring at a policy level taken place, but new 
administrative structures in both homeland and non-homeland South Africa 
had been created to ensure the implementation of the new pol icy 
direction. The most important consequence of the Bantu Affairs 
Administration Board Act was the tighter control it allowed the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development to exercise over the 
implementation of policy. The ministerial powers of appoi ntment of the 
chairmen and vice-chairmen of the boards was a major way of achieving 
this. This power of appointment was to be used to appoi nt persons who 
were known to be sympathetic to Government policy. 
The extent of head office control exercised after the introduction 
of the boards is shown in remarks of J.C. de Villiers, a former chief 
director of the West Rand Administration Board: 
"The result of necessary ministerial control was the creation 
of an administrative body concerned with urban Bantu 
administration, which cannot be easily matched for its 
clumsiness and long-wordiness. I do not think it posssible to 
design a more clumsy system without becoming ridiculous ... In 
vi ew of the care taken in the appoi ntment of peop 1 e who coul d 
tackle the job of urban Bantu administration thoroughly and 
effectively and who could correctly interpret government 
policy, one would justifiably expect that the traditional 
ministerial view would undergo a change and that specific steps 
woul d be taken to provi de a greater degree of I autonomy I to the 
local administration boards. However this did not happen." 
(Sunday Times, 24 May 1981) 
A t the same time as a11 owing more thorough head offi ce control, the 
Act also went some way towards meeting long-expressed employer demands 
for greater mobilit¥ of black labour. While it had been the intention of 
the Department to couple the granting of greater mobility of urban black 
employees with the abolition of Section 10 qualifications, this was not 
achieved, for reasons which were shown. It is now necessary to examine 
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the developments in influx control policy after the introduction of the 
boards, ending with the recommendations of the Riekert Commission in 
1979. 
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V. ADMINISTRATION BOARDS AND CHANGES IN INFLUX CONTROL DURING THE 1970s 
Within six years of the passage of the Bantu Affairs Administration 
Board Bill through Parliament, the procedures of influx control were 
being reconsidered by the Riekert Commission. This chapter will examine 
and suggest reasons for this reconsideration of policy which was to 
affect the administration boards in various ways . The chapter begins by 
outlining the development of administration boards after which attention 
will be paid to developments affecting influx control, paying special 
attention to the views of administration board officials. 
A. Administration Boards - The De limi taUon :of 'Boundari es 
The Bantu Affairs Administration Board Act was , promu1gated on the 26 
November 1971. The first administration boards started functioning on 27 
November 1972 and by September 1973 the entire country outsi de the 
homelands had been delimitated into 22 administration board areas with 
juri sdiction over important aspects of administration in both urban and 
rural areas. Seven of the boards were in the Cape, three in Natal, three 
in the Orange Free State and nine in the Transvaal. 
The basis for the delimi tation of the administration boards is of 
significance, especially to labour issues and to the involvement of 
administration boards in the development of homeland towns. Of the 22 
ori ginal boards, 15 shared at least one common boundary with a homeland 
or surrounded a section of a homeland. The only boards that did not 
share a border with at least one homeland were the Peninsula (Cape Town), 
South West Cape (Worcestor), Karoo (Graaff-Reinet), Vaal Triangle 
(Vanderbij1park), Cape Mi dlands (Port Elizabeth) and the East Rand 
(Germi s to n) and Wes t Rand (J ohannesburg) boards • Although factors such 
as language and geographic considerations influenced the delimitat i on of 
the boundaries, these wer e decided upon with the over-riding goal being 
one of linking as many administration boards as possible to a homeland 
boundary . (Bantu, 1973: 3). 
These homeland-administration board boundary linkages were designed 
to facilitate "homeland orientated administration" - a euphemism for 
various policy goals. These included (a) streamlining the supply of 
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labour from homelands to urban areas with the possibility of implementing 
labour zoning (as provided for in the 1968 labour regulations), (b) 
increasing the usage of contract and frontier commuter labour as a means 
of labour supply by allowing for more concerted action from the 
administration boards in the development of homeland towns, and (c) of 
allowing more consistent action and resettlement of "redundant" persons 
from the urban areas to the homelands. 
On the latter pOint, T N. H. Janson, deputy minister of Bantu 
Administration and Education, declared during a discussion on the 
importance of homeland-administration board linkages: 
"Aanverwant aan die voorsiening van behuising in die tuislande 
is daar 'n verdere belangrike funksie wat die 
verantwoordelikheid van Bantoesake-administrasierade word, 
naaml ik tuislandvestiging. Ons vind dat daar in gevalle waar 
by die Department van Bantoeadministrasie en -ontwikkeling 
aansoek gedoen word om uitbreiding van bestaande huisvesting in 
stedelike Bantoewoongebiede, by ondersoek vasgestel word dat 'n 
groot deel van sodanige behuising dikwels opgeneem word deur 
onproduktiewes, dit wi] se diegene wat weens hoe ouderdom, swak 
gesondheid, ongeskiktheid of ander geldige redes nie meer in 
staat is om eni ge lonende werk te verrig nie. Hierdie 
ongelukkige mense het dikwels 'n heenkome in die tuislande of 
'n heenkome kan vir hulle daar voorsien word. As gevolg van 'n 
gebrek aan aanmoediging en bystand bly hulle egter waar hulle 
is. Waar dit in die verlede die taak van individuele plaaslike 
besture was om elk ten opsigte van sy eie regsgebied behulpsaam 
te wees met die vestiging van hierdie onproduktiewes in die 
tuislande en sodoende beskikbare behuising ten volle te benut, 
word dit nou 'n funksie van die Bantoesake-administrasierade 
oor veel groter gebied, insluitende stedelike en landelike 
gebiede " (Jansen, 1972: 34-35) 
The advantages of the boundary arrangements for promoting the use of 
frontier commuter labour by administration boards has been recognised 
(Smit and Booysen, 1981: 28) and by the end of 1975 almost half of the 
boards were active in developing homeland towns. By 1978, an estimated 
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42 342 blacks had been resettled in homeland towns developed by 
administration boards, but this figure excluded numberous projects stillnumerou 
in the planning stage. (Riekert, 1978: 78) This figure is all the more 
important when those boards that did not share a border with a homeland 
are left out of consideration. It is unlikely that these efforts could 
have been matched by individual municipalities had they remained 
responsible for urban black administration during the 1970s; the 
introduction of the boards must be seen as a major factor in promoting 
the use of frontier commuter labour during the 1970s. 
These initial boundaries remained in force until April 1979 when the 
number of boards was reduced from 22 to 14 primarily, it seems, because 
of the financial difficulties many of the smaller boards were 
experiencing as a result of their boundaries. This redelimitation saw 
the number of boards reduced to three in the Cape; two in Natal; with the 
remaining nine in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. One of these 
latter boards - Oranje Vaal - cut across the Transvaal-Orange Free State 
provincial boundary. 
The importance of administration board-homeland boundary linkages 
was, though, accentuated by the new boundary arrangements: only two of 
the fourteen boards - West Cape and West Rand - did not share at least 
one common boundary with a homeland. Just as the importance of 
administration board-homeland boundaries had been an important factor in 
deciding on the original boundaries in the early 1970s, so too was it a 
factor in the 1979 changes. (Mathee, 1979: 22) That only two of 14 new 
boards di d not share at least one common boundary wi th a homel and 
suggests that it was a very important criterion. The two boards that 
were not directly linked in this way to a homeland were the West Rand and 
Western Cape boards. 
The advantages of these new boundaries for the promotion of 
"homeland orientated administration" were enthusiastically welcomed by 
the chairman of the East Rand Administration Board, S.J. van der Merwe, 
whose board had not previously shared a boundary with a homeland. Van 
Der Merwe, an outspoken proponent of labour zoning, saw in the new 
boundary arrangements the ideal opportunity for his board - and others -
to propagate political and migrant labour links between neighbouring 
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homelands and his board. Involvement in the development of homeland 
towns had also been facilitated by the new boundary arrangements. 
"By die vorige SABRA Kongres is baie sterk bepleit vir die her-
afbakening van Raadsgebiede sodat bepaalde Rade deur afbakening 
'n natuurlike gerigtheid tot bepaalde tuislande sou 
hi!. .. Gekoppel aan groter homogeniteit, kan Rade dus nou baie 
nouer tuislandskakeling ontwikkel. Hierdie tuislandskakeHng 
is ongelukkig nie vir die Wes-Rand bewerkstellig nie, wat baie 
jammer is. In die nouer skakeling sal dit baie makliker 
bewerkstellig kan word dat die enkellopende arbeid vanuit 
gerigte tuislande gekry kan word." (Van der Merwe, 1978: 7l 
Two years previously Van Der Merwe had presented a comprehensive 
scheme for the achievement of labour zoning for all the administration 
boards. In terms of the plan, formulated with clinical precision, each 
board would have drawn labour from, at the most, three homelands instead 
of the up to 10 homelands most of them drew their contract 1 abour from. 
(Van der Merwe, 1977: 54-59) Although the Riekert Commission was later 
to reject proposals that labour zoning be adopted as official policy, the 
new boundaries certainly aided the informal adoption of such policies by . 
individual boards and to their general involvement in labour recruitment 
and township layout in the homelands nearest to them. 
since 
These boundaries have not been alteredt1979. With this as a brief 
background it is now necessary to discuss the changing influx control and 
labour regulation policies during the 1970s leading up to the Riekert 
Commission and the Government's response to its report, giving speci al 
emphasis to the views of administration board officials 
B. Influx Control and Labour Regulation - Changes and Continuities 
The introduction of the administration boards and the ending of 
municipal responsibi li ty for urban black administration was a major 
triumph for the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Their 
introduction was primarily the result of Departmental concerns over the 
implementation of influx control; the Department wasted no time in 
setting the agenda for the new authorities as far as influx control and 
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labour regulation was concerned. The lANA congresses of 1972 and 1973 
were used by the Department to identify these avenues of concern which 
will be presented as a background to more particular on-going issues, 
such as Section 10 and homeland citizenship, before examining the impetus 
for restructuring influx control as ultimately expressed by the Riekert 
Commission. 
Departmental expectation about the tasks of administration boards 
was expressed by P.S.F.J. van Rensburg, deputy secretary and chairman of 
the Van Rensburg Committee, in his speech to the 1972 lANA congress 
titled "The Task of Bantu Affairs Administration Boards in White areas". 
Hi s speech was repeated in almost identical fashion at the 1973 congress 
by I.P. van Onselen, secretary of the Department. 
Firstly, Van Rensburg said the boards had to clamp down on the 
"still increasing" illegal employment and residence of blacks 
particularly those employed in domestic service and in the building and 
catering sectors. These categories of employment have traditionally been 
regarded as major users of illegal and/or unregistered labour and Van 
Rensburg's specific reference to them must be seen in that context. 
Secondly, they were to give attention to the " ... samedromming en die 
aanwesigheid van groot getalle oenskynlik ledige Bantoes in die 
blankewoon-, besigheids- en ontspanningsgebiede ••. ". Thirdly, in the 
rural areas the boards were to ensure that restrictions on the employment 
of farm labour were enforced and so prevent the "verswarting" of rural 
areas. 
"Die aanwesigheid van groot getalle Bantoes op plase en by myne 
en be drywe, moet toegesk ryf word aan di e een of ander oorsaak. 
Oorindiensneming is een hiervan ... Ook 
werkers soms buite alle verhouding. 
is die aantal gesins-
Plakkerdiensbodes en 
plakkers op arbeidsplase soos veral in Natal is 'n ander 
voorbeeld. So ook bestaan daar verskeie Swartkolle en 
Sendingsplase ... Dan is daar ook die volgende tendense wat ons 
nog in die nie-voorgeskrewe gebiede bespeur. Daar is 'n 
bedekte voortsetting van die plakkerdiensbodestel sel sel fs in 
daardie dele waar dit alreeds formeel afgeskaf is. Die 
voortsetting vind plaas deur die oenskynl ike registrasie van 
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Bantoes as vol tydse werkers maar in di e praktyk is die 
diensverhouding niks anders as die ou stelsel nie, en daarom is 
daar groter getalle op sulke plase aanwesig as wat daar behoort 
te wees." (lANA, 1972: 21-22)* 
And fourthly, the Department indicated its concern at continual 
requests by those 'categories of employers in rural areas who were subject 
to housing restrictions, for permission to exceed them. This, too, must 
be seen as an attempt to prevent the "verswarting" of the platteland. 
"Vir die behoud van gesinne wat reeds buite verhouding hoog is 
en vir die toevoeging van nuwe gesinswerkers, word die 
permanensie en die verwerfde opleiding, ondervinding en 
onmisbaarheid van sulke gesinswerkers, voor die Department se 
kop gegooi as rede vir hul indienshouding op 'n 
gesinsgrondslag. Elkeen wil sy eie klein gesinsgemeenskap he 
en niks kom tereg van 'n eie huis in die tuisland nie, of 
benutting van akkomodasie in 'n beplande Bantoedorp of 
behuising net vir die werkers by die werkplek. "(lANA, 1972: 22) 
Van Rensburg, and Van Onselen a year later, gave no indication of 
any considerations that important aspects of influx control could be 
liberalised as some municipal administrators were already urging: instead 
their presentation was of the orthodox and hardline nature which had been 
articulated during the 1960s by Departmental spokesmen. The suggestions 
by some municipal administrators, by now administration board officials, 
that influx control could be liberalised will be discussed after an 
examination of development affecting Section 10 during this period. 
* Thi s statement by Van Rensburg is another indication of Departmental 
concern over the extent of "over-employment" and the residence of farm 
labourers' families on farms. Du Randt, it will be recalled, had 
earlier referred to the inadequacy of control on farm labour 
employment. The transfer of the functioning of the district labour 
bureaux from the Bantu Commissioner's to the administration boards was 
crucial in this regard. "Sodra die Administrasieraad die 
distrikarbeid-buro's beheer (m.a.w. die Bantoe op plase) sal daar 
ernstig gekyk word na die stelsel van die aanhou van 8-10 siele op die 
plaas, terwyl slegs een se arbeid benut word." (Riekert, 1973: 127) 
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i) Section 10 and Homeland Citizenship 
The Department had fully intended that Section 10 should either have 
been repealed or drastically amended duri ng the late 1960s to achieve 
both the tightening of influx control and the ideological goal of linking 
urban blacks to e,thnic homelands. However, for the reasons which were 
dealt with in the previous chapter, this goal was not achieved and the 
Bantu Affairs Administration Board Act, paradoxically, brought increased 
employment benefi ts to the hol ders of Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) 
qualifications. Despite the setback to Departmental plans, it remained 
the goal to get rid of Section 10, as Koornhof had indicated in 1969. 
The ideological incentive to remove Section 10 from the Statute Book had 
been increased with the creation of homeland citizenship for every black 
South African; this legislation, according to the Department, finally 
established the political status of urban blacks, in relation to the 
ethnic homelands. 
Even though Section 10 was not amended during the 1970s despite the 
continuing commitment to do so, other important amendments to legislation 
during this period affected crucial long term aspects of Section 10 
qualifications. However despite this, pressure for the repeal of Section 
10 came from both within and outside the Department. 
Within the Department, two committees of inquiry urged a review of 
its provisions . The first, the Meyer Committee of 1974, noted the 
conflicting interpretations given to the status of Section 10. According 
to the summary of the' report in the Riekert Commission, the report argued 
that the black worker in urban areas was a "guest worker" and that 
employment was the criterion for their presence. It urged that the 
Appeal Court be asked to rule on the status of Section 10 and that 
amendments be made to it "where necessary". (Riekert, 1979: para. 4.194) 
One year later, in 1975, the provisions of Section 10 were again 
investigated, this time by the Vermeulen Committee. Like the Meyer 
Committee report, the report of this committee was never publically 
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released: once again it is necessary to rely ·on the summary provided by 
the Riekert Commission to provide an indication of the findings of the 
report. The report noted, inter alia, -
" •.. the detrimental effects of Section 10: misuse by agitators 
and the press ~o show up the Government in a bad light and to 
i nci te Blacks; pressure on the inspectorates of the 
administration boards to prosecute more blacks with a view to 
higher income from fines; raids on families when asleep, which 
lead to violence and strife and disturbed relations between 
peopl es as a result of arrests and the excessive zeal of 
officers in the carrying out of their duties. The Commi ttee 
recommended that Section 10 be amended to take account of the 
relevant factors of employment, accommodation and citizenship." 
(Riekert, 1979: para. 4.195) 
Continued gainful employment and approved accommodation had always 
been hel d out duri ng the 1960s as the sine ~ non for continued 
residence in urban areas; the addition of homeland citizenship was the 
new factor in the equation. It will be remenbered from the discussion in 
the previous chapter that the introduction of homeland citizenship was 
seen as an essential forerunner to the repeal of Section 10; departmental 
planners were now trying to link acquisition of homeland citizenship with 
access to housing and employment in urban areas to substitute it for the 
possession of Section 10 qualifications. Van Rensburg had already given 
notice that employment in urban areas ought to be linked with the 
acquisition of homeland citizenship (lANA, 1972: 22) as did H.J.D. Van 
der Walt, a prominent National Party parl i amentarian. 
"I think the policy of the National Party has already developed 
to the stage where we can say without qualification that the 
Whites of South Africa have citizenship in White South Africa 
and that the Bantu in our midst have citizenship in their 
homeland. I know what I am talking about, and I know we should 
do it in a responsible manner i.e. namely that this content of 
pretence permanently embodied in Section 10 (1) (a) and (b) 
shoul d be removed because we have now reached the stage where 
we are dealing with peoples next to one another ... the Black 
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peoples may be in South Africa at a given time and under given 
circumstances, be it for a longer or shorter period - may be 
generations - he is here as a citizen of that nation. He is 
here as a citizen of that nation to sell his labour, and we 
should link the sale of his labour to the possession of a 
certificate of citizenship." (emphasis added) (Hansard, 1975: 
5284) 
Not only was possession of homeland citizenship held out as an 
intended prerequisite for employment in urban areas but it was being 
linked to access to housing. The announcement in May 1975 that home 
ownership was to be reintroduced in urban areas, after being suspended in 
1967, was, in 1976, linked to the acquisition of homeland citizenship. 
(Senate Hansard, 1976: 2532) This stipulation designed to legitimise 
homeland citizenship was later withdrawn after considerable agitation. 
Homeland citizenship was even being linked to benefits of mobility 
of labour and service conditions, so seriously did the Department of 
Bantu Administration and Development undertake the task of trying to 
attach greater benefits to homeland citizenship than advantages which 
accrued to Section 10 qualifiers; Thus M.C. Botha in 1976: 
"To those who acknowledge their own specific national context, 
we must grant more and more privileges here in the White area 
Preference must be given to them in regard to available 
jobs •.• They must be protected by conditions of service, they 
must be provided with housing. That is why we introduced it 
into thi s new development of the home-ownership scheme •. . They 
may have greater freedom of movement to and within the White 
area ... " (Hansard, 1976: 5564) 
On another occasion Botha indicated that the benefits which homeland 
citizenship would bring would "put the so-called misrepresented 
privileges of Section 10 ... in the shade." (Senate Hansard, 1976: 2565-66) 
Nothing came of these proposals however: the Department backed down on 
- the stipulation that ci tizenship was a pre-condi tion for the 30 year 
leasehold housing scheme and no employment benefits were attached to 
acqui si tion of homeland ci tizenship. 
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The brief summaries of the Meyer and Vermuelen reports and the 
statements of Botha and Van der Walt woul d seem to indicate that the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development was preparing 
alternative legislation to govern the residence and entry of blacks to 
urban areas which would tighten influx control. If this was so, it would 
seem likely that such alternative legislation could have seen the removal 
of the 72 hour provision: the Van Rensburg Committee had earlier shown 
the difficulties municipal officials had in proving a stay of longer than 
72 hours in the face of a denial by a recent entrant. It is also 
possible, bearing in mind that the Transkei had indicated its intention 
to consider independence, that suggestions could have been made that 
homeland independence be linked with the forfeiture of Section 10 
qualifications by persons deemed to be ci tizens of homelands accepting 
independence. This stipulation would have catered for the ideological 
component of the long-standing antagonism towards Section 10 . 
Amongst administration board officials, these plans appear to have 
found support, certainly at a general level of a commitment to doing away 
with Section 10 . Dr P . J . Riekert, chief di rector of the Western 
Transvaal Administration Board and who had been the only member of lANA's 
executive to support the repeal of Section 10 during the negotiations 
over the Bantu Labour Boards draft bi 11, remained in favour of such a 
step . Section 10 could not be reconciled with "nation building" RiekEirt 
argued. (Riekert, 1972: 34) Another influential and conservative 
administration board official, C.H. Kotze, chief director of the 
Central Transvaal Administration board, urged the scrapping of Section 10 
on the grounds that it resulted in an undisciplined and choosy workforce 
which could only be corrected by amending Section 10. (Kotze, 1974: 3) 
On the other hand, J .C.K. Erasmus, the appointed chairman of the 
Cape Midlands Administration Board, recognised the national and 
international pol i tical consequences which a "drastic departure" from the 
existing position could cause. His proposal amounted to a freezing of 
Section 10 with a set of definite conditions for their continued 
possession - a proposal which was not very far removed from the spirit of 
- Departmental plans. 
"Daar word dus gevoel dat aan die Bantoe wat tans sekere 
voordele kragtens genoemde artikel 10 geniet, steeds daardie 
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voorregte gegee moet word met die uitsondering dat dit in die 
vervolg nie in die vorm van permanente verblyfsregte verleen 
word ni e, maar eerder as 'n verblyfsvergunning slegs aan 
daardie Bantoe wat produktief en in staat is om sy eie 
behui si ng te voorsi en op 'n erf-en-diens-skema-basi s en 
onderwerpe daaraan dat hierdie vergunning sal verval sodra hy 
ophou om te vol doen aan die vereistes." (Erasmus, 1974: 8) 
There was thus a general consensus amongst administrators - both at 
head office and at local administration board level - that Section 10 
should have been repealed. Why then was it not? Although M.C. Botha had 
indicated early in 1976 that it might not be necessary to repeal it 
because of the proposed benefits which acquisition of homeland 
citizenship would bring in its place (Senate Hansard, 1976: 2565-66), a 
more likely explanation is that the outbreak of. extensive violence in 
urban areas throughout South Africa in 1976 created political conditions 
which made it difficult to proceed .. immediately with such plans. 
But even in the post-1976 period when the Riekert Commission was, in 
effect, reconsidering the status of the urban townships and about to 
propose an end to Stallardi st-i nspired attitudes towards the townships 
and their replacement by Faganist attitudes, Stallardist inspired 
attitudes still found support within the ranks of administration boards. 
S.J. van der Merwe, chairman of the East Rand Administration Board, was 
an example. In hi s address to the 1978 SABRA conference, referred to 
earlier, he adopted a strong Stallardist position on the labour role of 
urban townships: 
"Die Swart stedelike gebiede bly steeds net 'n woondorp. Nie 
een van die stedelike Swart woongebiede het in eie reg onstaan 
as 'n dorp met al die elemente van 'n dorp of stad nie. Hulle 
kan eerder beskou word as 'n voorstad wat 'n bepaalde funksie 
vervul in die grotere Blanke stad of dorp - 'n soort 
voorstedelike aanhangsel. Hierdie Swart stede kan ook nie 
toegelaat word om te ontwikkel tot sel fstandige ·stede in eie 
reg met al die ~emente van 'n groot dorp of stad nie, want 
hulle is primer daar om juis 'n arbeidselement te voorsien 
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aan die stad of dorp waarvan hulle 'n deel uitmaak. Indien die 
totale reeks elemente van' n dorp of stad in eiereg aan die 
Swart woongebied gegee word, vervaag sy arbeidsvoorsienings-
funksie in die Blanke dorp ... " (Van der Merwe, 1978: 6-7) 
Hostility towards Section 10's provisions and such Stallardist 
attitudes towards the function of urban townships went hand-in-hand. 
However, even though the Departme nt fa il ed to di rectly subst i tute 
homeland citizenship for Section 10 qualifications as the basis for 
preferential access to housing and employment in urban areas, at a more 
explicitly political level the institution of homeland citizenship was 
beginning to have far-reaching long-term implications for further 
acquisitions of Section 10 (1) (a) qualifications, and thus eventually 
access to housing and employment. This process, which Dugard has called 
an "exercise in denationalisation" (Dugard, 1980) was heralded by the 
Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970; was developed further by the 
Status of Transkei Act of 1976 - as the first of the independent 
homelands - but was taken to its logical conclusion by provisions of the 
Black Laws Amendment Act of 1978. 
Although the legislation conferring independence on Transkei, and 
subsequently Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, did not affect the 
possession of Section 10 qualifications by persons who thus became 
citizens of these states at the time of independence, the Black Laws 
Amendment Act of 1978 effectively prevented children born to such persons 
after the date of independence from acquiring Section 10 (1) (a) 
qualifications. The amendment did this by amending Section 12 (1) of the 
Blacks (Urban Areas) Consol i dation Act to deny access to urban areas for 
work, residence and in general to enter such areas to a black "who is not 
a South African citizen, or who is not a former South African citizen who 
is a ci tizen of a state the territory of which formerly formed part of 
the Republic." Persons born in urban areas after the date of 
independence of homelands to which their parents had by law become had, 
by definition, never been South African citizens and so were excluded 
from the categories of exemption outlined above. Permission to enter, 
work or remain in an urban area could only be granted by the Director-
General of the Department of Plural Relations and could be withdrawn "at 
any time". 
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As Dugard has poi nted out, this amendment placed "the children of 
denationalised persons in the position of foreigners in respect of their 
right to remain in urban areas." (Dugard, 1980: 29) Once defined as 
foreigners such persons would become subject to the processes of 
deportation of foreign nationals, if their continued presence in urban 
areas was no longer desired, for whatever reason. It should also be 
poi nted out that the prospect of arbi trary deportation had been extended 
on the date of homeland independence to persons who had become homeland 
ci tizens. (Dugard, 1980: 33) 
This amendment should be seen against the statement by Dr C.P. 
Mulder, who had succeeded M.C. Botha as minister, during debate on the 
measure when he provided the most succinct admission of the political aim 
of homeland citizenship. 
"There must be no illusions about this because if our policy is 
taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black people 
are concerned, there will be not one black man with South 
African citizenship." (Hansard, 1978: 579) 
Thus to the extent that more and more homelands opted for these 
conditions of independence, coupled with other on-going developments 
affecting Section 10 - the development and resettlement of urban blacks 
to homeland dormitory towns, the re-drawing of homeland boundaries to 
include existing townships and the entrenchment of contract labour 
through the 1968 labour regulations - meant that the ability to obtain 
Section 10 qualifications, outside of Section 10 (I) (d) qualifications, 
was being continuously and severely circumscribed to an ever narrower 
group of black persons within the country as a whole. But at the same 
time there is evidence that within the urban black townships the 
proportion of the total registered labour force holding Section 10 {ll 
(a), (b) or (c) qualifications had increased rapidly during this period. 
S.J. van der Merwe, chairman of the East Rand Administration Board, 
quoted fi gures in 1978 showing that in the four administration boards in 
the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeeniging complex, 83 per cent of the 
registered labour force was housed in family conditions, while in 1975 
the fi gure had been 70 per cent. The use of family housing to gauge the 
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extent of the possession of these Section 10 qualifications is an 
acceptable indicator as contract labourers, being Section 10 0) (d) 
persons, could not qualify for family housing. 
The following table, quoted by Van der Merwe, illustrates the 
pOSition for the four boards in 1978. 
Table 12 
EmEloyment and Section 10 Qualifications 
Vaal West East Central 
Tri angl e Rand Rand Trans vaa 1 Total 
Single man 
labour (including 
frontier commuters) 23 068 62 342 76 703 66690 228 803 
Labour housed on 
fami ly basi s 146 469 525 485 257 825 227 013 1 156 792 
Total registered 
labour 179 537 587 827 334 528 293 703 1 385 595 
% Single man 
labour 13,6 10,6 22,9 8,2 16,6 
% Family housed 
1 abour 86,4 89,4 77 ,1 91,8 83,4 
Source: Van der Merwe, 1978: Table 2. 
Although Van der Merwe recognised that the use of contract labour 
had been seriously affected by the depression - dropping from 250 000 in 
1975 to 229 000 in 1978 in these four boards - the extent of the 
increasing possession of Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) qualifications 
attained through birth or length of employment was "disquieting". The 
implication of these figures is chiefly that they reflected that any 
attempt at increasi ng the proportionate use of contract 1 abou r depended 
on the new employment openings outstripping by far the capacity of 
stabilised labour to fill them. This was against a background where 
three of the four boards planned to drastically increase their contract 
labour capacity: Van der Merwe noted that the boards planned to increase 
their use of contract labour from the 1975 figures of 11,3 per cent, 15,4 
per cent, 17,1 per cent and 7,1 per cent to levels of 32,1 per cent, 20,1 
per cent, 20 per cent and 8,7 per cent. (Van der Merwe, 1977: 53) 
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To conclude: even though the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development failed to repeal Section 10 during the 1970s, this was not as 
severe a setback as may appear at first glance. For the consequences of 
actions such as the re-drawing of homeland boundaries, the resettlement 
of Section 10 persons to newly developed homeland towns as a result of 
which they lost these qualifications, and the long term consequences of 
the Black Laws Amendment Act of 1978, all helped to make major inroads to 
the extent and capacity of blacks to qualify for such qualifications. 
It is now ne-cessary to turn to an examination of the pressures within 
municipal ranks for a re-examination of influx control during this same 
period, at the end of which possession of Section 10 qualifications took 
on more si gni fi cance than ever before. 
ii) Municipal Pressures for a Partial Reform of Influx Control 
The recommendations of the Riekert Commission in 1978 and the 
subsequent White Paper detailing the Government's response, marked an 
important recognition at central government level that aspects of influx 
control and labour regulation could be relaxed and urban conditions 
ameliorated while still retaining a commitment to severe curbs on rural-
urban migration. It will be argued that many of these proposals had been 
expressed by municipal administrators from the late 1960s; illustrating 
that pressures for a partial reform of the system were building up within 
the vast bureaucracy controlling urban black administration before the 
outbreak of widespread urban unrest in the middle and late 1970s. 
It is necessary to return to the late 1960s when the Department of 
Bantu Administration and Development was putting the finishing touches to 
its plans to end municipal control of urban black administration. The 
Van Rensburg Committee had reported earlier with its declared aim of 
strengthening influx control - with no hint of any recognition that any 
of the requirements of ' influx control and labour regulation could be 
liberalised. Yet two years later, in 1969, a report of a sub-committee 
of the Transvaal Provincial Division of lANA was urging such changes, 
although these urgings were later rejected by a more senior committee. 
And in 1971, proposals which were later to be presented by the Riekert 
Commission were presented by H.A. du Plessis, director of Bantu 
181 
Administration of the Kimberley City Council, to the annual lANA 
conference. These three important debates at municipal level about 
possible future influx control policies will be examined in turn. 
The de~a te started wi th the appoi ntment in October 1969 of a sub-
committee of the Transvaal Provincial Division of lANA to investigate and 
report on the productivity of blacks permanently resident in urban areas 
and to make recommendations on ways of improving their productivity, if 
it was found to be unsatisfactory. The -committee was chaired by A.E. 
Steenhuizen, from the Johannesburg City Council's Non-European Affairs 
Department and later Director of Labour with the West Rand Administration 
Board, with other members drawn from the municipalities of Springs, 
Boksburg, Roodepoort, Vereeniging and Krugersdorp. The committee 
reported in Novell'i>er 1970. 
With a view to its term of reference, the committee attempted to 
determine the productivity "outside the work situation" of urban blacks. 
Because of the methodological problems and dubious nature of the 
calculations, they will be ignored other than to note that it argued that 
the average productivity of the permanent black resident on the 
Witwatersrand was 49,21 per cent. This indicated, it argued, a "great 
deal" of unproductiveness on their part. Of more interest, however, are 
the conclusions and recommendations which the commi ttee drew from these 
figures, irrespective of doubts and reservations about the validity of 
the calculations. 
As a general point the committee argued that given the high rate of 
labour turnover amongst permanently resident urban blacks - an average of 
56 per cent for the Witwatersrand towns surveyed - and the time-consuming 
process which accompanied each registration of a service contract, the 
result was that " •.. die Bantoe-arbeids potensiaal in voorgeskrewe gebiede 
nie optimaal benut word nie." 
"Dit wil dus voorkom dat as gevolg van behelkmatreel s (wat tot 
'n sekere mate natuurlik noodsaaklik is), algehele motivering 
tot optimale produktiwiteit nie moontlik is nie, en dat 
alleenlik vanwee hierdie feit dit moet aanvaar word dat die 
Bantoe-arbeids potensiaal in stedelike gebiede nie ten volle 
benut word nie. (Steenhuizen, 1970: 8) 
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This rather outspoken comment on the economic consequences of 
aspects of influx control procedures was again apparent in the 
formulation of its recommendations, discussed below. 
Secondly, it argued that labour bureaux were not instituted solely 
for influx control purposes to prevent the residence of large numbers of 
blacks in urban areas: instead their "main function" was to ensure the 
efficient usage of labour. Furthermore, the many tasks labour bureaux 
offi ci al s had to perform prevented them from giving proper atte.ntion to 
placing blacks in employment for which they were suitably qualified. 
Thirdly, it supported aspects of the conservative argument over 
Section 10 qualifications as expressed, for example, by the Van Rensburg 
Committee. Possession of Section (10) (l)(a), (b) and (c) qual ifications 
allowed workseekers with such qualifications greater choice of work, 
greater mobil i ty between employment and the choi ce to rema in u nemp 1 oyed 
if available employment openings were not satisfactory . The "cumbersome" 
procedures whi ch had to be followed before a successful prosecution in 
terms of Section 29 could be obtained, meant that " ... hierdie hulpmiddel 
om produktiwiteit te bevorder van min praktiese waarde is." (Steenhuizen, 
1970 : 9) 
And finally it argued that the influx control machinery was 
complicated and consisted of outdated and redundant requirements: 
" ... sogenaamde beheermatreel swat oor die jare ontwikkel het maar wat 
blyk dat hulle nie meer 'n nuttige doel dien nie." (Steenhuizen, 1970:11) 
A completely new approach to influx control was needed, it argued, 
which could not be achieved simply by adjustments of existing procedures, 
as previous experience had shown that these adjustments had not had much 
success. The labour bureau system had to be reviewed to allow .quicker 
and easi er empl oyer-employee interaction in the labour market while at 
the same time taking much stricter action against employers and employees 
who infringed the legal requirements governing employment procedures. 
"'n Feit wat soos 'n paal bo water staan is dat ons bestaande 
arbeidsburo en toestromingsbeheerstelsel dit baie moeilik maak 
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om di e besk ikbare arbeidspotensi aal ten volle te benut, omdat 
die skakeling tussen owerheid en werkgewer en werknemer 
onnodi gl ik bel emmmer word en di e bymekaarbri ng van werkgewer en 
werknemer grotendeels verydel word. Verder werk dit onwettige 
indiensneming in die hand omdat die wetsgehoorsame werkgewer en 
werknemer gepenaliseer word ten gunste van die wetsoortreders. 
Met ander woorde ons le allerlei beperkings op diegene wat 
graag die wet wil gehoorsaam en op diegene wat die wet oortree 
le ons slegs ligte strawwe op. Die onderligende gedagte wat 
ons aanbevelings bevat is eenvoudig; maak dit makliker vir 
nyweraars en ander werkgewers om arbeid te bekom en die wet te 
gehoorsaam en maak dit eweneens makliker vir die werknemer om 
geskikte werk te bekom en die beheermatreels na te kom en straf 
dan die wetsoortreders swaar. (emphasis added) (Steenhuizen, 
1970: 12-13) 
It was this emphasis on the need to simplify and streamline the 
employment procedures governing the employment of urban blacks which 
provided the basis of the committee's recommendations. It recommended 
the introduction of a worker permit system for Section 10 qualifiers on 
condition that such persons had been employed for at least 10 months of 
the previous year. Permit hol ders woul d be allowed to change employers 
as they wished; but the committee was less certain about the possi bil i ty 
of doi ng away with the need to report changes and dismissals of 
employment. But such a permit system would eliminate the need to issue 
workseeker's permits to persons each time they were discharged from 
employment. (Steenhuizen, 1970: 16) 
Secondly, it proposed that a similar permit system could be 
implemented for contract workers, with the important provision that 
contract workers ought not to be res tri cted to emp 1 oyme nt with a s i ngl e 
employer during their stipulated maximum 12 month contract. Changes of 
employment within the industrial sector the contract worker was 
restricted to, ought to be sanctioned by the local labour bureau. 
"Indien 'n werker sou van werkgewer moet verwissel in 'n 
vooorgeskrewe gebied sou hy onmiddelik na die arbeidsburo moet 
gaan om by 'n nuwe werkgewer binne die toegelate tydperk van 12 
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maande geplaas te word (gedagtig 
bepaalde kategorie gekoppel is). 
aan die feit dat hy aan In 
As hy in die stadsgebied 
gevind sou word sonder In werkerspermit of sonder dat dit 
behoorlik geteken is (In maand grasie behoort toegestaan te 
word) sou hy onmiddelik aan In hoe boete of gevangenisstraf 
onderhewig wees en vir In bepaalde tyd gepenaliseer word om in 
In voorgeskrewe gebied te gaan werk." (Steenhuizen, 1970: 16) 
Thirdly, as a complementary step to the above recommendations, the 
committee argued that the introduction of the proposed permit system 
would allow the scrapping of certain prescribed influx control 
procedures; these included the compulsory registration of workseekers, 
the registration of indi vidual service contracts (excluding the 
notification of employment and discharge of workers - presumably by 
employers) and the issuing of workseeker permits each time an urban black 
resident wished to find alternative employment. 
But the gUid pro guo for the abolition of these procedures was 
tougher action and higher fines against offenders; particularly persons 
found in prescribed areas without a valid workers permit (excluding 
persons exempted on grounds of age etc.) and employers who employed 
persons who did not qualify for such permits. 
These proposals by the sub-committee did certainly not question the 
necessi t;y for continued influx control; rather their importance 1 i es in 
the recognition that certain aspects - which had up until then been 
considered essential aspects of influx control - could be relaxed without 
sacrifiCing any efficiency in the implementation of influx control while 
allowing for less direct labour bureau control of labour regulation of 
persons with Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications. These 
proposals were roundly condemned by an lANA committee established in 1972 
to review the fi ndings of the Steenhuizen report; it is to this that we 
now turn. 
This committee was chaired by C.H. Kotze, of the Transvaal Board 
for the Development of Peri-Urban Areas. The suggestion by the 
Steenhuizen committee that relaxations of the procedures of influx 
control could be considered was rejected outright; instead this committee 
185 
proposed tha t infl ux control procedures ought to be ti ghtened still 
further and re-affirmed the importance of labour bureau x control over 
employment opportunities. 
"Die komitee is die mening toegedaan dat beheermatreels eerder 
verskerp word as om toegewings te maak soos in bogenoemde 
verslag aanbeveel. 'n Sprekende voorbeeld hiervan is die 
komitee se voorstel dat Artikel 10 ... en die Bantoe -
Arbeidsregulasies sodanig gewysig word, deur voorsiening te 
maak vir 'n werkerspermit stelsel. .. Die huidige arbeidsburo -
stelsel het die tyd van die toets deurstaan en daar moet gewaak 
word teen ' n stelsel wat die uiteindelike oogmerk kan 
vertroebel. Die Steenhuizen-komitee se voorgestelde werkers-
perm i t kan onproduktiwiteit in die hand werk as gevolg van 'n 
groter arbeidsomset en kan selfs neig tot ongedisseplineerde 
arbeid . " (emphasis in original) (Kotz€!, 1972 : 2) 
This commitment to reta i ning the labour bureau as the crucial pivot 
around which the implementation of influx control hinged is apparent in 
other comments of the committee. It argued that the goals of the labour 
bureau system should be purposefully implemented by, for example, 
scrupulously checking on the reporting of vacancies by employers, 
ensuring that blacks also reported promptly to the bureau as required by 
law and that failure to register service contracts should be kept to an 
absolute minimum by stricter action by inspectors. 
It accepted that the tedious administrative procedures involved in 
the allocation of labour ought to be eliminated and referred specifically 
to t he issuing of reference books and the call-in card system. But these 
recommendations for simplification of labour bureau intervention were 
certainly not as major as those proposed by the Steenhuizen committee. 
It did concur, though, with the Steenhuizen committee's suggestions 
that penalties for the contravention of influx control provisions ought 
to be drastically increased to serve as a real deterrent for illegal 
employment and residence in prescribed areas. These tougher penalties 
ought also to be applicable to employers who contravened employment 
procedures. 
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While the Steenhui zen committee had made no explicit reference to 
the need to repeal Section 10 qualifications, the Kotze commi ttee 
strongly advocated such a step. It argued that Section 10 qualifications 
contributed towards poor productivity because possession bestowed a 
certain protection on the holder as he could only be removed from a 
prescribed area by a Section 29 hearing. It accordingly advocated the 
repeal of Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) qualifications; instead it 
proposed that the capaci ty of an urban black person to work shoul d be the 
sole criterion for continued residence in prescribed areas. (Kotze, 
1972: 6) 
These were the most important political factors identified by the 
Kotze committee as contributing to the unsatisfactory utilisation of 
black labour in urban areas. It identifi ed other factors - more 
technical ones - but these are not important to the functioning of labour 
bureaux as an instrument of influx control, which was the central concern 
of the Kotze commi ttee. 
The last example of the debate within municipal, and later 
administration board circles during this period over the role of labour 
bureaux in influx control policies were the proposals presented by H.A. 
du Plessis, director of Bantu Administration of the Kimberley City 
Council, to the 1971 lANA congress. As remarked earlier, many of the 
proposals which the Riekert Commission was to recommend seven years later 
bore a very close resemblance to the poi nts made by Du Plessi s to the 
congress. 
His proposals were aimed at finding alternate policies and 
regulations for influx control and labour regulation which would satisfy 
three inter-related aspects: increasing mobilit;y of labour, simplifying 
the bureaucratic procedures attached to employment in urban areas and of 
prevent i ng the large-scale use of legal sanctions against influx control 
offenders. 
Du Plessis noted the consistent limitations post-war developments 
had had on the mobility of black persons and argued that " ... through 
control from above, we are moving directly contra to the natural laws 
requiring a balance between labour supply and labour demand." (lANA, 
187 
1971: 72) He wel corned the provlslons of Section 26 of the Bantu Affairs 
Admin i stration Board Act of 1971 - which allowed qualified blacks to take 
up employment in other prescr i bed areas while retaining their 
qualification in the prescribed area in which they obtained it - and 
suggested that they gave the administrator the opportunity " •.. to move 
away from the idea of limiting the Bantu to relatively small areas and 
should be used to encourage the more natural free flow of the labour 
force." (lANA, 1971: 73) 
It was, however, Du Plessis's suggestions for the revision of the 
documentation procedures surrounding service contracts which were a major 
departure from accepted policy and practice . Revision of these 
procedures woul d have to accompany any reform of pol i ci es affecting the 
mobil i ~ of blacks, he argued. The existing procedures, governed chiefly 
by the 1965 labour regulations, laid down stringent stipulations on 
blacks seeking work, entering employment or leaving employment. 
Du Plessis's proposals on this count were concerned with altering 
the procedures of documentation of service contracts to achieve two major 
new developments : shifting the onus of responsibility for informing the 
labour bureau of changes of employment from the employee to the employer 
and of moving towards control based on the a.vai lab·i,l i ty!. of work and 
accommodation. 
As regards the first, he proposed that once the identity of a 
qualified workseeker had been established such a person could be given a 
work document "which wi] 1 enable him to change employers a number of 
times without having to report to a labour bureau each time he does so". 
"A work document of this nature could well contain bas i c 
details required to enable him to take up work as well as 
detachable portions which the employer completes and passes on 
to the labour bureau, thereby completing a service contract. 
Once the service contract is completed in this man~er, the 
employer accepts a financial responsibility due to the labour 
bureau and wi thout having to complete any other forms and 
returns. By this means the onus is placed entirely on the 
employer to ensure that the affairs of his Bantu employee, has 
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been brought in order in so far as it concerns the labour 
bureau." (lANA, 1971: 73) 
Such a system woul d el iminate the necessity for employees to notify 
the labour bureau of di scharge from employment and of the requirement 
that workseekers register and seek work via the labour bureau. Instead, 
workseekers with such documents could seek work outside the auspices of 
the bureau with it being the responsiblity of the employer to notify the 
bureau of his taking on new employees. 
Although Ou Plessis intended such a system to be used primarily for 
urban blacks he argued tha t a si mi 1 ar scheme "wi th pos si b ly rna re 1 i mi ted 
scope for movement" could be implemented for homeland contract workers, 
as the Steenhuizen committee report had also suggested. 
Turning to the large-scale penalisation of influx control offenders, 
he argued that his proposals for increased mobility and revised 
employment procedures, coupled with the use of an employment document in 
preference to an identity document, should decrease the number of 
prosecutions of persons who could not identify themselves. 
"The last mentioned thought is based on the possibility that 
(a) man's identity as such is not of cardinal importance 
provided he is employed or is in the process of changing jobs. 
It then follows that our control must place the accent on the 
employer and the avail abil ity of accommodation for the Bantu 
employee, rather than on the individual as at present." 
(elllphasis.£.q.ded) (lANA, 1971:74) 
These suggestions by Du Plessis, for what amounted to a drastic 
revision of the procedures of influx control, were not motivated by a 
desire to tighten influx control, as perhaps could have been expected. On 
the contrary, Du Plessis in a rather surprising justification of his 
proposals acknowledged that they were "motivated •.• to offer possible 
solutions that will be acceptable to the subjects governed rather than to 
the administrator" (lANA, 1971: 73) and that, furthermore, implementation 
of his proposals could lead to "relatively serious problems" in the short 
term with a "major influx" from the homelands to urban areas. (lANA, 
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1971: 74) These justifications and admission of the consequences of his 
proposals were certainly far-removed from the orthodox attitudes and 
interests of his colleagues at the time. 
Du Plessis's proposals did not provoke the response one might have 
expected from his fellow administrators, although a cautious defence of 
the existing labour bureau system was offered by A.H. Stander of 
Roodepoort (later chief director of the West Rand Administration Board) 
who was aware, though, of the inherent difficulties of totally preventing 
i nfl ows of unauthori sed workseekers to urban areas. Stander, in effect, 
challenged Du Plessi s' assumption that employers - because they had a 
financi al stake in reporting the discharge of employees ~would inform the 
labour bureau of turnover of employees. Rather, he argued that illegal 
workseekers, because of the marginal nature of their residence in urban 
areas, provided employers with their best labour, who would thus continue 
• 
to employ such labour and fail to report changes in employment to the 
1 abour bu reau. Under these conditio ns, the 1 abour bureau had to conti nue 
to police the system, with officials dedicated to what they perceived as 
impartial intervention between employee and employer in the national 
interest. If they did not, the controls on rural-urban migration would 
collapse. 
"Aan die eenkant het ons die Bantoe wat in die besol di ge 
betrekkings 'n heenkome wil vind en ook waar hy wil, en aan die 
anderkant het ons blankepubliek by wie 'n selfsugtige 
ben .aderi ng stewig, sal ek s~ gefundeer op eiebelang, 
deurgaans aan die orde van die dag is. Voeg 'n mens hierby nog 
die feit dat die Bantoe wat die gebied binnegesluip het vol gens 
die werkgewer sonder uitsondering die mees voortreflike diens 
lewer, dan kan u die amptenaar se dilemma begryp. Die 
werkgewer is dan ook maar min daaroor bekommerd dat die ideale 
vondeling van hom binne drie maande tot die algemeengeldende 
standaard sal daal. " (emphasis added) (lANA, 1971: 75) 
This orthodox statement of the importance of labour bureau 
intervention was linked by Stander to the necessity of more rapid 
economic development in the homelands to reduce the impetus to seek work 
in urban areas but with a recognition of the enormous difficulties 
involved in completely preventing illegal entry. 
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" ... want glo my ons kan maar papier gordyne rondom ons stede 
span en alle sekondere maatreels in werking stel maar solank 
daar in di e tui slande mense si t wat wil werk, en hier in die 
stede die blanke wat enigiets in die werk stel om hulle dienste 
te bekom, dan het ons nie baie hoop nie." (lANA, 1971: 76) 
Reaction of a different sort to Du Plessis' proposals was made by 
P.S.F.J. van Rensburg of the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development, whose importance in the formula tio n of pol icy matters duri ng 
this period has been noted. Van Rensburg had little comment on the main 
thrusts of Du Plessis' proposals - which was surprising in view of his 
important position within the Department - but he commented instead on 
future policy directions affecting the newly established aid centres. 
Van Rensburg held out as the goal of future policy developments 
affecting the labour bureau system that a clear distinction should be 
made between influx control on one hand, and other aspects of labour 
bureau activity, on the other: 
" •.. dit is nodig dat ons daardie onderskeid al meer en meer in 
ons administrasie moet beklemtoon, sodat ons meer positief in 
verband met ons arbeidsburowerk sal kan dink. II (lANA, 1971: 78) 
Influx control, he argued, coul d be performed by the aid centres 
while the labour bureaux ought to concentrate increasingly on the 
orientation and training of workseekers for the labour market. This 
statement of the goal of future pol icy by Van Rensburg was only to be 
taken up seriously after the Riekert Commission report, a period which 
falls outside the scope of this study. The difficulties involved in 
attempting to enforce such a clear-cut distinction were not di scussed by 
Van Rensburg but it should be noted that even the registration of a 
service contract at a labour bureau served an influx control function; 
this suggests that no precise distinction can simply be made between 
influx control and other aspects of labour bureau activity. 
In conclusion, what are we to make of these three examples of 
municipal proposals for future policy developments affecting influx 
control and the labour bureau system? Perhaps the most important feature 
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of the debate is to be found in the acceptance by certain municipal 
administrators that the extent of labour bureau involvement in the 
process of labour regulation in urban areas could be reduced and the 
responsibility for keeping the bureau informed of employment be shifted 
from the black employee to the white employer. The Steenhuizen committee 
and the proposals of H.A. du Plessis - for different reasons and in 
different ways - accepted and proposed similar steps to achieve the same 
goal. Both proposals singled out increased mobility of labour for 
Section 10 qualifiers as the starting point in any attempt to re-pattern 
the labour process, but both also presented arguments allowing contract 
workers greater mobility within their contract period - a suggestion 
which was contrary to policy. 
The reaction of the Kotze committee to the proposals of the 
Steenhuizen committee were, on the other hand, more closely allied to the 
standpoint of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development on 
these issues, as they had been expressed in the Van Rensburg committee 
report, for example. 
Thus municipal administrators by no means constituted a united corps 
of officials implementing policy and uncritically accepting policy 
directives from the Department of Bantu Administration and Development 
(as their response to the introduction of administration boards had al so 
revealed). On the contrary, the debates summarised in this section 
indicate that pressures for a re-examination of the procedures of influx 
control and labour regulation were being discussed within municipal ranks 
from the la te 1960s and shoul d be seen as a major force in the 
appoi ntment of the Riekert Commission and of its recommendations. 
iiil The Appointment of the Riekert Commission 
In the past two SUb-sections, the continued commitment by the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development to repeal Section 10 
in favour of urban residential qualifications based on employment and the 
possession of homeland citizenship, on the one hand, and secondly the 
pressures by numbers of municipal administrators for changes in the 
procedures of labour regulation were dealt with. In different ways both 
of these groups stood to gain by a re-examination of the processes of 
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labour regulation: the Department of Bantu Administration and Development 
because it had failed to implement the major findings of the Meyer and 
Vermeulen committees, while to the, by now,administration board officials 
in favour of a partial liberalisation, such an inquiry would present an 
opportunity to motivate such changes . Additional factors serving to 
explain the appointment of the Riekert Commission will be identified 
duri ng the course of thi s sub-sect ion. 
By the mid-197Ds, the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development began to face more clearly pressure from homeland leaders for 
a reform of influx control. In 1975, at a conference between the 
homeland leaders and senior political representatives of the government, 
the implementation of influx control was one of the issues raised. 
According to M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development, the di scussion concerned "the degree to which we can bring 
about a revision of influx control without throwing the system overboard, 
but nevertheless with a view to modernisation and improvement." (Hansard, 
1976: 5668) 
Despite the commitment by Botha to a "modernisation" of influx 
control - it is arguable that by modernisation he was referring to a 
system incorporating homeland citizenship in the i mplementation of influx 
control as the Vermeulen Committee had recol1l1lended, and al so because at 
the same meeting it was agreed that consideration should be given to 
strengthening homeland government links on a substitute structure for the 
Urban Bantu Councils (Hansard, 1975: 5306) - his statement, and 
subsequent actions by the Department, indicated that no major changes to 
liberalise influx control were contemplated by the Department. 
Faced with these pressures from homeland governments, amongst 
others, for a revision of influx control, official spokesmen consistently 
argued the necessity to protect the employment interests of permanent 
residents against competition from outsiae workseekers as a justification 
for the maintenance of influx control. (Hansard, 1975: 128) 
A good example of such justifications - which municipal 
administrators had long seen as an integral part of the justification for 
influx control measures - was presented in 1977 by W.A. Cruywagen, deputy 
minister of Bantu Affairs. 
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" .the established population of a region has first claim to 
the employment opportunities in that region. The illegal 
i nfl ux into the area of people who snatch the employment 
opportunities away from the established population, cannot be 
allowed. The worst aspect of all is that these people who 
enter the area illegally, fi 11 the available situations at 
lower wages. Therefore, besides, depriving other people of 
employment opportunities, they are also doing the entire labour 
community a disservice, for the entire wage structure is forced 
downwards." (Hansard, 1977: 11428) 
In keeping with this justifications, penalties for the illegal 
employment and illegal residence were substantially increased in the same 
year in terms of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, No. 119 of 1977. And in 
the following year what might be called the historical reality of the 
implementation of influx control - namely the importance of reference 
books as proof of identity and legal residence - was affirmed by Dr C.P. 
Mul der, Minister of the newly named Department of Plural Relations and 
Development and M.C. Botha's successor. 
"How does one control inflow? Let us be realistic and 
practical .•. How does one control inflow if one cannot ask a 
person to produce a document at some time or other showing that 
he is legally in a certain place? One cannot tell whether he 
is legally or illegally in a place by looking into his eyes. 
One can only determine that in one way and that is to ask him 
to produce his document." (Senate Hansard, 1978: 2706) 
These actions and statements, coupled with the developments examined 
ina previous sub-section, indicate the extent to which influx control 
and related matters such as homeland citizenship, Section 10 and 
penalties for the contravention of influx control procedures, were being 
tightened prior to the findings of the Riekert Commission. 
The second additional factor which must be seen as contributing 
towards the appointment of the Riekert Commission is that of the 
widespread unrest in urban areas throughout South Africa from mid-1976. 
While not solely responsible for the appointment of the commission with a 
194 
brief to examine labour legislation implemented by departments other than 
the Department of Labour, the rioting certainly prompted a re-examination 
of policies towards urban black residents not only within the National 
Party government but by the private sector as a whole. The establishment 
of the Urban Foundation in November 1976 - five months after the outbreak 
of the riots - to mobilise business interests in attempting to ameliorate 
conditions and pressuring for such changes in urban black areas is the 
clearest evidence of the recognition by the business community of the 
consequences of the outbreak of unrest. 
This concern by business interests was directed towards the creation 
of a black middle class in the townships. For example, the Transvaal 
Chamber of Industries in its memorandum to the Prime Minister soon after 
the outbreak of unrest expressly linked this goal with the maintenance of 
long-term whi te economic and pol i tical interests. 
"The thought most basic to our submission is the need to ensure 
a stable, contented urbanised Black community in our 
metropolitan and industrialised areas. In this context a 
stable "middle class" is most important. Our prime point of 
departure should be that this "middle class" is not weakened by 
frustration and indignity. Only by having this most 
responsible section of the urban Black on our side can the 
Whites of South Africa be assured of containing on a long-term 
basis the irresponsible economic and political ambitions of 
those Blacks who are influenced against their own real 
interests from within and without our borders." (Greenberg, 
1980: 206). 
The memorandum listed the extensive range of issues which restricted 
the development of such a middle class - transport facilities, the 
backlog of housing and township amenities, education, the streamlining of 
influx control, occupational mobility and greater powers for the Urban 
Bantu Counci 1 s. 
Although this pressure for reform of elements which had long 
constituted the central tenets of state policy was not immediately 
wel corned by the National Party government - witness the corrments by the 
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then Prime Minister B.J. Vorster to comments by the Association of 
Chamber of Commerce (Greenberg: 1980: 206) - the perceived advantages of 
developing a stable black middle class in urban areas outside the home-
lands became accepted policy of the Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development, at least formally. The annual report of the Department 
for the years 1978-1979 concluded after a review of policy developments -
including the 99 year 1easeho1 d scheme - during the period that : 
"It should also result in the accelerated growth of a stable 
middle class, as well as a general improvement in the quality 
of life of the Black man in the areas concerned." (Department 
of Co-operation and Development, 1979: 29) 
Nothi ng ill us tra tes more aptly the changes brought about by the 
unrest to aspects of Departmental policy than the above statement. New 
developments such as the institution of 99 year leasehold, the relaxation 
of trading restrictions in urban areas, and the developments affecting 
Communit¥ Councils are all evidence of this new emphasis, which hinged on 
the possession of Section 10 qualifications. 
The final factor which helps to explain the appointment of the 
Riekert Commission was the necessity of evolving new procedures and 
structures to deal with the changing composition of the black labour 
force employed in urban areas in "white" South Africa during the 1970s. 
In particular, the rapid growth of the frontier commuter labour force 
during this period - from 290 000 persons in 1970 to 638 500 in 1976 -
meant that existing procedures for the cana1isation of labour from 
dormito ry home 1 a nd towns ha d to be revi ewed to tak e account of these 
developments. 
The labour bureau system had remained unchanged since the 1968 
regulations established the labour bureaux in the homelands, although the 
district labour bureaux were transferred in 1974 from the jurisdiction of 
the Bantu Commissioner to the administration boards. The extremely rapid 
growth in the number of frontier commuters had introduced a new aspect to 
the allocation of labour from the homelands, which had not been matched 
by changes to the labour bureau system. 
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Administration boards were not permitted by law to operate within 
homelands as the Bantu States Constitution Act of 1971 had reserved 
powers over labour matters to the homeland governments. Thus, formally, 
applications for labour by employers dependent on frontier commuters had 
to be routed via a homeland labour bureaux and subsequently to the Chief 
Commissioner's office for approval, as frontier conmuters did not possess 
Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualifications they were formally regarded 
as Section 10 (1) (d) cases. Important industri al areas such as East 
London, Durban and Pretori a were crucially dependent on frontier commuter 
labour while many smaller towns near homelands were similarly affected. 
In conclusion, therefore, it would seem possible to identify at 
least five important factors which led to the appointment of the Riekert 
Commission to examine future policy options affecting influx control and 
labour distribution: namely, pressures from within administration boards 
for a partial liberalisation of the procedures of influx control and also 
for a re-examination of the distributive procedures as performed by the 
labour bureau system to take account of the emergence of frontier 
commuters; pressures from homeland governments for a re-examination of 
influx control; the consequences of the outbreak of unrest in urban black 
areas in 1976 and finally the interests of the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development in re-patterning conditions of urban 
residence and employment to include the requirement of homeland 
citizenship as the Vermeulen Committee of 1975 had recommended. This 
last factor was probably reduced in importance as a result of the urban 
unrest throughout South Africa, although this does not mean that senior 
departmental spokesmen jettisonned the wishes they had to incorporate 
homeland ci tizenship into the requirements of urban residence and 
employment. Rather, in the aftermath of the riots such an interest was 
superceded by the other factors mentioned above. It is now necessary to 
examine the findings of the Riekert Commission on the issues highlighted 
in the previous chapters and to examine the Government's response via the 
Whi te Paper. 
C. The Riekert Conmission 
L ike the Van Rensburg Committee report, the Riekert Commission's 
recommendations covered a wide range of issues relating to influx control 
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and labour regulation and the institutional structures necessary for 
their implementation. While the recommendations of the Van Rensburg 
Commi ttee were deal t wi th i ,n some depth, because the report was never 
published, it is not proposed to deal with the findings of the Riekert 
Commission on the same basis. Rather, only those recommendations 
affecting influx control issues will be examined. 
In examining the findings of the Riekert Commission it is necessary 
to recognise the assumptions and 1 imits which the Commission adopted, 
within which it proposed changes to the statutory framework. A full 
exposit on of this intellectual framework was provided in the report 
(Riekert, 1979 : para. 6 1 6.36) but the more important aspects should be 
noted here. Firstly, the Commission, while declaring its intention to 
avoi d findings and recommendations of a "purely pol i tical nature" 
nevertheless adopted the position that any attempt at eliminating 
eXisting "market failures and points of friction" would be made "within 
the framework of certain political parameters which were taken as given" 
(emphasis added) (Riekert: 1979: para. 6.5(c)} These crucial, and 
contradi ctory, statements of pri nc i ple underline t he degree t o which the 
Commission adopted self-imposed limits over the possible nature and scope 
of recommendations. 
Secondly, the commission accepted as the goal of its recommendations 
the avoidance of discriminatory legislation and regulations, in as far as 
possible, but where this was not possible, reasons would be spelled out. 
The adoption of this principle shoul d be seen as a consequence of the 
post-1976 unrc·st in urban areas throughout South Africa which, as already 
mentioned, had led the Department of Plural Relations and Development to 
formally encourage the growth of a black middle class in urban areas. 
The distinguishing feature of the Riekert Commission's discussion on 
the various aspects of infl ux control, which al so pervades its 
recommendations, is the extent to which it strove to further tighten 
influx control to reduce illegal employment in urban areas. The 
Commission consistently stressed the "large-scale" contravention of 
existing curbs on illegal employment and entry to urban areas - which in 
itself was no new realisation - but what was important was its 
recommendation that illegal employment would be " ... effectively checked 
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only if, as regards the prosecution of offenders, there is a real shift 
of emphasis to the prosecution of employers". (emphasis in original) 
(Riekert, 1979: para. 4.152(c)) It accordingly recommended that all 
penalties for illegal employment should oe directed at the employer with 
the corresponding aoolition of penalties against the olack worker. 
The Commission stressed the necessity of effective control over 
restricting access to uroan employment, -in the first instance, to Section 
10 qualifiers and limiting illegal employment, as an essential 
precondition to its other recommendations for a restructuring of the 
procedures of influx control. It declared: 
" •.• the employment of laoour must take place within the 
statutory framework created and the necessary machinery must be 
used to ensure that the supply of and the demand for Black 
laoour are orought into equiliorium. This is one of the 
keystones on which the Commission's report is founded and if 
the unlawful employment of workers is permitted to continue at 
the present rate, it will not be possiole to implement a great 
many of the recommendations of the report that are des i gned to 
eliminate inconsistencies and to lioeralise the use and 
residence of Black labour." (Riekert, 1979: para. 4.152(c)) 
The recommendations proposed oy the Commission for a restructuring 
of influx control and laoour regulation covered a wide range of issues 
out the most important aspect, for our purposes, was its attempt at 
constructing a system of influx control in uroan areas oased on 
employment and accommodation. The Commission did this oy accepting and 
extending the existing distinction between workers living in uroan areas 
and possessing Section 10 qualifications allowing them to remain in such 
areas (what the Commission called "estaolished workers") and of those who 
did not i.e. workers on annual contracts or frontier commuters from 
homelands. Around this distinction, the Commission oased a series of 
recommendations affecting mooility of workers and their relationship to 
the laoour bureau. 
It is necessary to trace the way in which the Commission arri ved at 
its recommendations, starting with the provisions of Section 10 of the 
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Blacks (Urban Areas) Consol i dation Act of 1945. 
An important difference between the recommendations of the Riekert 
Commission and its earlier equivalents, most notably the Van Rensburg 
Committee report and the Vermeulen Committee Report, concerned its 
treatment of Section 10 qualifications. The 72 hour clause - an 
important aspect of Section 10 - will be dealt with separately to the 
discussions on the categories of residential qualifications. Previous 
chapters have shown how, during the 1960s, the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development was committed to repealing Section 10 and 
replacing it with residential qualifications based solely on continued 
employment, while the passage of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 
1970 saw conservative administrators attempting to couple homeland 
citizenship with urban residential rights duri ng the first hal f of the 
1970s. 
In contrast, the Riekert Commission, while echoing many of the 
comments made by the earlier reports, regularly stressed the need to 
preserve Section 10's residential qualifications and to give security of 
urban tenure to established workers. It noted, from the evidence it 
received, the "practical problems" which administrators faced in 
implementing and interpreting the di fferent provi sions of Secti.on 10 
(Riekert, 1979: para. 4.1B8) - as the earlier reports had also noted -and 
accordingly recommended unspecified amendments and "in other cases 
adjustments in the practical administration of the existing provisions". 
The Commission was thus aware of, and agreed with, the administrative 
problems which Section 10 created, but was unable to support its repeal 
on essentially political grounds. These political reasons included the 
fear of "strong political reactions" and also because the Commission's 
sel f-decl ared framework included a pledge of "non-interference with the 
existing rights and privileges" of individuals or groups under existing 
legislation and regulations. In addition, an examination of the reasons 
offered by the Commission for rejecting evidence from the "vast majority" 
of witnesses for the dropping of a distinction between prescribed and 
non-prescribed areas, suggests an appreciation of the reasons why Section 
10 was thoroughly amended in 1952 and thus of its continued benefits, 
administrative difficulties notwithstanding. Furthermore, imperfect 
though Section 10 was, it did provide a basis from which the Commission's 
200 
recommendations regarding differential treatment between "establishing 
workers" and other workers cou1 d proceed. 
The discussion so far has examined only the response to the 
residential qualifications involved in Section 10 but of equal importance 
to the commission's recommendations for future influx control procedures 
was its analysis of the 72 hour clause contained in Section 10. The 72 
hour clause was, in effect, the cutting edge dividing qualifiers and non-
qualifiers in prescribed areas. Despite this, the Commission recommended 
its abolition. 
Evidence presented to the commission on the 72 hour clause appears 
to have overwhelmingly stressed the difficulties which the provision 
entailed, particularly to administration boards in the enforcement of 
influx control. The boards' evidence, as summarised by the Commission, 
indicated their difficulties with the provision - that it was difficult 
to prove a stay of longer than 72 hours - but most importantly, they were 
"of the opinion that the existing control measures in regard to housing 
and employment were adequate to ensure the effectiveness and success of 
influx control" . (Riekert, 1979 : para. 4.167) Thus administration boards 
- it is not clear from the report whether they were unanimous in their 
evidence on this point - were prepared to forego the 72 hour clause in 
favour of controls based on housing and employment without expecting to 
surrender any effective implementation of influx control. Control based 
on housing and employment had always been an integral component of influx 
control procedures exercised by the labour bureau in approving employment 
contracts; the willingness of the administration boards to suggest the 
scrapping of the 72 hour clause must be seen in this context. 
It appears to have been this evidence that led the Commission to 
recommend the lifting of the 72 hour clause (although it recognised other 
advantages which could flow from such a step) (Riekert, 1979: para. 
4.282(d)) in favour of controls based directly on housing and 
accommodation which would: 
" ... render completely unnecessary purely paper control 
comprising the arbitrary and general demand for the production 
of reference books or travel documents outsi de of the 
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employment and occupation situation, i.e. on the street ... " 
(Riekert, 1979: para. 6.15) 
It is here that we find the Commission's determination to tighten 
and secure the more efficient enforcement of influx control, even after 
it had come out against the need to produce reference books on demand, 
whe nit dec 1 ared ina jus tifi ca tion of its recommenda tio ns: 
"The Commission is also satisfied that movement control that 
applies to all population groups and which is linked to 
employment and housing affords a far more acceptable and 
justifiable basis than the present set-up, and that it will in 
no way yield poorer results, but rather far better results, 
since control will be concentrated on a far smaller number of 
strategic points, i.e. on employers and owners of premises". 
(emphasis added) (Riekert, 1979: para. 6.16) 
The essential condition, though, in proposing this change in 
procedures of influx control was much stricter action against employers 
of illegal labour, illegal occupiers of dwellings and persons who 
accommodated persons illegally in prescribed areas. 
Co ntrol over the ac commoda ti 0 n of black persons in townships had 
been uniformly regulated and linked to Section 10 qualifications since 
1968 and the Commission proposed no changes over its continued use as an 
instrument of influx control. But as regards employment and the role of 
employers in influx control - the other pillar of influx control proposed 
by the Commission - the nature of the proposed changes hinged on whether 
a black person was an "established worker" or not . 
Where previously black employees who possessed Section 10 (1) (a), 
(b) or (c) qualifications were legally bound to register at the labour 
bureau as workseekers and inform it of changes of employment, the 
Commi ssi 0 n proposed tha t such workers be gi ven a "standing authori sa tion" 
to change employment without reporting to the labour bureau but that it 
would now become the duty of the employer to observe the registration 
procedure and inform the labour bureau. (Riekert, 1979: para. 4.105(1)} 
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Thus the onus of keeping the labour bureau informed of changes in 
employment of "established workers" would rest completely with the 
employers - a change which should be seen against the recommendation that 
all penalties for illegal employment should be incurred by employers and 
not the unauthorised employee. The procedures for the entry of contract 
workers to urban areas and their relationship to the labour bureau were 
not affected by any oJ the commission's recommendations. Labour bureau 
approval for their entry coul d only be granted subject to an offer of 
employment, approved accommodation and the non-availability of local 
workseekers for the job. (Riekert, 1979: para. 4.157(c)) 
On balance, therefore, the major thrust of the recommendations of 
the Commission as regards influx control were designed to allow for a 
more efficient implementation and detection of illegal employees while at 
the same time granting more freedom of movement to "established workers". 
To the extent that the Commission strove to tighten influx control, its 
a ims were no different to the goal s of earl i er reports; its si gnifi cance 
lies instead in the different pressures it was reacting to and which 
accordingly influenced its recommendations. 
D. The White Paper 
The reaction of the Department of Co-operation and Development to 
the recommendations of the Riekert commission will be examined in as far 
as they affect influx control. 
Although the White Paper identified fully with the Riekert 
Commission's sentiments on the need to maintain effective control over 
movement to the towns, a major difference of opinion on the way of 
achieving this is apparent between the two reports. As the White Paper 
decl ared: 
"In hierdie verband is die vraag waarop sowel die Kommissie as 
die Regering 'n antwoord moes soek, dus nie of daar 
instromingbeheer moet wees of nie, maar wel wat die aangewese 
meganisme van intromingbeheer in Suid Afrika se omstandighede 
behoort te wees." (emphasis added) (White Paper, 1979: 2) 
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Thi s difference of opinion is noticeable on a number of issues, but 
particularly so on the 72 hour provision and the suggestion that 
employers, and not illegal black employees, should be penalised for 
unauthorised employment. 
The Riekert Commission had sought to, in effect, take influx control 
off the streets (the demand for reference books to prove legality of 
residence) and to rest it instead on the shoulders of employers and 
authorised occupiers of housing in the urban areas. The suggestion that 
the 72 hour provision could be scrapped in favour of housing and 
employment controls was disputed by the Department of Co-operation and 
Development, who were not convinced that efficient influx control 
administration could rest on housing and labour controls. Accordingly, 
the 72 hour provision would be retained pending a decision on whether or 
not it could safely be dropped from legislation. (White Paper, 1979: 9) 
E. Conclusion 
The concluding chapter will deal more fully with the continuities 
and changes in policy during the 1970s against the trends in policy of 
the 1950s and 1960s, but brief reference will be made here to the 
influences on, and uncertainties of, influx control policies during the 
1970s. 
It is certainly true to note the tougher attitude and determination 
of the Department of Co -operation and Development to maJntain and tighten 
curbs on the movement of black persons to the cities in search of 
employment opportunities during the decade. The determination to prevent 
illegal employment was being taken more seriously at the end of the 1970s 
than it was at the beginning of the decade. The higher fines for illegal 
employment announced in 1977 and the suggestions of the Riekert 
Commission for drastic action against employers, accepted in the White 
Paper, are evidence of this tougher attitude. No claims, or evidence, as 
to the success of this policy are made, or can be made; we can only note 
the increased penalties and statements as commitments to tougher action. 
Yet it is equally important to note the changes in assumptions and 
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statements of policy during this period. Where, for example, policy at 
the end of the 1960s and early 1970s was firmly rooted in the Stallardist 
tradition of te l11Porary sojourners - evidenced in the report of the Van 
Rensburg Committee and its hostility towards Section lO's provisions - by 
the end of the decade thi s assumption had been largely abandoned. The 
Riekert Commission continually stressed the need to protect the interests 
of "established workers" in urban areas as a justification for influx 
control, and of the necessi ty to retain Section lO's urban residential 
qualifications. 
This shift in emphasis did not mean that the earlier policy approach 
did not continue to attract support from within administration boards and 
in the Department of Co-operation and Development. That the appoi nted 
chairman of the East Rand Administration Board - one of the most 
important of the boards - could still propagate hardline Stallardist 
ideas in 1978, testifies to this. Van der Merwe's comments, if made in 
the 1960sc would have influenced policy in the way that statements by 
C.H. Kotz€! and A.S. Marais seem to have influenced policy in the 1960s. 
Instead, the Riekert Commission rejected such railings against Section 
10's provisions. 
This change in emphasis on these issues did not mean that the 
necessi ty for influx control was under reconsideration. On the contrary, 
many new justifications were being offered for influx control and the 
importance of possessing a Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) qualification 
became more pronounced in this context. 
Yet even though the necessity for influx control was not being 
questioned by administration board and Department of Co-operation and 
Development officials and the Riekert Commission, important differences 
of opinion on the procedures of influx were apparent throughout the 
decade. The differences between the reports of the Steenhuizen and 
Kotz€! Committees at the turn of the decade were early signs of this 
conflict. It is possible that the evidence of the administration boards 
to the Riekert Commission also reflected these uncertainties. The 
disagreement between the Riekert Commission and the Department of Co-
operation and Development over the suggestion that the 72 .hour provision 
could be dropped also reflects these differences. A close reading of the 
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Commission report indicates that it was as a result of the evidence by 
the adm i nistration boards that the Riekert Commission proposed the 
eventual abolition of the 72 hour provision 
Its optimistic assertions that influx control cou l d rest solely on 
housing and employment controls and did not need arbitrary street checks 
on legal resi dence was not supported by the Department of Co-operation 
and Development. Just prior to the finalisation of the Commission's 
recommendations, the necessity of asking blacks to prove the legality of 
their residence in urban areas was re-affirmed by Dr C.P. Mulder in 
Parliament, as quoted earlier in this chapter, and this attitude was 
again supported in the White Paper . Such statements would indicate that 
no changes coul d be expected in the near future in legislation flowing 
from the Riekert Commission 
Finally, the influence of the urban unrest in providing an impetus 
to the Riekert Commission recommendations, while needing to be 
recognised, ought not to be over-estimated on specific issues. This 
chapter has shown how many of the recommendat i ons proposed by the 
Commission which liberalised the relationship of urban blacks (Section 10 
(1) (a), (b) and (c) qualifiers) to the labour bureau were being debated 
at a then municipal administrator level as early as 1969. These early 
debates were fueled, as in the case of the Steenhuizen committee report, 
by the perceived need of some municipal administrators to ensure a more 
efficient utilisation of urban black labour . Many of their 
recommendations, although re j ected by another municipal-level committee, 
were to be proposed by the Riekert Commission eight years later, by when 
they coul d only have become more generally accepted within administration 
b,oard ranks . 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The previous chapters sketched the historical developments 
influencing the formulation of urban areas policy leading up to the 
introduction of administration boards. In explaining the development of 
legislation, particular emphasis was devoted to the attitudes of 
municipal, and later administration board, officials charged with the 
implementation of state policy and to those offici al s who served in a 
head offi ce capaci ty. In many respects, the formulation of these 
policies has been presented as an interaction between the views of these 
two sets of officials. Implicit in this treatment has been a recognition 
of the importance of their attitudes to the formulation of policy and 
hence to the powerful political position of both the municipal and head 
office administrators. Against this background, this chapter will 
consider two issues: firstly, to examine the political importance of 
bureaucratic structures against a conceptual framework and secondly, the 
justifications by the state for influx control within a changing 
administrative framework. 
A. A Conceptual Framework 
A consistent feature of the previous chapters has been the extent to 
which offici al s in the head office of what is now the Department of Co-
operation and Development played an overtly political role in the 
development of legislation during the 1950s .and 1960s, the major focus of 
this study. So, too, did officials in the municipalities whether they 
supported government policies or not. Their statements, as quoted in 
this study, were political because they were designed to influence policy 
in a way which went far beyond purely administrative concerns. This 
tendency to exceed administrative concerns and to attempt to shape 
government policy will be examined against Max Weber's conceptual 
framework of the nature of bureaucratic power after which specific 
reference to empirical data will be analysed. 
Weber's analysi s of the nature of bureaucratic power attempted to 
explain the political importance of the Prussian bureaucracy - how it 
came to play such a crucial role, what the consequences of this were to 
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the functioning of the political system and how it could be controlled. 
His analysis has three components; firstly, a categorisation of 
bureaucracy as a technically efficient instrument of administration, 
secondly, its tendency to exceed its administrative function and to enter 
the political arena and, thirdly, that state bureaucracies reflected the 
class structure of the society in which they operated. 
Weber's characterisation of the component parts of a bureaucratic 
structure and the soci etal precondi tions necessary for its emergence need 
not be examined in any detail, suffi ce to note tha t he argued tha t the 
term applied only to that form of administration that was " ..• fully 
developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern 
state, and in the private economy, only in the most advanced institutions 
of capitalism". (Gerth and Mills, 1947: 196) The term was thus used by 
Weber to denote a form of administration synonymous with administration 
in an advanced economy, and accordingly the most technically efficient 
structure of administration yet evolved. 
As Beetham (Beetham, 1974: 71) notes, Weber formulated these 
characteristics in his Economy and Society whereas the theme of his 
political writings was of "its tendency to become an independant social 
and political force with distinct values of its own and a capacity to 
effect the ends and culture of society". * 
The first factor identified by Weber in explaining the political 
importance of bureaucracies was a consequence of those very aspects which 
he had identified as establising the administrative superiority of 
bureaucratic administration. Thus not only was bureaucratic 
administration defined by these factors but they were responsible for its 
tendency to enter the pol i tica 1 arena. 
"This is the nub of Weber's critique; this is where he saw the 
aniJivalence of bureaucratic rationality . The very qualities 
which made it such a technically effective form of 
administration - knowledge and expertise protected by secrecy, 
* This discussion of Weber's writings on bureaucracy draws heavily on 
Beetham's account because Weber's political writings have not been 
translated.4 
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the confi dence in its own superior competence and impartiality 
- al so gave it the means and the impetus to wiel d power beyond 
its inherent l imitations. This was not an acc i dental 
phenomenon, but integral to its nature." (Beetham, 1974: 79) 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the entry of civil servants into 
the political arena held the danger of government by officials, or what 
Weber called "Beamtenherrschaft", unless strong p~ i tical control was 
exercised by politicians over the civil service. Weber defined rule by 
officials as occuring either through the appointment of civil servants to 
. important pol i tical posts or informally where officials directed the 
determination of pol i cy through the weakness of the pol itical head of the 
government department. His condemnation of this state of affa irs as an 
aberration of the proper function of a bureaucracy was prompted not only 
by his analysis of the consequences this had caused Germany but also 
because Weber saw the role of politician and civil servant as being 
fundamentally different. While politicians had to take personal 
responsibi lity for their actions and policies and their career depended 
on their ability to attain support, this was very different to the secure 
and gradual career paths of civil servants . As Weber declared: 
"The position of the modern administrative offi cial is totally 
unfavourable to the development of pol i tical self-
assurance .. . The arena of the modern politician is struggle in 
Parl i ament and country and there is no substitute for this -
least of all the orderly competition for career advancement." 
(Beetham, 1974: 77) 
The capaci ty of a state bureaucracy to enter the political arena 
gave them the abili4Y to influence political deci sions, often from the 
claimed perspective of being "true interpreters of the national 
interest" . 
Weber's second reason for pointing to the political role of a state 
bureaucracy stemmed from his refusal to see the Prussian bureaucracy as a 
neutral force in Prussi an society, as traditional accounts held, standing 
above the interests of party and class . Instead, Weber and his brother 
argued that the basi s of recrui tment to the bureaucracy was from the 
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upper classes, so firmly linking the interests of class with those of the 
administrative sector. As his brother Alfred declared in 1909 when the 
two brothers attacked the traditional view: 
"It is a fundamental error to imagine that bureacracy has the 
characteristic of being independent of any social basis. It 
finds its social basis in those power groups which secure the 
organisation of society." (Beetham, 1974: 66) 
In similar vein, Weber himself declared: 
"The party interests of the conservative officialdom in power, 
and of the interest groups associated with them, control the 
direction of affairs alone." (Beetham, 1974: 155) 
How then, if Weber argued that the political role of a civil service 
was an inevitable consequence of its administrative characteristics and 
of the social classes from which it recruited its personnel, did he 
propose to prevent it from exceeding purely administrative interests? The 
answer he gave was a combination of constitutional mediation between 
parliament and civil service and also of ideal qualities Weber thought a 
pol i ti ci an ought to possess,. The cons t i tut i onal rel ationship between 
parliament and civil service ought to secure a parliament with strong 
powers to which the government was answerable. His stress on the correct 
constitutional structure was designed not only to ensure accountability 
of the government but also because he argued that a strong parliament 
recruited and promoted strong leadership capable of making decisions and 
taking responsibili1;y for them. Weber contrasted the British parliament 
with that of the token constitutionalism of Russia and Germany of his 
time to illustrate his argument. Yet one senses that he recognised the 
extreme di ffi cul ty attached to securi ng pol i tical control over 
bureaucratic interests regardless of the form of the political structure 
whe n he wrote: 
"Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully 
developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The 'political 
master' finds himself in the position of a 'diletante' who 
stands opposite the 'expert', facing the trained of"dcial who 
'" r+ r+ 
'" ::;, 
r+ 
'" 
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stands wi thi n the management of admini stration. This hol ds 
whether the master .. . is a people .. . or parliament ... an 
aristocratic collegiate body . .. or a popularly elected 
president, a hereditary monarch, or a constitional monarch." 
(Gerth and Mills, 1947: 232) 
The importance of Max Weber's analysis of bureaucratic power lies in 
his recognition of the various sources of this power and of the 
imperative need to control and limit the exercise of this political power 
by persons who bear no direct responsibility for decisions \~hich they 
t 
make . What insights does Weber's analysis hold for the empirical data 
di scussed in the previous chapters? 
At the outset it must be noted that the data deal s with the 
attitudes and interests of two sets of bureaucratic structures - the 
municipal officials, who were not civil servants in the conventional 
sense, and the senior officials in the head office of what is now the 
Department of Co-operation and Development. It must al so be noted that 
no direct evidence has been presented of the mechanics of decision making 
within the Department of Co-operation and Development or, perhaps more 
.especially when wishing to examine any political influence of these 
senior ci vil servants, of the relationship between these ci vil servants 
and the political head of the department. Neither has any data been 
presented of decision making within the National Party government during 
the 1950s and 1960s . Thus any judgements of whether the municipal or 
head office administrators played a political role in the formulation of 
policy must rest on the extent and the kind of issues raised by municipal 
administrators taken up by the head office administrators and later 
passed into law or proclaimed in regulations . 
To start with the municipal administrators: a major theme of the 
preceeding chapters has been the extent to which municipal 
administrators, as a corps of officials, were divided in their responses 
to issues of racial policy along lines closely approximating party 
political control of the munic i palities. Yet these divisions should not 
be allowed to obscure the large measure of agreement between these 
offi ci al s over the necessi ty for influx control measures, although they 
di d differ on how severe legislation ought to be. Ever si nce the urban 
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areas legislation of 1923, municipal officials have maintained an 
extraordinarily keen interest in urban areas policy. Ideological 
considerations aside, this interest was due to municipal concern over the 
fi nanci al costs invol ved to the white ratepayers of administering urban 
townships which could not pay their own way when measured against need 
and aggravated by new entrants to urban areas. These financial issues 
became inevitably politicised since official policy denied the right of 
urban townships to exist as a permanent, stable urban community. 
The over-riding impression of the proceedings of the lANA congresses 
of the 1950s and 1960s is the extent of the politicisation of municipal 
officials with regard to issues of racial policy. The debates were 
notable for the extensive discussions on topical issues which were never 
far removed from the political arena. Responses to problems encountered 
in the implementation of policy often saw leading municipal officials, 
who supported government policy, suggesting far-reaching changes to 
overcome these problems. These suggestions would, at the same time, have 
established new principles of policy. 
The best example of this is to be found in the on-going debate 
during the 1960s and early 1970s over Section 10's provisions for urban 
residence. Enthusiastic proponents of a drastic revision of these 
provisions, such as A.S. Marais and Dr P.J. Riekert, were suggesting 
nothing less than new policy directions. While it can certainly be 
conceded that the provisions of Section 10 did cause certain 
administrative problems to municipal officials, their responses to these 
problems became political when these administrators suggested changes in 
legislation which were fundamentally different to the existing 
legislation. 
Within the Department, these tendencies were more clearly 
established. The report of the Van Rensburg Committee is notable for 
showing how future legislation was formulated by civil servants, often 
after sympathetic municipal administrators had first raised these issues. 
The 1968 regulations governing access to family housing can, for example, 
be traced back to earl i er concern by conservative munici pal 
administrators that access to family housing was not being sufficiently 
strictly applied with consequences for acquisitions of Section 10 
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qualifications. The Van Rensburg Committee's suggestion that the 
advisory boards and Urban Bantu Councils be scrapped - even though not 
acted upon - is another example. That the Committee could have suggested 
such a course of action, with major political implications, testifies to 
a political confidence on their part vis-A-vis the political head of the 
then Department of Bantu Administration and Development and towards 
Government policy. 
The most obvious explanation for the politicisation of municipal and 
head office administrators lies in the fundamental importance of racial 
issues to the determination of general party policy to "white" politics 
in South Africa. Their interests stemmed not only from their 
responsibility for the implementation of legislation of this crucial 
divide in South African politics, but from a feeling that political 
decisions on racial policy affected white interests as a whole and hence 
their own, as individuals. The powerful political position of the 
municipal and head office administrators was re-inferced by the franchise 
inequalities of South African society. The denial of the franchise to 
black persons for the election of the central government meant that they 
were not, and are still not, in a position to ensure the accountability 
of the administrators, via the political head of the Department of Co-
operation and Development, for decisions which they make. This inability 
was all the more important since political decisions affecting 
adminstrative matters were being made. 
As Weber pointed out, the political interests of a bureaucracy were 
also derived from the basis of recruitment to it. In the South African 
context, recrui tment to either the municipalities or the central 
department was restricted to whites while, at an informal level, 
preferences for a career in the 
Afrikaans speaking South Africans. 
civil service were mainly expressed by 
By 1966, Afrikaners accounted for 71 
per cent of the posi tions in the Civil Service, with higher percentages 
in the prisons service and the police force (Van Wyk, quoted in Van der 
Merwe et al., 1974: 80) Given that the basis of support for the ruling 
National Party government during this period was over-whelmingly derived 
from Afrikaans speaking South Africans, this served as an important link 
between civil service and government. This link was further established 
by the educational process. Many of the senior municipal administrators 
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were graduates of Afrikaans medium universities whose intellectuals 
played a major role in providing justifications for government pol icy. 
Such intellectual s attended and often addressed lANA conferences during 
the 1950s and 1960s. Among the more prominent were Professor N.J.J. 
Olivier of Stellenbosch, Professor B.S. van As of the University of South 
Africa and Professor R. Coertze of the University of Pretoria. The South 
African Bureau of Racial Affairs should also be seen in this context. Its 
journal frequently publ i shed contributions by municipal or head office 
admini strators sympathetic to government pol icy. 
To conclude: Weber's analysis of the political role of 
bureaucracies, derived particularly from his observations of the Prussian 
civil service, provides a basis for explaining and conceptualising the 
importance and interest of municipal (later administration board) 
officials and departmental officials in the development and formulation 
of urban areas policy. Within the limits of the material surveyed in 
this study, the conclusion that these officials as a corps were active 
and keen participants in the formulation of government policy in a way 
which went beyond an interest in the administrative consequences of state 
policies is firmly established. 
B. Administration Boards and Influx Control 
The data presented in the previous chapters has shown the intimate 
connections between the establishment of administration boards in 1972 
and 1973 and state policies towards the regulation of black labour and, 
more particularly, influx control. Indeed, the primary reason for their 
establishment can be traced directly to issues of influx control although 
this issue was down-played in official explanations for their 
establishment, as can be seen from an examination of the Parliamentary 
debate in 1971. And just as issues of influx control were related to 
their establishment, so too at the end of the 1970s were these wider 
issues prominent in considerations on the future role of the boards. 
These links between labour policies and the institutional structures 
should be traced more closely. 
The beginning of the end of municipal responsiblity for the 
administration of urban townships came 20 years after the election 
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victory of the National Party when the Department of Bantu Admin i stration 
and Development circulated the draft bill for the establishment of Bantu 
Labour Boards. The circulation of these proposal s si gna11ed the 
intention of the Department to assume more direct control over the 
implementation of labour regulation on the basis of the recommendations 
of the Van Rensburg Committee report. Although the Bill was withdrawn, 
it was soon replaced by the first draft of the Bantu Affairs 
Administration Board Bill . 
The termination of municipal administration of labour and housing 
policies was the culmination of a series of developments between 1967 and 
1971 - such as the institution of compulsory one year contracts for 
migrant labourers, the ban on the provision of further family housing in 
urban areas, and the concerted drive to resettle " redundants" in the 
homelands - which were the most important developments in urban black 
administration since the package of legislation piloted through 
Parliament in 1952, as described in chapter two. 
In this respect, the introduction of the boards came at a high point 
in the formulation and implementation of the policy of temporary 
sojourners, which linked the presence of blacks in urban areas solely 
with their usefulness as employees in white owned industries and 
manufacturing. And yet, it is surprising that the State took so long to 
end municipal responsibility especially when viewed against the continual 
conflicts between the larger United Party controlled municipalities and 
the Department during the 1950s . The firm rejection of any such 
suggestions by Dr H.F. Verwoerd, as Minister of Native Affairs, indicates 
that in spite of these severe strains his department was prepared to 
continue using the municipa1i ties as agents for the implementation of 
pol icy . Why then were the first steps to end municipal responsib1ity 
only acted on during the 1ate-1960s? 
The report of the Van Rensburg Committee shows that even though 
municipal-departmental relationships were not as openly stormy as they 
had been a decade earlier, the United Party controlled municipalities 
were still seen as politically, and hence administratively, unreliable. 
But what the report does also indicate is the marked hardening of policy 
towards urban blacks which became noticeable early in the 1960s with the 
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unfol ding of the homelands pol icy with its political implications for 
urban residents. This hardening of policy and attitudes is most clearly 
shown by the consi stent attacks on the provisions of Section 10 of the 
Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 by conservative 
administrators. 
The amendments to Section 10 in 1952 were seen as having been a 
grave mistake, not only because such administrators argued that it 
complicated and undermined influx control, but also because it was seen 
to create a political right to permanent residence in urban areas by 
blacks. These arguments were noted in chapter three and four. The 
amendments in 1964 to Section 29 of the same Act, bringing Section 10 
qualifiers within the ambit of removal from urban areas if they were 
deemed idle and undesirable, was an extension of these arguments. 
The repeal or drastic amendment of Section 10 was held out 
throughout the 1960s (and even into the 1970s) as necessary and imminent 
to establish the proper status of blacks in "White" South Africa. This 
was just, however, one aspect of this hardening of policy. Other 
examples include the changes to the conditions of recruitment of labour 
for urban industries, their housing, and the necessity to clamp down on 
the widespread use of illegal labour. 
The Van Rensburg committee report is notable for how close it came 
to arguing that influx control was unenforceable under the then 
prevailing administrative apparatuses and legislation. Given that 
official attitudes towards influx control were based on the assumption 
that influx control was strictly enforceable, the arguments in the report 
showing the deficiencies were obviously used to seriously reconsider the 
structures and legislation of influx control. The hardening of policy in 
the late 1960s - of which the administration boards were a product - came 
directly from the Van Rensburg Committee. 
I twas thi s hardening of atti tude by the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development towards these issues coupled with residual 
doubts over the reliability of the United Party controlled municipalities 
for the implementation of central government policy that explains the 
introduction of the administration boards. 
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But just as the administration boards were shaped by these forces, 
by the end of the 1970s a changed set of ideological and political 
factors was causing a re-examination and restructuring of urban black 
administration with implications for the boards. The unrest across urban 
areas from June 1976 - the first major manifestation of opposition to 
government policies since the banning of the African National Congress 
and the Pan African Congress in 1960 - fundamentally al tered the 
political milieu within which the boards operated. In particular, the 
need to create more acceptable and powerful structures of local 
government for the urban black community held potentially far-reaching 
consequences for the boards. It implied that their more overt 
involvement in local authority matters in the townships had to be reduced 
in favour of these newer local authority structures, the community 
councils. The communi1;y councils were introduced from 1977, replacing 
the largely di scredi ted Urban Bantu council sand advi sory boards. 
This did not mean, however, that the administration boards 
involvement in administering influx control, or the justification for 
influx control measures, were similarly being re-examined. On the 
contrary, the report of the Riekert Commission and subsequent government 
response indicated that even tougher action against influx control 
offenders, whether employer or employee, had to be enforced, with a newer" 
justification for influx control being advanced. Ouri n9 the 1950s and 
1960s, offici al justifications for influx control curbs concerned the 
need to ensure sufficient labour for the farming sector while during the 
1960s the justifications were linked rather to the consequences of the 
homelands policy - which was meant to ensure that blacks in urban areas 
woul d be temporary and pol i tica lly ri ghtless sojourners, whil e di rect i ng 
black urbanisation to homeland dormitory towns. Although the more extreme 
versions of this pol icy were largely abandoned during the late 1970s and 
replaced by a guarded recognition of the permanent nature of the urban 
black communities, the consequences of the earl ier approach were not 
rejected. The concept of homeland citizenship remained intact with its 
long term consequences appreci ably strengthened during the late 1970s by 
the denial of any secure right to residence and employment to children 
born in urban areas to parents deemed to be citizens of independent 
homelands. Homeland ci tizenship, in this instance, is an agent of influx 
control, born of orthodox Verwoerdian philosophy. 
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Contemporary justifications for influx control - as advanced by the 
Riekert Commission - now rely on the arguments which municipal 
administrators were advocating during the 1940s after the influx to the 
cities, namely that it be accepted as a principle of urbanisation policy 
that the ri ghts and pri vileges of already urbanised blacks be protected 
from competition from new entrants to the cities. The likelihood that 
this principle will form the basis of future justifications for influx 
control is strengthened when it is appreciated that only a third of the 
black population of South Africa and the independent homelands are 
presently urbanised. (Cilliers and Groenewald, 1982: Table 3) 
In conclusion, the data presented in this study has shown the vital 
importance of the attitudes of municipal (later administration board) 
officials and of the officials in the Department of Co-operation and 
Development to the formulation, particularly during the 1960s, of a 
conservative, authoritarian urban areas policy, and especially as regards 
influx control. This suggests that unless strong political leadership is 
exercised in the future over these officials, restricting their interests 
in policy formulation to more narrowly administrative concerns, their 
attitudes will continue to shape the pol i tical course of future urban 
areas policy at a time when major changes are essential. 
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APPENDIX A: Amendments to Section 10 (1) of the Blacks (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945 
The most important single piece of legislation governing entry into 
urban areas is Section 10 (1) of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consol i dation 
Act, No. 25 of 1945. The tightening of requirements for entry and 
permanent residence rights in urban areas is reflected in the major 
amendments to Section 10 (1) during this period. 
As noted in the text, Section 10 in the revision of urban areas 
legislation in 1945, contained no influx control measures which were 
automatically applicable. Instead, the invoking of these measures was 
depende nt on a deci si on by the Governor General. The text read: 
"10. (1) The Governor-General shall, if requested to do so by a 
resolution adopted by a duly constituted meeting of any urban 
local authority, by proclamation in the Gazette, declare that 
from and after a date to be specified therein no native shall 
enter the urban area under the jurisdiction of that urban local 
authority for the purpose of seeking or taking up employment or 
residing therein, otherwise than in accordance with conditions 
to be prescribed by the Governor-General in that proclamation; 
and the Governor-General may at any time after consultation 
witht he urban local authority concerned, of his own motion 
issue any such proclamation in respect of any urban area ~ " 
In 1952, however, Section 10 was fundamentally altered. Now, influx 
control was automatically applicable throughout the Union and 
differential residential qualifications were laid down. The 72 hour 
, 
provision was part of this amendment. The amendment read: 
"10. (1) No native shall remain for more than seventy-two hours 
in an urban area or in a proclaimed area in respect of which an 
urban local authority exercises any of the powers referred to 
in sUb-section (1) of section twenty-three or in any area 
forming part of a proclaimed area and in respect of which an 
urban local authority exercises any of those powers, unless -
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(a) he was born and permanently resides in such area; or 
(b) he has worked continuously in such area for one employer 
for a peri od of not 1 es s tha n ten years or has 1 awfully 
remained continuously in such area for a period of not 
less than fifteen years and has not during either period 
been convicted of any offence in respect of which he has 
been sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a 
fine for a period of more than seven days or with the 
option of a fine for a period of more than one month; or 
(c) such native is the wife, unmarried daughter or son under 
the age at which he would become liable for payment of 
general tax under the Natives Taxation and Development 
Act, 1925 (Act No. 41 of 1925), of any native mentioned in 
paragraph (a) or (b) of this sUb-section and ordinarily 
resides with that native; or 
(d) permission so to remain has been granted to him by a 
person designated for the purpose by that urban local 
authori ty. 
In 1957, the first major amendment in Section 10 (1) was introduced 
to close loopholes in the previous wording. The amendments introduced by 
the Native Laws Amendments Act, No. 36 of 1957, affected mainly Section 
10 (1) (a) or (b) but a comprehensive re-phrasing of Section 10 (1) (d) 
was also introduced. The most important changes are underlined. 
"10. (1) No native shall remain for more than seventy-two hours 
in an urban area or in a proclaimed area in respect of which an 
urban local authority exercises any of the powers referred to 
in sUb-section (1) of section twenty-three or in any area 
forming part of a proclaimed area and in respect of which an 
urban local authori~ exercises any of those powers, unless -
(a) he has, since birth, resided continuously in such area; or 
(b) he has worked continuously in such area for one employer 
for a period of not less than ten years or has 1 awfully 
resided continuously in such area for a period of not less 
than fifteen years, and .has thereafter continued to reside 
in such area and is not employed outside such area and has 
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not during either period or thereafter been sentenced to a 
fine exceeding fifty pounds or to imprisonment for a 
period exceeding six months; or 
(c) such native is the wife, unmarried daughter or son under 
the age at which he would become liable for payment of 
general tax under the Native Taxation and Development Act, 
1925 (Act No. 41 or 1925), or any native mentioned in 
paragraph (a) or (b) of this sUb-section and ordinarily 
resides with that native; or 
(d) in the case of a native who is not a workseeker as defined 
in section one of the Native Labour Regulation Act, 1911 
(Act No. 15 of 1911), and is not required to be dealt with 
by a labour bureau as provided for in any regulations 
framed under paragraph (0) of sub-section (1) of section 
twenty-three of that Act, permission so to remain has been 
granted to him by an officer designated for the purpose by 
.the urban local authority concerned or in the case of a 
native who is a workseeker, permission has been granted to 
him by such labour bureau to take up employment in such 
area. 
Provided that whenever any native who is under this sub-section 
qualified to remain within any such area for a period in excess 
of seventy-two hours becomes disqualified so to remain and 
cannot within that area or any other such area but outsi de a 
scheduled native area or released area as defined in the Native 
Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act No. 18 of 1936), obtain 
employment and accommodation for himself, his wife and 
children, if any, the Minister shall, if satisfied that such 
native cannot so obtain employment and such accommodation 
provide that native with a residential site within any such 
schedul ed nati ve area or such rel eased area." 
In 1964, the amendment severely curtailed the ability of wives to join 
their husbands in urban proclaimed areas which now became prescribed 
areas. Section 10 (1) (c) was amended to read: 
"10. (1) No Bantu shall remain for more than seventy-two hours 
in a prescribed area unless he produces proof in the manner 
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prescribed that -
(a) he has, since birth, resided continuously in such area; or 
(b) he has worked continuously in such area for one employer 
for a period of not less than ten years or has lawfully 
resided continuously in such area for a period of not less 
than fifteen years, and has -thereafter continued to r.eside 
in such area and is not employed outside such area and has 
not during either period or thereafter been sentenced to a 
fine exceeding one hundred rand or to imprisonment for a 
period exceeding six months; or 
(c) such Bantu is the wife, unmarried daughter or son under 
the age at which he woul d become li able for payment of 
general tax under the Native Taxation and Development Act, 
1925 (Act No. 41 of 1925), of any Bantu mentioned in 
paragraph (a) or (b) of this SUb-section and after lawful 
entry into such prescribed area, ordinarly resides with 
that Bantu in such area; or 
(d) in the case of any other Bantu, permission so to remain 
has been granted by an officer appointed to manage a 
labour bureau in terms of the provisions of paragraph (a) 
of SUb-section (6) of section twenty-one ter of the Native 
Labour Regulation Act, 1911 (Act No. 15 of 1911), due 
regard being had to the availabiltiy of accommodation in a 
Bantu residential area: 
Provided that whenever any Bantu who is under this sub-section 
qualified to remain within any such area for a period in excess 
of seventy-two hours, becomes disqualified so to remain and 
cannot within that area or any other such area or outside such 
area but outside a scheduled native area or released area as 
defi ned in the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act No. 18 of 
1936), obtain employment and accommodation for himself, his 
wife and children, if any, the Minister shall, if satisfied 
that such Bantu cannot so obtain employment and such 
accommodation, provide that Bantu with a residential site 
within any such scheduled native area or such released area." 
Minor amendments to Section 10 (1) have been made since 1964 and it 
now (1982) reads as follows: 
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"10. (1) No Black shall remain for more than seventy-two hours 
in a prescribed area unless he produces proof in the manner 
prescribed that -
(a) he has, since birth, resided continuously in such area; or 
(b) he has worked continuously in such area for one employer 
for a period of not less than ten years or has lawfully 
resided continuously in such area for a period of not less 
than fifteen years, and has thereafter continued to res i de 
in such area and is not employed outside such area and has 
not during either period or thereafter been sentenced to a 
fine exceeding five hundred rand or to imprisonment for a 
period exceeding si x months; or 
(c) such Black is the wife, the unmarried daughter, or the son 
under the age of eighteen years, of any Black mentioned in 
paragraph (a) or (b) of this sUb-section and, after lawful 
entry into such prescribed area, ordi narily resi des with 
that Black in such area; or 
(d) in the case of any other Black, permission so to remain 
has been granted by an officer appointed to manage a 
labour bureau in terms of the provisions of paragraph (a) 
of sUb-section (6) of section twenty-three ter of the 
Black Labour Regulation Act, 1911 (Act No. 15 of 1911), 
due regard being had to the availability of accommodation 
in a Black residential area: 
Provided that whenever any Black who is under this sub-section 
qualified to remain within any such area for a period in excess 
of seventy-two hours, becomes disqualified so to remain and 
cannot within that area or any other such area or outside such 
area but outside scheduled Black area or released area as 
defi ned in the Development Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act No. 18 
of 1936), obtain employment and accol11l1Odation for himself, his 
wife and children, if any, the Minister shall, if satisfied 
that such Black cannot so obtain employment and such 
accommodation, provide that Black with a residential site 
within any such scheduled Black area or such released area." 
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APPENDIX B: The Structure of Administration Boards and their 
Relatjonship to the Department of Co-operation and Deyelopment 
A. The Structure of the Board 
Perhaps the most useful way of approachi ng the structure of 
administration boards is to compare them with white local authorities. 
Formally, when referring to an administration board, what is being 
referred to is the Ministerially appointed body consisting of 
representatives of white local authorities, agriculture, commerce and 
industry and representatives of the State. These representatives are 
appointed by the Minister in terms of his powers under Section 3 (1) of 
the Act. The cha i rman and the vi ce-cha irman are also des i gnated by the 
Minister; thus the chairman is responsible to the Minister for the proper 
functioning of the Board. Most chairmen fill the post in a part-time 
capaci ty but three or four are appointed in a full-time capacity. The 
officials of the boards - the employees - are appointed and paid by the 
Board. The chief director is the chief executive official. It is worth 
noting that with the establishment of the boards, most of the staff came 
from the Non-European Affairs Departments of the municipalities. 
Thus, in a comparison with white local authorities, the appointed 
board has the same relationship to the chief director as the elected town 
council has to the town clerk. 
Besides the department of the chief director, most administration 
boards divide their staff into six departments - administration, finance, 
technical services, trading (including sorghum beer production and 
sales), labour (manpower), and community services. This latter 
department normally has responsibil i ty for housing and the commmunity 
councils (previously the advisory boards and the Urban Bantu Councils) 
within the board's jurisdiction. Each of these departments is normally 
headed by a director, responsible to the chief director. 
B. Administration Board-Department of Co-operation and Development 
relations 
While the most obvious, and important, relationship of the 
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administration board to the Department of Co-operation and Development is 
through the Ministerial power of appointment of the board, the 
administration boards are responsible to the Department is other 
important ways. 
At a day-to-day level, the eight Chief Commissioners are the 
Department's most direct link to the boards. The Chief Commissioners -
the senior regional offici al s of the Department controlling the 
commissioner's offices responsible for quasi-judicial functions and the 
payment of pensions and other state grants - are normally, if not in all 
cases, the State represent~tives on the board. All correspondence, 
policy instructions and queries between the Department and the boards 
are directed through the Chief Commissioner's office. A further link 
between the boards and the Chief Commissioner, as the regional 
representative of the Department, is the necessity for all applications 
for use of contract labour (Section 10(1) (d) cases) to be approved by 
the Chief Commissioner's office before the contract labourer may enter 
the urban area and start employment. The labour bureaux of the board 
deal with the application, process it and then forward it to the Chief 
Commissioner with a recommendation of approval or rejection but it is the 
Chief Commissioner who formally approves such applications. 
Departmental supervision and control over the boards is however also 
exerci sed through a vari ety of other ways, many of them had been 
applicable to the municipalities before 1971. The Blacks (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act of 1945 is the most important in this regard. Amongst 
these powers are the necessi ty for the Minister to approve and authori se 
the annual budgets of the boards ( and the community councils), the 
layout of new townships and housing schemes, the licensing by the 
Minister of certain key officials in the employ of the Board (this now 
seems a matter of course), and by the inability of the board to make 
regulations. This power is vested in the Minister. Further, the 
accounts of the boards are audited annually by the Audi tor General and 
tabled in Parl i ament. Parl i amentary Select Committees can, and have, 
investigated the reports of the Auditor General and questioned 
administration board officials on issues raised in these reports. 
Under these condi tions, Departmental supervision of administration 
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board activities, if not already comphrehensive, is at the very least 
potentially far-reaching. This extensive control derives surely from the 
aims underlying the introduction of the boards. 
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